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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a theoretical model to explain the creation of international behavioural 
norms drawing on two literatures: Constructivism in International Relations and the 
Sociology of Knowledge. This theoretical model draws attention to the interplay between 
scientific knowledge and normative concerns in the process of norms creation, to the role of 
non-state actors in norm construction, as well as to the importance of states in normative 
negotiations. I have also sought to uncover different types of power that both states and 
non-state actors have employed and the tactics of bargaining and persuasion which prevail 
and lead to the successful creation of international norms. 
The proposed theoretical model is applied to three case-studies, which are the creation of 
the norm outlawing the use of torture, the norm protecting intellectual property rights in the 
pharmaceutical industry, and the norm for the protection of the atmosphere from the effects 
of human activities to prevent or slow down global warming. The historical reconstruction 
of events leading up to the legalisation and operationalisation of these norms has revealed 
important similarities in the way that these norms were negotiated. There is a resemblance 
in the manner in which scientific knowledge and normative beliefs interacted. All three 
case-studies exposed the degree to which non-state actors – NGOs, scientific communities, 
advocacy organisations, religious groups, businesses, etc. – participated in the creation of 
international norms, and although this is not a new concept in itself, it is worth 
reconsidering its intensity and the role of these actors in world politics. My research into 
the development of these three international norms has also emphasised the need for a 
better understanding of the points of closure in scientific, normative, and political debates. I 
argue that the way in which closure is reached is directly relevant to the strength, 
effectiveness and authority of the norm created. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Questions of international order and justice, of international law and power have 
been getting an increasing amount of media coverage, public and research interest in the 
dynamic context of world politics after the end of the Cold War. I have always had a great 
interest in understanding the evolution of social perceptions in general and of international 
norms in particular. This combined with my long-standing interest in the nexus between 
international relations theories and practice and prompted me to search for theoretical 
proposals that matched the development of various international norms relating generally to 
the protection of people. The existing research on international norms puts ample emphasis 
on issues of norm compliance and state behaviour in the context of the growing legalisation 
of world politics, and it aims to understand the behavioural choices that states make. 
Existing studies, however, do not seem to provide a comprehensive explanation of state 
actions neither prior to the creation of international norms nor in the process of their 
development. The current research is not concerned with norm compliance; instead it 
focuses on the question of how international norms come into existence. The niche between 
the inception of a normative idea and the point at which we question norm compliance 
provides fertile ground for theorising the practice of international politics. 
This research seeks to explore the process of norm development in world politics. 
The causal variables, the influence of the international politico-economic context, the 
nature, power, and interests of the actors involved in the process of norm creation, all 
influence the norms that are constructed. International norms are a product of a sequence of 
closures and consensus reached at different levels of analysis, which makes them permeate 
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the social and political fabric of international relations even before they become established 
principles of state behaviour. International norms are socially constructed and result from a 
complex and dynamic socio-political exchange among actors with conflicting views, 
interests and priorities. International norms are aimed at regulating behaviour and are 
created to address a problem or an injustice, which in turn means that norms combine an 
ethical element, assigning moral values and a technical element, determining practical 
solutions. Norms should not be considered as only ethical or only technical because that 
would undermine our understanding of their very nature and would hinder our perspective 
on their development and role.   
This research aims to understand the process of norm creation and the factors 
involved in this process. International norms are socially constructed; they are a part of the 
flow of politics and if we assume that they are exogenously given, we are interrupting this 
flow and risking overlooking important causal mechanisms in the behaviour of states. 
Examining norm development will reveal dynamics that might have been ignored by 
existing approaches to world politics, and will attempt to take into account actors’ identities 
and interests as a determinant of their actions and aims. Studying the complexity of 
international negotiations will outline the causes of normative change and the 
circumstances in which actors agree to amend their social constructions of appropriate 
behaviour. 
In other words, the conceptual problem to which this research seeks to respond is 
two-fold. Firstly, understanding the process of norm creation in more depth will 
demonstrate that norms have a normative and a technical side where the normative side is 
not necessarily reflective of what is considered ‘good’ for or by the public. The example of 
the norm for the protection of intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector, 
which is explored in detail in Chapter 4, illustrates the high probability of creating a ‘bad’ 
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norm, which caters for the economic interests of a limited social group. At the same time, 
all three case-studies presented here demonstrate the central role of technical knowledge in 
constructing the causal relationships that underlie the normative concerns. And secondly, 
this research seeks to demonstrate that norms are not exogenously given, and also that the 
process of their evolution may account for the ensuing state behaviour. It is essential, I 
argue, to understand the process of norm creation, as it accounts for the character, strength, 
and effectiveness of the resulting norm.  
The principal hypothesis of this research is that normative ideas have similar and 
logically ordered paths of evolution, where the actors involved aim at generating scientific 
knowledge and formulating normative beliefs in a way that will secure support for a new 
behavioural norm. Many behavioural norms that are part of the international normative 
environment today can be traced back to moral beliefs held by individuals or to normative 
campaigns led by different institutions or organisations. What forces help individual ideas 
to develop into international legal rules or non-legal norms that bind states across the 
world? What are the necessary conditions that turn a normative campaign into an integral 
part of our constructions of appropriate behaviour? Who determines which moral principles 
will grow to become a behavioural norm and which ones will be discarded? Are there 
favourable factors within the political and social environment, which affect positively norm 
creation? Why are some norms questioned and challenged and others are not? An essential 
goal of this research is to develop a theoretical framework through which answers to these 
questions can be found.  
A further contribution of this research to the wider context of international relations 
theory and practice lies with a pragmatic approach to international policy-making and an 
improved understanding of complex international negotiations on standards of appropriate 
behaviour. A pragmatic approach to international relations will be based on the acceptance 
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of the fact that social relations are highly dense, that social processes are influenced by a 
large array of factors that cannot always be accounted for, and that contingencies play a 
significant role in international politics.  
The study of the process of norm development is vital for addressing the conceptual 
problems discussed earlier. Understanding norm evolution will involve breaking down the 
process of norm development in distinct stages that lead to normative change, and studying 
the channels through which ideas travel to become legal rules or non-legal norms. This 
analysis is best conducted through the historical reconstruction of the events leading up to 
the creation of a given norm. In this way, we can also begin to appreciate the influence of 
the wider political and normative concept on the construction of international norms. It is 
argued here that similar factors influence ideas to evolve into successful norms. Solid 
scientific knowledge and strong normative arguments help a normative campaign pick up 
speed and support, and draw the attention of policy-makers. Historically reconstructing this 
process will provide useful insight not only into the mechanisms of international policy-
making, but also into the power relationships among states, between states and non-state 
actors, and the interplay between the different levels of analysis of the international system. 
Understanding the dynamics of the norm creation process might provide insight into when 
and how this process can be influenced or changed. An improved conceptualisation of 
international negotiations, of causes and effects, and of successful negotiating tactics can 
offer useful tips for international campaigners and a more profound idea of who the movers 
and shakers of the international system are.  
The theories that provide the most useful tools for conducting this research are the 
conventional constructivism in international relations and the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. On the one hand, the need to engage the methodology of process tracing in re-
creating the evolution of norms points to conventional constructivism as the appropriate 
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theoretical approach.1 On the other hand, it is crucial that the above two literatures are 
engaged in conjunction with each other because of their expertise in analysing dynamic 
social relations and questioning what already exists as ‘hard fact’, as natural and given. 
While “conventional constructivism [aims] to ‘denaturalise’ the social world, that is, to 
empirically discover and reveal how the institutions and practices and identities that people 
take as natural and given, are, in fact, the product of human agency, of social 
construction”,2 the sociology of scientific knowledge is concerned with “what comes to 
count as a scientific fact and how it comes so to count”.3 The social constructivists of 
international relations examine the interplay between the material and the ideational in 
explaining state behaviour and state decision-making. Social constructivists have also paid 
attention to the role of non-state actors in world politics, which have emerged as new nodes 
of power in the global system most notably over the past forty years. This research takes 
advantage of the findings of conventional constructivism in these areas, as well as the 
research tools applied to the processes of historical reconstruction of events. These findings 
are combined with the achievements of the sociologists of scientific knowledge. They draw 
attention to “the process by which scientists make sense of their observations”4 and 
emphasise that changes in science and technologies “cannot be explained in isolation from 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey Checkel, “It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International 
Politics”, Working Paper No. 26, Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oct 2005, 
http://www.arena.uio.no – pp.6 
2 Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 16,  no.2, 1987, 233-236. The term ‘conventional constructivism’ has been used by Ted Hopf to 
distinguish it from critical constructivism, which offers a different approach to the study of IR – see T. Hopf, 
“The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” International Security Vol. 23, No. 1, 
1998, 171-200. This research has been conducted from the theoretical vantage point of conventional 
constructivism, to which I will refer as constructivism. 
3 H. Collins, “The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of Contemporary Science” Annual Review of 
Sociology. No.9, 1983 – pp. 267 
4 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life – The Construction of Scientific Facts, (Princeton University 
Press. Princeton, New Jersey: 1979) – pp. 32 
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the economic, political, and other social circumstances of that change”.5 Since studying 
dynamic social systems is rather complex, the research tools used by these social scientists 
will be very useful to the aims of this current study. The need to bridge these two literatures 
has been recognised by other authors in the past, who have acknowledged that the 
expansion of scientific knowledge is a political process,6 as well as that social interactions 
produce not only ideas, understandings and identities, but also facts and artefacts.7 
There is another reason why the social constructivists in international relations and 
the sociologists of knowledge need to communicate and that is their shared interest in the 
social moment of closure or tipping in the process of development of norms/scientific facts. 
Closure, according to the sociologists of scientific knowledge, signifies the end of a 
scientific debate and the transition of a newly established scientific fact into the larger body 
of knowledge.8 Tipping has been defined by constructivists as the moment at which a new 
norm is agreed upon and processes for its institutionalisation begin.9 Obtaining a clearer 
understanding of the dynamics of closure, its importance in the continuum of norm 
development and the processes that lead to it, is essential for this study, as this social 
moment has been understudied with regards to international behavioural norms.  
Based on the two sets of literature discussed above I propose a theoretical model of 
norm development and knowledge creation in world politics, which takes into account the 
context within which the need for a new behavioural norm has emerged, follows the 
                                                 
5 D.MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy – A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. (The MIT Press. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1990)- pp. 9 citing D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of 
Technology, (Open University Press: Milton Keynes, England: 1985). 
6 F.Kratochwil and J. Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State” 
International Organization. Vol. 40, no. 4, 1986 – pp.773 
7 J.Lezaun, “Limiting the Social: Constructivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations”. 
International Studies Review. Vol. 4, no. 3, 2002 – pp. 233 
8 H.Engelhardt and A. Caplan, eds. Scientific Controversies – Case studies in the resolution and closure of 
disputes in science and technology. (Cambridge UP, New York: 1987) 
9 M.Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”. International 
Organisation. Autumn 1998, vol. 52, no. 4 – pp. 901-3 
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development of the normative idea, and examines the entry into force of a newly 
constructed norm. The stages of the proposed model have a causal character, as the 
conclusion of each stage leads the process of norm evolution onto the next. Some of the 
model stages take place simultaneously, as discussed in Chapter 2. Research indicates that 
closures can be reopened, leading to loops in the model, and to the need for further closures 
to be reached.  
This synthetic model of norm development is then compared to three unrelated 
empirical case-studies to analyse its accuracy and to evaluate the variation among the 
examples. In other words, the empirical case-studies test the theoretical model, and thus 
assess the theory behind this research. Comparing the three examples with the theoretical 
model and with each other shows the recurring themes and the emerging differences, 
reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the hypothesis. The theoretical model 
presented in this research seeks to reveal in some detail the process via which international 
norms emerge, the types of actors involved in pursuing the development of international 
norms and the mechanisms, institutions, arguments and persuasion techniques that these 
actors use to achieve their aims. In other words, what I seek to achieve here is a more in-
depth understanding of the process of norm evolution. 
The deconstruction of the process of norm formation and the examination of the 
characteristics of successful normative campaigns will assist our understanding of the 
points of reconciliation between idealpolitik and realpolitik,10 and the place of concerns 
about idealpolitik in state behaviour. The analysis of the processes of norm evolution will 
provide an opportunity to study the different types of power, apart from the material 
                                                 
10 Christopher Rudolph uses the term idealpolitik to describe the achievement of creating an effective 
atrocities regime based on humanitarian norms despite the political and procedural obstacles created by 
powerful states and bureaucratic factors. For further discussion see: C. Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities 
Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals” International Organization. Vol. 55, no. 3, 2001 – pp. 656 
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capabilities of states, which exist and operate in the international system. The current 
research will also draw attention to the role that non-state actors – such as communities of 
scientists, INGOs, advocacy networks, social movements, local community groups, 
multinational corporations, etc. - play in world politics, which will necessitate the 
redefinition of the conventional concept of power nodes in the world system. Non-state 
actors form diverse networks, which may sometimes wield more power than nation-states, 
command more public support than politicians, and pool more finance than national 
governments. This certainly complicates our concept of the way in which world politics 
operate, but only in this way we can gain a clearer and more pragmatic idea of what drives 
international relations and with what effect.  
A more detailed overview of the two theoretical approaches that I will use as the 
basis for the synthetic theoretical model in this research is provided in Chapter 2. The 
chapter outlines the key assumptions and the main arguments of the two sets of literature. It 
offers a critical evaluation of the typology of actors, as defined by the social constructivists 
of international relations. It then goes on to consider the manner in which these theorists 
construct the understanding of process. Chapter 2 further examines the literature of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge and technologies (SSK). After emphasising the main 
assertions of this approach, I proceed to examine SSK’s understanding of process and 
closure, which is then used in the synthetic theoretical model.  
Chapter 3 studies in detail the historical development of the norm prohibiting the 
use of torture, which has been institutionalised by the Convention Against Torture and its 
Optional Protocol. This is a norm protecting individuals and stemming from the more 
general context of human rights and concerns for individual welfare. CAT may appear as a 
logical development of human rights legislation, supported by the ‘civilised world’, but 
despite its seemingly natural evolution, there are severe problems of implementation and 
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compliance by various states. This signals a fault in the normative determinist’s reasoning 
because if the norm’s development was as logical as portrayed, states would have 
automatically taken it on board. The norm evolution process in this chapter reveals an 
interesting interplay between states and non-state actors, and shows how scientific 
knowledge and normative ideas merge into one powerful normative campaign to persuade 
states to create new behavioural norms. 
Chapter 4 is an inquiry into the development of intellectual property rights in the 
pharmaceutical industry. This international norm has evolved in a direction that few could 
predict – starting from a strong case in favour of increased worldwide protection of 
intellectual property, made by some of the largest industries in the world, it was later 
defeated by global civil society working together with the global South, and the norm was 
re-shaped into a more human life-friendly version. The industries interested in intellectual 
property protection are some of the most powerful industries in the business world. These 
industries had the governments of most of the economically-developed countries on board 
for the creation of a blanket norm to protect all intellectual property with the strongest 
possible norm. With time and with the increased interest of NGOs, social movements, non-
governmental professional organisations and advocacy networks, the normative belief in 
the rights of human beings to life and health prevailed over corporate interests and nation-
states agreed to concessions towards those most needy in the international system. This is 
an interesting case-study with an unexpected end, which shows most clearly that 
conventional wisdom and generalisations with regards to actors, power and process in 
international relations, need to be re-examined and re-defined.  
The third case study presented in chapter 5 is the study of the creation of a norm for 
the protection of the atmosphere and the reversal of climate change. The reasons for 
choosing this study are multiple. Negotiations on the issue of climate change have been 
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long and difficult, ridden with scientific uncertainty, political opposition, normative issues 
of responsibility, equity and justice, as well as by controversies among industries. A real 
blow to the implementation of the norm to reverse climate change has been dealt by the US 
President George W. Bush’s coming into power, when he rejected the scientific agreement 
that climate is changing with long term effects on human activity. This norm is very rich in 
material for analysis – there is the disagreement among experts worldwide regarding the 
causal relationship between CO2 and anomalies in the environment and world climate; 
negotiations are difficult among states who are unwilling to give up what they call their 
chance for economic development; one of the most powerful countries and one of the 
largest polluters – the United States - refuses to sign one of the major documents relating to 
climate change – the Kyoto Protocol; while the biggest problem is that there is no reliable 
prediction of how bad the effects of climate change can be. The development of the Kyoto 
Protocol is the most contemporary case-study and to an extent I join the race of analysts 
attempting to explain the long road to the creation of this legally binding treaty and the 
roles that different states and non-state actors have played.  
 
Selection of Case Studies 
The empirical scope of this thesis encompasses norms that are contemporary, as all 
three norms have been created within the past thirty years, so that the controversies 
surrounding them have still not had a chance to settle down completely. The analysis of the 
historical development of the norm outlawing the use of torture, the norm protecting 
intellectual property in the pharmaceutical industry, and the norm for the protection of the 
atmosphere and the control of climate change, is aimed at providing a varied background 
against which the synthetic theoretical model is tested. The case studies were chosen from 
three different fields of contemporary international concern, which were also of great 
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interest to me, as emerging spheres of international regulation. There is no relationship 
between the case-studies, apart from the increasing concern for the protection of the 
individual, evident from the changing behaviour of states under pressure from civil society 
and other actors in global politics. The combination of case-studies coming from different 
social fields indicates similar trends in the process of policy-making at the international 
level. These developments are not accidental; they are directly related to the changes that 
have taken place after the end of the Cold War in the international social, political and 
economic context. IR theories cannot afford to ignore these changes as they have 
implications for state behaviour, state identities, and the way in which the latter interact 
with the material and ideational context of world politics.  
The three case-studies have purposefully been chosen to not have direct relevance to 
strategic and security interests of states. This in my view softens the impact of strategic 
national interest as the reason for states to negotiate and act, and makes the question of why 
states get engaged in norm development in the first place even more relevant. Some may 
argue that issues not directly related to national interests make negotiations more likely 
because states feel that their vital interests are less threatened. I argue that when national 
interests are not directly at stake, negotiations are not more likely per se, but instead they 
may be more likely to be successful. This, however, still does not explain why states 
choose to get involved in the development of new behavioural norms that would shape their 
behaviour in the future.  
The empirical examples in this research have been compiled from a variety of 
different sources, in order to reconstruct the events leading up to the creation of 
international norms. I have sought to incorporate sources that reflect the position and 
arguments of all sides involved, thus making this study a relatively exhaustive and neutral 
reflection of larger-scale social and political processes. In other words, these historical 
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overviews are themselves original contributions to the body of social knowledge.  
 
Methodology and Research Methods 
The methodology of this research is based on theoretically informed historical 
reconstruction of the sequence of events leading to norm formation.11 This methodology 
will help uncover the relationship between the product - a new behavioural norm – and the 
complex process of conflict and collaboration between a range of social actors, scientists, 
corporations, and political leaders leading up to norm creation.12 The historical 
reconstruction of negotiations will further allow the examination of actors’ positions, the 
changes in these positions, the argument and persuasion techniques used, as well as the 
techniques that were successful, as these reveal information about actors, power and 
process in international relations.  
One aspect of this study is focused on the closure of scientific, normative, and 
political debates, and how we can show that closure has taken place. An important 
controversy surrounding normative research is related to the issue of proving that a norm 
exists. Some authors have proposed that we can infer the existence of a norm from state 
practice;13 others argue that state action alone does not signal the existence of a norm;14 yet 
others point out that it is the justifications that states give for their actions that indicate the 
                                                 
11 George, Alexnader (1979) “Case studies and theory development: the method of structured, focused 
comparison” in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory and Policy, (Free 
Press: New York) – 43-68 
12 D. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy – A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. – pp. 3 
13 M. Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in P. Katzenstein, (eds.) The Culture of 
National Security – pp. 159 and M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society – Chapter 1. 
14 “As shared expectations about behaviour, both behavioural norms and normative beliefs may have common 
knowledge effects, decreasing uncertainty about what actors are likely to do in certain circumstances, and 
facilitating coordination because “norms”, that is, both behavioural norms and normative beliefs, are 
‘functional’ in ways similar to the role of other ideas or knowledge and institutions. In this sense, norms are 
not unique. Non-normative beliefs, habits and rules – indeed any form of common knowledge and agreed 
upon procedures – may help actors coordinate of limit the range of choice” – N. Crawford, Argument and 
Change in World Politics – pp. 88  
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existence of a norm.15 Norms are “shared and social”16 prescriptions of behaviour; they are 
“intersubjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social 
practice”.17 Intersubjectivity infers more than a subjective existence – beliefs need to be 
expressed, if not codified and recorded, in order to be shared. In this way beliefs leave 
physical residues. Further proof for the existence of norms can be found in the justifications 
that states use for their actions when in breach of a written or customary norm. Disapproval 
and justification are both based on the acceptance of a behavioural norm, as a prescription 
for appropriate behaviour. There is a quantitative element involved in judging whether a 
norm has been accepted by enough states. Norms that are in the process of becoming 
legalised need a minimum number of states to accept them, but what is also important is 
that they are underpinned by the “concurence of the major powers in the particular field”.18  
It is clear that the participation and the willing cooperation of the powerful states in 
the system can speed up a process of norm evolution; however, this in itself is not a 
sufficient condition to establish a new norm and make it work. As Finnemore argues, “rules 
backed only by force, without any legitimacy or normative authority, are difficult to sustain 
and tend not to last long”.19 In other words, power alone is not sufficient to enforce long-
term compliance with norms and its influence may wear off with time, as normative 
agendas and national priorities change.  
                                                 
15 “Repeated declarations by authoritative actors are indicative of the state’s commitment to the rule” – A. 
Cortell and J. Davis, “How do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules 
and Norms”, – pp. 456; “When actors regularly refer to the norm to describe and comment on their own 
behaviour and that of others, the validity claims of the norm are no longer controversial, even if the actual 
behaviour continues violating the rules” – Risse-Kappen as cited in A. Cortell and J. Davis, “How do 
International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms”– pp.456; M. 
Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention – Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. – pp. 12  
16 M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society – pp. 22 
17 T. Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army”– 
pp. 71 
18 M. Shaw, International Law, 4th edn. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1997), – pp.63 – although 
Malcolm Shaw uses this criteria to distinguish customary international law from general state practice, the 
involvement of the major powers in the field is crucial for the development of an effective norm. 
19 M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention – pp. 2 
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The study of norm development requires the use of detailed empirical analysis for 
the recovery of the historical process of norm development. Historical reconstruction of the 
events leading up to the creation of a new norm will show the role and influence of non-
state actors in the evolution of a norm. Evidence of the evolution of normative ideas can be 
found in historical records, memoires, journal articles, newspapers. The processes of 
network configuration and of specifying the parameters of an issue are normally marked by 
conferences and meetings, which means records of meetings and conferences can be a 
valuable source of information. Qualitative content analysis of the speeches of delegates 
and transcripts of debates will reveal the dynamics of network formation, issue 
specification and processes of bargaining and persuasion. Speeches and debates will hold 
clues as to which arguments prevail in these initial meetings and whether it is moral ideas 
or technical knowledge that sets the agenda. Some political speeches and government 
positions are determined in advance and this means that they carry less personal bias and 
more organisational bias, which will help understand better the standpoint and interests of 
groups and organisations involved in these meetings. Interviews with participants in such 
conferences are also a valuable and helpful source in reconstructing historical events. The 
dialogue with the conservative actors may be a challenging process to follow, since the 
records of some inter-state negotiations are not made public and one has to rely on the 
recollection of participants and other secondary sources. When normative ideas that have 
previously been publicised by civil society or scientific research become the subject of 
international negotiations, one can begin to find more in-depth analysis of the surrounding 
controversies and debates in academic journals and books. Conferences are also being held 
more often among states and there usually are parallel civil society conferences, which 
provide abundant research materials.  
To summarise, the sources that will be analysed in this research are largely primary 
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sources where available, such as historical documents, legal documents, memoirs, personal 
accounts, speeches, debates, newspaper articles, statements of state officials; some 
secondary sources have been considered such as books, articles from academic journals and 
conferences. Interviews will be conducted where possible with individuals who are as close 
as possible to the real negotiations – representatives of NGOs and IGOs, technical experts, 
state officials.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORISING NORM DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework for understanding norm 
development. This framework is based on the research and findings of two fields of social 
research – social constructivism in international relations and the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. After examining these paradigms and outlining their limitations, I propose a 
synthetic model, which reflects the key stages in the evolution of international norms. 
There are a few key questions that this chapter seeks to address, namely, how international 
norms evolve, what roles different actors play and how closures on new norms are reached. 
The emphasis on theoretically informed process-tracing throughout this study makes it 
crucial that the studies of conventional constructivism are engaged.20 The analysis of the 
types of actors involved in the process of norm development is one of the meeting points of 
social constructivists of IR and the sociologists of knowledge. Both of these theories 
examine a larger spectrum of internationally active social groups and engage in analysing 
the varying degrees of persuasion, argumentation and coercion that these actors use. The 
moment of closure, discussed in this research as having three components – social, 
scientific and political closure, has been studied in more depth by the sociologists of 
knowledge and to a lesser degree by the social constructivists. This is a nexus where the 
two literatures can benefit from each other’s findings.  
My discussion, however, will begin with the definition of the concept and form of 
international behavioural norms, which are then distinguished from other ideational 
                                                 
20 Jeffrey Checkel, “It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International 
Politics”, Working Paper No. 26, Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oct 2005, 
http://www.arena.uio.no – pp.5 
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phenomena that affect actors’ behaviour and decision-making patterns. Norms are often 
defined as shared expectations about or standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a 
given identity.21 These definitions, however, are not precise, because ‘shared expectations 
of appropriate behaviour’ do not constitute norms - they result from already existing norms 
or a given normative context. Furthermore, the concept of shared expectations of 
appropriate behaviour does not indicate with enough authority the level of agreement and 
support needed to create a norm. The term ‘standard of appropriate behaviour’ should not 
be perceived as a synonym for the term norm either, because standards presuppose a high 
degree of specificity and not all norms are always stipulated in precise terms. Moreover, 
within a context which has not been precisely regulated, states can still project would-be 
standards of appropriate behaviour within the context of existing normative principles, but 
that would not constitute a norm. In other words, while ‘shared expectations’ is a term that 
is too loose to be synonymous to a norm, ‘standards of appropriate behaviour’ is a term too 
strict to convey the same meaning as ‘norm’, since “standards of behaviour [are] defined in 
terms of rights and obligations”,22 while that is not always true for norms.  
The term ‘norm’ will be used here to mean prescriptions for appropriate and 
acceptable behaviour,23 from which the standards of behaviour are further negotiated and 
institutionalised. Farrell argues that norms “regulate action by defining what is appropriate 
                                                 
21 For a discussion of norms as expectations – R. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity 
and Culture in National Security” in P. Katzenstein, (ed.) The Culture of National Security – Norms and 
Identity in World Politics. (Columbia University Press, New York: 1996) – pp.54; M. Finnemore, National 
Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1996) – pp. 22; T. Risse, S. Ropp, and K. 
Sikkink, (eds.) The Power of Human Rights – International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge: 1999) – pp.7. Norms are perceived as standards of behaviour by M. Finnemore 
and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”. International Organisation. Autumn 
1998, vol. 52, no. 4 – pp. 891; A. Klotz, Norms in International Relations – The Struggle Against Apartheid 
(Cornell University Press. Ithaca: 1995) – pp. 14; J. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International 
Relations Theory”. World Politics, Vol. 50, 1998 – pp. 327-8; S. Krasner, International Regimes, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca: 1983) – pp. 2. 
22 S. Krasner, International Regimes, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1983) – pp. 2 
23 N. Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use” 
International Organization. Vol. 53, no. 3, 1999 – pp. 436 
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(given social rules) and what is effective (given laws of science)”.24 However, the internal 
division of a norm into a technical and normative part is artificial and only useful for the 
study of the interplay between technical knowledge and normative beliefs in the process of 
constructing norms. Norms are a product of both social rules and laws of science and they 
carry forward elements of both. Norms are guiding posts for state behaviour; they become 
embedded in the belief systems of policy-makers thus, influencing state behaviour. Norms 
can remain tacit prescriptions for appropriate behaviour but they can also develop into legal 
principles – either customary or codified. Legal rules institutionalise norms by stating them 
in technical terms – asserting the parameters of a norm, its definition, its subjects, what 
constitutes a breach of it, often including specific consequences of non-compliance. 
In this research ‘norms’ and ‘behavioural norms’ will be used interchangeably. Neta 
Crawford draws attention to the need to differentiate between behavioural norms and 
normative beliefs.25 Behavioural norms represent “the dominant practice in certain 
contexts” and vary “in their prevalence, degree of institutionalisation, normativity, and the 
cost of non-compliance”,26 while normative beliefs are “the beliefs about what it is right to 
do”,27 they are “the ethical arguments we already hold as true”.28 In other words, normative 
beliefs are similar to the conventional understanding of moral principles and/or ethical 
principles. They are held by individuals and result from the overall social constructions of 
good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate, right and wrong. Breaking these principles 
does not result in an institutionalised punishment, but is condemned and ostracised within 
the social group. ‘Idea’ is another term that is used in this research and it indicates 
                                                 
24 T. Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army”, 
European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001 – pp. 71 
25 N. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics – Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian 
Intervention. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: 2002) – pp. 86 
26 Ibid. – pp. 91 
27 Ibid. – pp. 86 
28 Ibid. – pp. 98 
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individual perceptions. They result from the interaction between the individual and the 
social, and political environment, as well as from the interactions among individuals. Ideas 
can be beliefs held by individuals, normative judgements and proposals for normative 
change that are not necessarily shared by others.   
 
  Theoretical Approaches 
Social Constructivism in IR 
In general, “constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international 
reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as 
instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective 
intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not 
independent of time and place”.29 Despite the heated debates within constructivism 
regarding epistemology and methodology, one thing has been agreed - human action is 
shaped by ideational constructs and material constraints.30 Research has been conducted not 
only into how material and ideational factors interact to influence actors’ actions and 
identities, but also into the logics that drive social action. Finding answers about the driving 
forces and principles that guide social action will help our understanding of how ideas get 
established – whether by means of coercion, persuasion, or argumentation.31  
                                                 
29 J. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge”, International Organisation. Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998 – pp. 879 
30 A. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social constructions of power politics”, International 
Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992; A. Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, International Security. 
Vol. 20, No.1, 1995; P. Katzenstein, (eds.) The Culture of National Security; J. Ruggie, “What Makes the 
World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”; J. Weldes, “Constructing 
National Interests”, European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996; M. Zehfuss, 
Constructivism in International Relations – The Politics of Reality. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: 
2002); J. Checkel, “Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions”, 
1999 – Available from: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_24.htm; E. Adler, “Seizing the Middle 
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997. 
31 For further discussion of logics of action see: J. March and J. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of 
International Political Orders”, International Organisation, Vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, 943-969; O. Sending, 
 26
Constructivists have managed to adopt a unitary stand on the question of ontology. 
They share the understanding that there is a ‘constructed social reality’32 within which the 
material environment gains meaning and value and where day-to-day human activities 
make sense and have a purpose. Alexander Wendt takes this sociological claim and puts it 
in the context of world politics “… world politics are ‘socially constructed’ [thus] 
fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and 
these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour”.33 
Adler further engages in a definition of constructivism as a whole (without disregard for its 
internal divisions) as “the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is 
shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world”.34 What still divides constructivism are the debates 
over the nature of interaction between agents and structures;35 questions of epistemology – 
whether there really exists a common intersubjective ideational reality, outside of 
individuals’ heads that can be studied with the tools of the social sciences.36  
                                                                                                                                                    
“Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ and its Use in 
Constructivist Theory” European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, 443-470; M. 
Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1996) – pp. 29-30. 
32 S. Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations”, European Journal of 
International Relations Vol. 6, No.3, 2000 – pp. 160 
33 A. Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, International Security. Vol. 20, No.1, 1995 - pp. 71-2.  
34 E. Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics” – pp. 322 
35 J. Dryzek, M. Clark, and G. McKenzie, “Subject and System in International Relations” International 
Organization. Vol. 43, no. 3, 1989, 475-503; D. Dessler, “What is at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?”, 
International Organization, Vol. 43, no. 3, 1989, 441-473; A. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in 
International Relations Theory” International Organization. Vol. 41, no. 3, 1987, 335-370; D. Porpora, 
“Cultural Rules and Material Relations”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, no. 2, 1993, 212-229; W. Carlsnaes, 
“The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, no. 3, 
1992, 245-270 
36 Some constructivists propose to approach the international system from the assumption that there exists a 
shared, intersubjective reality, which can be measured see M. Finnemore, National Interests in International 
Society – pp. 22-3; G. Goertz and P. Diehl, “Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and 
Measurement Issues” International Organization. Vol. 36, no. 4, 1992 – pp. 645; while other constructivists 
claim that intersubjective meanings are not so important, as they are drowned by the subjectivity of 
individuals and institutions - J. Dryzek, M. Clark, and G. McKenzie, “Subject and System in International 
Relations” – pp. 479; G. Raymond, “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms”, Mershon 
International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1997 – pp. 216-9. 
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The main assumptions of constructivism leave it open to criticism. Some IR 
theorists envisage constructivism not as a theory, but as a “meta-theoretical framework of 
analysis”,37 a method,38 which relies on assumptions and variables that are difficult to 
measure and quantify. Some of these criticisms are handled rather well by constructivists in 
their discussion of the importance of intersubjectivity and the existence of collective 
knowledge, shared by the relevant actors.39 Finnemore has argued that “norms make similar 
behavioural claims on dissimilar actors, [thus creating] coordinated patterns of behaviour, 
which we can study and about which we can theorise”.40 Since evidence of coordinated 
patterns of behaviour can be found, and the causal link between given norms and state 
behaviour can be established, it can provide the basis for producing verifiable theoretical 
claims. 
Another criticism directed at constructivists is that they have tended to study 
concepts/issues that are comparatively stable over time – identities, interests, culture, norm-
consistent state behaviour. As Hopf puts it “constructivism is agnostic about change in 
world politics… change is both possible and difficult”.41 In the past decade of dynamic 
international relations constructivists have acknowledged the need to adapt their methods to 
the study of change42. Studying change is not an easy task – a complex system made up of 
                                                 
37 S. Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations” – pp. 163 
38 P. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security; J. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” – 
pp. 883; M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations – The Politics of Reality, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2002); J. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 
World Politics. Vol. 50, 1998. 
39 E. Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, European Journal of 
International Relations. Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997– pp. 327; T. Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military 
Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army”. European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol.7, No. 1, 2001 – pp. 71 
40 M. Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in P. Katzenstein, The Culture of 
National Security – pp. 153-185 
41 T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” International Security Vol. 23, 
No. 1, 1998 – pp. 180-1 
42 N. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics – Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian 
Intervention, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK:2002) 
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numerous components, all in flux, is quite a challenge even for the most experienced 
researchers. The fact that we are studying real-life events where laboratory-style 
experiments are impossible poses further problems to our understanding of the causal links 
between these events because they cannot be reproduced or measured. This means that the 
methodology of conducting research in a dynamic system may need to be further adjusted.  
Moving from the more general debates of constructivism to the more specific topic 
of norm evolution, I will now look at some of the key findings of constructivist analysis, 
relevant to the problematique of the current research. My inquiry into norm evolution is 
concerned with several questions – what are the types of actors who initiate and promote 
new norms in the international system? What are the means that the former employ in 
negotiations? And what is the process of norm development? I will draw out the answers 
proposed by constructivists in this review of constructivist literature. Some of the proposals 
forwarded by the constructivists need to be revised, as this research will show, to reflect 
more accurately the state of world politics.  
 
Typology of actors 
The typology of actors as discussed by the social constructivists of international 
relations involves a process of categorising actors in groups according to that who gets  
involved, i.e., scientists work in epistemic communities, individuals get involved in 
different types non-state civil society organisations, lawyers and advocates form advocacy 
networks, and so on. While this categorisation is useful in examining the groups of actors 
who operate in the international system, the current research argues that these typologies 
take away from a more thorough understanding of social processes and offers a dynamic 
approach where the contributions of all actors are assessed. Below is an illustration of the 
constructivist approach to actor classification and a brief discussion of its pitfalls.   
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The voice of social constructivists in the studies of international relations became 
more prominent following the end of the Cold War when non-state actors began to be 
recognised as relevant to IR analysis. These two developments are often merged, resulting 
in constructivism being related to the study of non-state actors in the international system. 
Not all constructivists, however, believe in the importance and influence of these actors, 
some have tended to focus their analysis on states.43 There are also those constructivists 
who study the development of norms but would only acknowledge nation-states and IGOs 
as relevant actors.44 The largest and growing segment of constructivist thought 
acknowledges the role and influence of non-state actors in the making of international 
norms.45 Some might argue that the type of actors involved in norm development depends 
on the types of norms that are being negotiated, for example security norms concern 
primarily nation-states and economic actors, whereas humanitarian norms will see the 
involvement of states, civil society, international organisations and in some cases economic 
actors. This argument may have some merit to it, but it is not relevant to the current inquiry. 
Many constructivists have accepted global civil society and non-governmental 
organisations as relevant and influential actors in the processes of development of 
                                                 
43 Early constructivist articles related to the study of international politics tend to focus their inquiry on the 
identities and interests of states – Alexander Wendt “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social 
constructions of power politics”, International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, 391-425; A. Wendt, 
“Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 
2, 1994, 384-396; J. Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, European Journal of International Relations 
Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, 275-318; P. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security” in 
P. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security; R. Jepperson, A. Wendt, P. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, 
and Culture in National Security” in P. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security.  
44 N. Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use” 
International Organization. Vol. 53, no. 3, 1999 433-468; C. Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: 
The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals” International Organization. Vol. 55, no. 3, 2001, 655-691; E. 
Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society”, International 
Organisation, Vol. 44, no. 4, 1990, 479-526. 
45 Authors include Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Margaret Keck, Emanuel Adler, Audie Klotz, 
Thomas Risse-Kappen to name but a few.  
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humanitarian norms.46 The classification of non-state actors, however, varies with the 
increasing number of empirical studies that have been conducted. ‘Civil society’, for 
example, has been defined by the authors of a study into global citizen action as “the arena 
in which people come together to advance the interests they hold in common, not for profit 
or political power, but because they care enough about something to take collective 
action”.47 Boli and Thomas have characterized INGOs as actors that “employ limited 
resources to make rules, set standards, propagate principles, and broadly represent 
“humanity” vis-à-vis states [who have legal authority to make and enforce law] and other 
actors [like global corporations commanding economic resources]”.48 One can speculate 
from here that since epistemic communities also work with limited resources towards 
making rules and setting standards, this makes them INGOs, or otherwise carriers of world 
culture. Epistemic communities, however, have been distinguished from NGOs, as 
networks that operate on the basis of different values and use different methods of 
argument and persuasion. In other words, we need to be careful with definitions because 
they can blur lines of distinction among different groups of actors, which can in turn affect 
our understanding of the nature of these groups.   
Another categorization of non-state actors is introduced by Keck and Sikkink in 
their study of transnational advocacy networks – actors with instrumental goals (TNCs and 
banks), actors who share causal beliefs (scientific groups or epistemic communities) and 
                                                 
46 M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations, 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1998); J. Boli and G. Thomas, Constructing World Culture – International 
Nongovernmental Organisations since 1875, (Stanford University Press, Stanford: 1999); M. Edwards and J. 
Gaventa, eds., Global Citizen Action, (Earthscan Publications Ltd, London: 2001); A. Colas, International 
Civil Society – Social Movements in World Politics, (Polity Press. Oxford: 2002), etc.  
47 M. Edwards and J. Gaventa, eds., Global Citizen Action. – pp.2 (emphasis added) 
48 J. Boli and G. Thomas, Constructing World Culture,  – pp. 14 
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actors who share principled beliefs or values, namely Transnational Advocacy Networks.49 
Audie Klotz supports this classification by adding that “scientific knowledge and principled 
ideas are not the same, and [that] epistemic communities are not moral movements”50 thus 
excluding the role of scientific knowledge in her analysis of the anti-apartheid and anti-
slavery movements. The studies of epistemic communities also seem to tacitly distance 
themselves from the work of NGOs and advocacy networks. An epistemic community is 
defined by Peter Haas as a “network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
or issue-area”.51 Epistemic communities are considered to be independent of states and 
generally neutral, but as it will be shown in the case-studies, this assumption does not 
always hold true. The expertise of scientific communities is highly valued and their “claim 
to knowledge accords them influence over policy debates and serves as their primary social 
power resource”.52 The assistance of epistemic communities is most frequently requested 
by governments in situations of uncertainty, following shock or crisis.53 Although Haas 
points out that the work of epistemic communities is only resorted to in extreme cases, 
other authors envisage epistemic communities as rather more active agents in the 
international system who can create an intellectual climate favourable to starting up a 
                                                 
49 M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, – pp. 30; Sikkink briefly introduces this idea in an 
earlier article – K. Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America”, 
International Organisation. Vol. 47, no. 3, 1993 – pp. 412. 
50 A. Klotz, “Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist 
Experiences” European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 8, no. 1, 2002 – pp. 52 
51 P. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, International 
Organisation. Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992 – pp. 3 
52 Ibid. – pp. 15 
53 Ibid. – pp. 17; also see P. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution 
Control”, International Organisation, Vol. 43, No. 3, 1989 – pp. 380, where Haas provides a practical 
example of his thesis that expert opinion is sought following a crisis or in situations of uncertainty; Drake, W. 
and K. Nicolaidis, “Ideas, Interests and Institutionalisation: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round”, 
International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, – pp. 39. 
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particular debate.54 Some authors add international governmental organisations (IGOs) to 
the list of non-actors – the IGO most often involved in norm development is the United 
Nations (UN), along with its numerous agencies.55 Finnemore and Barnett argue that IGOs 
are bureaucracies and as such constitute almost independent rational-legal authorities 
within their sphere of expertise.56 They further argue that the expertise and specialisation of 
IGOs allows them a degree of autonomy from states, which makes these organisations 
separate actors in international negotiations with their own interests and agendas57. 
The above typology of actors involved in the norm development process emphasises 
a “three-fold bias against the state and state decision-makers. Normatively, elite policy-
makers are portrayed as bad; empirically, they are viewed as passive and reactive; 
ontologically, they are too often viewed solely as calculating agents”.58 There seems to be a 
clear barrier dividing the good and the bad actors and states/policy-making elites are 
inevitably on the latter side, while non-state actors are perceived as undoubtedly good. 
Although authors have acknowledged that such perceptions are naive, the IR literature 
continues to largely operate on basis of these assumptions. “Theoretically… John Ruggie, 
Emanuel Adler and Ernst Haas within international relations, remind us that politicians and 
                                                 
54 E. Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the international 
Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control”, International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992 – pp. 140-1 
55 K. Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America”, International 
Organisation. Vol. 47, no. 3, 1993 – pp. 419-420; P. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and 
Mediterranean Pollution Control” – the article reveals the active role that UN agencies played in the 
construction of the Med Plan – pp. 384; M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca: 1996) – UNESCO in particular is examined as a ‘teacher’ of norms – chapter 2; A. 
Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience – Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms, (Princeton 
University Press. Princeton: 2001) – “the institutional context of the UN is the environment within which 
human rights principles and norms are being established” – pp. 31; A. Klotz, “Transnational Activism and 
Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences” – the UN played an important 
role in promoting anti-apartheid policies – pp. 66. 
56 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World – International Organisations in Global Politics, 
(Cornell University Press: Ithaca: 2004) – pp. 20 
57 Ibid. – pp. 20-9 
58 J. Checkel, “Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions”, 
1999. Available from: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_24.htm 
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elites are not always bad, dumb bureaucrats who only ‘power’, rather they also ‘puzzle’”,59 
and neither are NGOs and scientists always good. In practice, however, very few of the 
studies on the work of non-state actors have reflected on NGO biases, on the influence that 
those who fund scientific research have on scientific findings, on the selectivity of the cases 
that advocacy networks take on. It is no news to anyone that INGOs or scientific experts 
are not necessarily politically and financially independent. Money for the study of the 
effects of secondary smoke are made available to experts by the tobacco industry,60 the 
activities of some NGOs are financed by industries, or governments,61 which clearly makes 
the point that labels such as good/bad, legitimate/unlawful – do not assist the analysis of 
norm-formation and further deconstruction of identities and liaisons is necessary on a case-
by-case basis.  
Another criticism against the way in which constructivists have distinguished 
between different types of non-state actors involved in the process of norm evolution was 
mentioned earlier. Constructivists have tended to differentiate actors with instrumental 
goals, from actors who share causal beliefs, from actors who share principled beliefs. If 
epistemic communities are being starkly distinguished from advocacy networks and both 
are different from economic actors who employ material resources, then clear dividing lines 
run along the type of power used by these groups in negotiations. I argue throughout my 
research, however, that we should not differentiate non-state actors along the lines of the 
perceived means they use in negotiation because the distinction is not instrumental in 
improving our understanding of the roles that these actors play. TNCs for example can and 
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do employ their own scientific experts and can avail themselves to the bargaining power of 
scientific knowledge. NGOs can be funded by multinational banks or governments to work 
on a particular cause and banks/governments can thus make use of their power of social 
persuasion. What really distinguishes advocacy networks and epistemic communities from 
economic actors and further from nation-states is the logic of action that these groups of 
actors follow – logic of argument, logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness. 
These logics of action will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In other words, 
the dense and interconnected environment of international relations has to be meticulously 
re-examined because natural sciences have a normative character just like normative 
prescriptions have scientific explanations and generalisations, even though they simplify 
the subject of study, are largely unhelpful. Furthermore, we have to be critical of 
unnecessarily drawing or erasing dividing lines among actors. My research will show that it 
is important to keep in mind that different types of actors often form coalitions that bring 
together and multiply their strengths in argumentation, persuasion, and even coercion 
during the process of negotiating the creation of new norms.  
To summarise the discussion of the actors involved, in view of constructivists’ 
findings, an increasing number of non-state actors initiate movements to change existing 
norms or to introduce new normative ideas in the realm of international relations. Nation-
states are both part of the problem of implementation of normative ideas and part of the 
solution as the only actors in the international arena having the institutional authority to 
enter international agreements and to legitimise them at the same time. Individuals also 
have a place in the larger context of norm evolution analysis, as they are in some situations 
“norm entrepreneurs” bringing their ideas/complaints to the international forum, skilful 
negotiators who foster agreements even in impossible circumstances, influential leaders 
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who lead by example.62 A useful conclusion following from the constructivist review is to 
address with care issues of power, intentions, effectiveness and character of both states and 
non-state actors in international policy-making. As this research will further demonstrate, 
the current categorisations of actors, although useful in understanding what types of actors 
partake in international negotiations, is not practical. Actors tend to group according to 
their vested interests in the early stages of the norm-evolution process. They search for 
supporters of their ideas, for actors who can provide technical expertise, and actors who can 
engage the attention of a powerful ally – be that national governments or the wider public. 
 
Constructing a process 
In this section I will review the concepts of process of norm development proposed 
by constructivist authors who have built their thesis around certain types of actors as central 
figures in norm formation processes. Thus, one can recognise at least three distinct 
propositions about process. These propositions about process have only slight differences, 
as we will see, supporting my thesis that there is a relatively standard logical sequence, 
according to which norms develop. 
Constructivists who focus their attention on nation-states and IGOs tend to explain 
normative change in terms of the strategic interests and identities of these actors.63 In her 
study of the changing US attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons (soon to become a 
taboo) Nina Tannenwald describes a process of strategic calculations, analysis of possible 
consequences and re-thinking of identity.64 “The nuclear taboo has become part of the 
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contemporary discourse of ‘civilization’”,65 the author states, and that in part shaped the US 
non-use of nuclear weapons after the end of World War II. The study of the construction of 
an atrocities regime reveals a similar tendency – where humanitarian norms conflicted with 
strategic interests and where pressure from the domestic public was put on policy-makers to 
act. Decisions were taken in such a manner as to limit the domestic political cost66 and yet 
to avoid the repetition of the atrocities of World War II, which is an embarrassment for the 
now ‘civilised’ states.67 In the case of prohibition regimes, one can recognise the powerful 
states of the day being norm entrepreneurs in areas where old norms needed changing due 
to their conflicting with a changing domestic and international environment.68 To 
summarise, the norm entrepreneur state is perceived to usually be the powerful of the day, 
at least in the area of the norm in question, and perceives itself as needing to take action of 
some sort to avoid damage to its reputation both at home and internationally. The 
entrepreneur state further tries to persuade other states to join a new practice by means of 
both argument and power. 
There has been considerably more research on the scenario in which NGOs and 
other advocacy networks play the leading role in norm development. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) present a theoretical model of the process of norm evolution and most of the 
other authors who have tended to conduct empirical research in this sub-field seem to fit in 
that framework. The norm life-cycle presented by Finnermore and Sikkink has three main 
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phases – norm emergence, norm cascade and internationalisation.69 The emergence of 
norms is itself characterised by a process, comprising of three levels – norm initiation, 
organisational level and institutionalisation or tipping point. 
A norm can be initiated by an individual, or organisation. In the case of the norm 
entrepreneur being an individual, he/she will look for an organisation that will provide the 
leverage needed to be able to communicate to states. Once organisations working together 
with norm entrepreneurs have managed to win the support of enough states (preferably the 
so-called ‘norm-leaders’ who are states considered to have higher moral leverage in the 
international system), the norm is said to have reached “a tipping/threshold point”.70 
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that when a “critical mass of states [have been persuaded] 
to become norm leaders and adopt new norms”71 then the norm is ready for adoption. The 
authors further argue that “the norm tipping rarely occurs before one-third of the total states 
in the system adopt the norm”.72 The difficulties surrounding the issues of measurement are 
complicated by the fact that there are differences in the “normative weight” of states in the 
system. The issue of “tipping” thus leaves a niche for further research. Most of the authors 
conducting empirical studies have altogether omitted the issue of the very transformation of 
an idea into a normative prescription, jumping straight to the next level of norm cascade 
and finally institutionalisation.73 There are a lot of issues that still need to be unpacked in 
the transition from an organizational level to a tipping point, to a norm cascade and this is 
where my own research will be focused.  
The third view on process is compiled by the authors who focus attention on the 
                                                 
69 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” – pp. 896 
70 Ibid. – pp.901 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.  
73 R. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” International 
Organisation. Vol. 52, no. 3, 1998 - pp.618; A. Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience – Amnesty International and 
Changing Human Rights Norms, (Princeton University Press. Princeton: 2001) – pp. 34-5 
 38
activities and influence of epistemic communities. Peter Haas delivers useful insights in his 
study of the development of an environmental regime – the Mediterranean Pollution 
Control Plan.74 Further contributors to this sub-field include the study on the reform of the 
International Food Aid Regime,75 the research on the construction of a regime for trade in 
services,76 the evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control,77 Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution78 and many more. The formation of a regime is a complex process of 
negotiation between technical experts (ecologists, marine scientists, development oriented 
food aid specialists, etc), economic actors in some cases, and nation-states. Needless to say, 
the interests of all these actors are often in conflict, with some of them wanting to hold on 
to the status-quo (mostly the economic actors), others promoting change (usually epistemic 
communities) and states being heavily lobbied by various groups; not to mention that the 
interests of nation-states are usually incompatible, due to their differing circumstances - 
economic status, strategic interests, foreign policy agenda.  
The authors studying epistemic communities largely agree that the expertise of 
these actors is sought when policy-makers face a crisis where scientific knowledge is 
limited79 or in situations where experts have established new causal relationships, which 
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have potential to change day-to-day politics.80 In any case, the first crucial stage of norm 
development is that of issue formation, as it defines the interests of the actors involved, and 
opens a niche for development of regulations and standards.81 Stage two of the process is 
the formulation of collective knowledge and meaning – Haas sees this as the stage where 
different epistemic communities form a common “core set of beliefs about cause-effect 
relationships”82 and Adler chooses to examine in more detail the work of scientists in 
“packaging the units of variation to create collective understandings”.83 Collective 
knowledge and meaning is further translated into the definition of state interests and the 
framing of the political controversy.84 Apart from changing the domestic agenda epistemic 
communities are engaged in policy diffusion that is in “diffusing ideas and influencing the 
positions adopted by a wide range of actors, including domestic and international agencies, 
government bureaucrats and decision-makers, legislative and corporate bodies, and the 
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public”.85 Epistemic communities play an active role in the process of finalisation of a new 
norm as well,86 but as Haas has observed, technical knowledge and expertise might have 
proved compelling, but the exercise of political power was crucial as well.87 
The studies of process of norm development, as presented by authors with different 
views on the leading actors in the system, exhibit curious similarities. As I will later 
propose in a synthetic model, combining findings of social constructivists with those of 
constructivists dealing with the creation of scientific knowledge and technology, the 
process of norm development is the same regardless of who the leading actors are 
envisaged to be. Epistemic communities, advocacy networks and NGOs, economic actors 
and states, all take part at one stage or another in a process of development of norms, which 
influence human well-being. In other words, the various cases presented above are only 
different viewpoints on the same process.  
 
Logic of Action 
The term logic of action indicates the type of considerations that actors take into 
account or act upon, whether consciously or sub-consciously, in the process of making 
decisions. According to March and Olsen, actors are guided either by calculations of 
consequences (logic of consequences) or by careful consideration of identities, obligations 
and rules (logic of appropriateness).88 Thomas Risse adds a third logic of action and that is 
the logic of truth-seeking and argumentation according to which “actors try to challenge the 
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validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement”.89 Most constructivists tend 
to prioritise the logic of appropriateness90 whereas rationalist theorists tend towards a logic 
of consequences.91 The logic of consequences drives behaviour when actors “choose among 
alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences… conscious that other actors are doing 
likewise”;92 the logic of appropriateness is at play when “action involves evoking an 
identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific 
situation”.93 In an earlier work March and Olsen have distinguished between the two logics 
in a slightly different manner. They have stated that within political institutions  
having determined what action to take by a logic of appropriateness in our culture, we justify the 
action by a logic of consequentiality… Reasons are important. It is clear they must be expressed, but 
their role in affecting outcomes is more obscure… resulting in a kind of healthy charade of hypocrisy 
in which reasons and actions are not tightly linked but place pressure on each other in a way that 
strengthens each94 
In other words, to assume that the functioning of the logics of action is straightforward and 
easy to track down and understand is, to say the least, naïve. The logics of action influence 
the participants in international decision making in a competitive and complex manner.  
The functioning of the logic of appropriateness is of particular interest to Sending, 
who shows that counter to the position of some constructivists,95 the logic of 
appropriateness “can hardly account for [normative change because] it cannot convincingly 
                                                 
89 T. Risse, “’Let’s argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”. International Organisation. No. 54, 
vol. 1, 2000 – pp.7, for an overall discussion of the logic of argumentation see – pp. 6-11 
90 O. Sending, “Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ and its Use 
in Constructivist Theory” European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 8, no. 4, 2002; M. Finnemore, 
National Interests in International Society. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1996); J. Checkel, “The 
Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”. World Politics. Vol. 50, 1998, 324-348; M. Finnemore 
and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” 
91 O. Sending, “Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ and its Use 
in Constructivist Theory” – pp. 444-5 
92 J. March and J. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”. International 
Organisation, Vol. 52, no. 4, 1998 – pp.949 
93 Ibid. – pp. 951 
94 J. March and J. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions – The Organisational Basis of Politics. (The Free Press, 
New York: 1989) – pp. 162 
95 M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society – pp. 28-31; H. Mueller, “Arguing, Bargaining 
and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International 
Relations”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no.3, 2004 – pp. 418-425 
 42
account for the process by which changes in norms come about, as it portrays actors as 
being internally related to prevailing norms as they constitute their very identity”.96 In other 
words, where normative change is occurring or norms are developing in areas where there 
have not been any norms before, actors cannot rely on a logic of appropriateness, since 
there are no standards of appropriateness to prescribe action and the conception of identities 
and interests has no ready answers. This in turn means that only by employing the “logic of 
truth seeking or arguing” one can begin to understand “the process through which new 
norms are internalised”.97  
The logic of argumentation has been further defined as consisting of two parts – 
logic of truth-seeking and logic of rhetorical action. The logic of truth-seeking guides the 
behaviour of actors who are genuinely looking for the solution of a problem where they 
have no material interests at stake. The logic of truth-seeking is based on normative beliefs. 
The logic of rhetorical action also involves argumentation, but actors who engage in 
rhetorical action are looking to protect or advance their material interests and their 
arguments are aiming to persuade others that this is also in the greater interest.98 
Neta Crawford further argues that “ethical argument analysis is a way to understand 
and explain normative change in world politics… [since] the usual understanding of agents 
and structures as constituting the major forces of world politics is incomplete without an 
understanding of the processes of world politics”.99 And if the understanding of process is 
seen as a dynamic interplay between argument, persuasion, power and interest, then we will 
need to look for the enactment of the logics of consequences and argumentation in order to 
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understand actors’ behaviour.  
The research conducted by social constructivists in the field of international 
relations is growing by the day. It is multi-layered and encompasses a variety of spheres of 
international politics that two decades ago seemed irrelevant to our understanding of the 
world system. The focus on the activities of a range of actors as well as the number of 
issues being researched means that there are many unresolved puzzles in IR. It has by now 
become clear that the study of politics cannot be separated from the studies of the other 
social sciences. Constructivists are even beginning to search for causes and effects of 
political action beyond the confines of the social sciences, thus involving scientific 
knowledge in the analysis of political processes.  
 
Theories of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) 
 
The sociology of knowledge began evolving as a discipline in the 1970s and the 
1980s.100 “SSK sought to show that knowledge was constitutively social, and in so doing, it 
raised fundamental questions about taken-for-granted divisions between social versus 
cognitive, or natural, factors.”101 The theories of the social construction of scientific 
knowledge focus attention on the study of the relationship between the material and 
ideational world by revealing the social beginning of scientific facts. One of the main 
contentions of SSK theorists is that there isn’t a single true, material world waiting “out-
there” to be discovered; rather, human knowledge and search for facts is socially 
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conditioned and socially constructed. The main concern of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge is the character of “what comes to count as scientific knowledge” and the 
mechanism that makes facts count as scientific knowledge.102 I will thus draw attention to 
the findings of SSK and SCOT regarding the process of the construction of scientific 
knowledge and the closure of scientific debates.  
The search for consistency of perceptions and convention is a central notion to 
understanding the way in which facts are established. As Fleck stresses “whatever is known 
has always seemed systematic, proven, applicable, and evident to the knower. Every alien 
system of knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, inapplicable, fanciful, 
or mystical”.103 The studies of the creation of scientific knowledge thus focus on that 
particular process of transition from the contradictory, unproven, fanciful to the systematic, 
logical, evident. This process of fact construction and fact recognition has been studied in 
different environments and with regards to diverse issues104 and one general conclusion has 
emerged – scientific knowledge and technologies are “limited by cultural constraints and 
the distribution of power, rather than internal technical knowledge or logical possibility”.105 
This is evidence of a larger move to ‘downgrade’ the natural sciences from the pedestal of 
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the holders of the objective truth about the material world – “the treatment of scientific 
knowledge as a social construction implies that there is nothing epistemologically special 
about the nature of scientific knowledge: it is merely one in a whole series of knowledge 
cultures”.106 The change in the perception of natural sciences means that scientific 
knowledge does not necessarily uncover a non-controversial, systemic and logical 
environment, neither is science impartial in its depiction of the material world.  
The above change of attitude towards scientific knowledge is reflected in the 
working assumptions widely accepted by SSK theorists - the relativity of knowledge; the 
requirement for symmetrical and impartial inquiry regarding scientific theories; the role of 
the human element in scientific knowledge and the resulting biases and misperceptions.  
The significance of relativism in scientific knowledge is that “it assumes neither 
fixed points in the physical world, nor a fixed realm of logic”.107 The denial of fixed truths 
and facts in the material world in essence denies the perceived objective material 
foundation of natural sciences, revealing their social roots. Collins explains that SSK 
theorists, using the principles of relativism, call for as little recourse to rationality as 
possible, so that “beliefs that seem less rational should be explained in the same way as 
those that seem more rational”,108 thus translating relativism into the requirement for 
symmetry and impartiality towards scientific theories.  
The concept and necessity of symmetrical and impartial inquiry into scientific 
knowledge was formulated and highlighted by David Bloor in his book Knowledge and 
Social Imagery (1976/1991). According to Bloor, “the central tenets of the sociology of 
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knowledge are that in investigating the causes of beliefs, sociologists should be impartial to 
the truth or falsity of the beliefs, and that such beliefs should be explained 
symmetrically”.109 The importance of this relativism is most clearly seen in the examination 
of the relationships between “science” and “pseudoscience”, between “hard” and “soft” 
scientific facts, which can only be comprehended if the nature of the definitions of both 
antipodes is objectively examined.110 Equal treatment of both scientific truth and falsity is 
crucial in social relations that are constantly in flux; according to Fleck, the history of 
humanity is a history “complete with all [our] errors [the past] survives in accepted 
concepts, in the presentation of problems, in the syllabus of formal education, as well as in 
language and institutions”.111 Relativity, insecurity, past mistakes and misperceptions, all 
these are features of the human individual and individuals are human before they are 
physicists, mathematicians, artists or social scientists. In other words, human agency in 
itself presupposes that all these imperfections will be passed on to anything that individuals 
do; which brings me to the third contribution of SSK – the influence of the human element. 
Human agency is at the centre of the inquiry of the sociology of scientific knowledge in the 
sense that an individual is motivated in his/her actions, decisions, statements not only by 
facts but by their environment, education, beliefs about the world and images of the others, 
cognitive consistency, etc.112 In the words of Barnes and Edge and in the context of SSK, 
“in controversial situations, the value premises of the disputants colour their findings. The 
boundaries of the problems to be studied, the alternatives weighed, and the issues regarded 
as appropriate – all tend to determine which data are selected as important, which facts 
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emerge”.113 Moreover, individual expectations of what there is to be discovered may also 
determine what is actually discovered.114 
 
Understanding Process 
Keeping these working assumptions in mind, I will now turn to the observations of 
process that authors have recorded and analysed. Process-tracing material will be used both 
from the field of the social construction of scientific knowledge and that of the social 
construction of technologies. There have been debates as to whether “science and 
technology are essentially different and [whether] different approaches to their study 
[should be] warranted” in the words of Pinch and Bijker.115 But as these authors have 
shown, “the study of science and the study of technology should, and indeed can, benefit 
from each other”.116 For the purposes of my research I will assume that they can be studied 
using the same methods of social construction, since the two fields have much in common 
– they are studying the development of material facts and technological objects within a 
social environment, paying special attention to the various types of power at play in the 
process.  
A large part of the studies of SSK and SCOT have been empirical in nature and 
have focused primarily on demonstrating and pinpointing the influence and bias of the 
social world and political power on the construction of knowledge and technology rather 
                                                 
113 B. Barnes and D. Edge, eds, .Science in Context – Readings in the Sociology of Science.– pp.278 
114 Good illustration of this point is provided by Bruner and Posman’s experiment with playing cards (cited in 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Knowledge), in the former, individuals were requested to identify anomalous 
cards (such as black four of diamonds) in a colonnade of cards. According to the results of the experiment, 
“individuals expectations, attuned to the conventional format of the cards, appeared to have structured what 
individuals can and do see” – in B. Barnes, D. Bloor and J. Henry, Scientific Knowledge – A Sociological 
Analysis – pp.5 
115 T. Pinch and W. Bijker, “The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of 
Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other” – pp.401, 432.  
116 Ibid. 
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than on creating a theoretical model of the process of knowledge construction.117 Some 
inferences can be made however and one can begin to construct a theoretical model on the 
basis of these readings. The process of fact and technology construction can roughly be 
taken to consist of two parts – firstly, there are experiments and debates among experts, 
which are supplemented by debates between experts, policy-makers and industry, and 
secondly, there is closure – this is where scientific facts get established and technologies 
get accepted. The point of closure means that “a fact… loses all temporal qualifications and 
becomes incorporated into a large body of knowledge drawn upon by others”.118  
The process of fact formation begins with research and findings. Findings need to 
come in the format and with the precision accepted throughout the field of research119 if 
they are to be recognised as worthy of attention. Format and precision is supplemented by 
the identity of those who present them – the reputation of scientists in the laboratory, their 
rank and experience all influence the extent to which their claims to knowledge are taken 
seriously.120 An observation of laboratory discussions concludes that “who had made a 
claim was as important as the claim itself”.121 Scientists in laboratories as well as groups 
working on the construction of new technologies all tend to work in networks and these 
networks in turn confront each other, as well as communicate with government officials 
                                                 
117 B. Barnes, D. Bloor, and J. Henry, Scientific Knowledge – A Sociological Analysis.; B. Barnes and D. 
Edge,eds. Science in Context – Readings in the Sociology of Science.; D. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy – A 
Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance; G. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of 
US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology; J. Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge – Constructivism and the 
History of Science; H. Collins, “The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of Contemporary Science”. 
118 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life – The Construction of Scientific Facts – pp. 106 
119 B. Latour and S. Woolgar discuss a situation where the standards of proof had changed pushing one of the 
researchers out of the field because he could not afford the expenses of investing in new equipment that 
would guarantee the precision of results – pp. 119-124; E. Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National 
Epistemic Communities and the international Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control”– members of 
the epistemic community working to enhance nuclear arms control “knew each other well… they learned 
from one another and together generated the standards by which they verified the validity of their ideas” – 
pp.112, see also pp.115. 
120 Ibid. – pp. 155-160. 
121 Ibid. – pp. 164 
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and industry representatives.122 The process of the construction of facts is one of lengthy 
discussions and reference to previous research and to the rules of reasoning available in the 
respective field, but clearly the focus of the findings of Latour and Woolgar remains on the 
fact that “the epistemological qualities of validity and wrongness cannot be separated from 
sociological notions of decision-making”.123 In other words, experiments and testing are not 
the sole determinants of resulting knowledge and/or technologies.  
The research into nuclear missile guidance provides ample evidence of the latter. 
The nature of the subject of study – Intercontinental Balistic Missiles (ICBMs) - does not 
allow for this technology to be tested in fully operational conditions, or even if a test is 
conducted, the latter cannot be used as convincing evidence of the proper functioning of 
this technology. The proponents of the unmanned ICBMs were confronted by the 
proponents of the manned bomber “who were inclined to radical doubt as to whether 
missile accuracies were fact”.124 This controversy was not resolved by unequivocal 
reference to facts and figures; rather, the issue “declined” due to a change in attitudes 
towards ICBMs and nuclear testing internationally.125 Change in the perceptions of nuclear 
weapons helped the epistemic community working on issues of nuclear arms control to get 
their agenda to policy-makers and start a process of negotiations between East and West on 
these issues.126 This discussion of how the course of science and technology changes under 
the influence of both scientific and social factors takes me to the second stage of the 
                                                 
122 D. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy – A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance; G. Spinardi, 
From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology – pp. 190-3; E. Adler 
“The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the international Evolution of the Idea 
of Nuclear Arms Control”; B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life – The Construction of Scientific Facts; 
H. Engelhardt and A. Caplan, eds., Scientific Controversies – Case studies in the resolution and closure of 
disputes in science and technology. (Cambridge UP, New York: 1987) – pp. 11-13.  
123 Ibid. – pp. 121 
124 D. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy – A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance – pp. 342-7, 
419. 
125 Ibid. – pp. 346 
126 E. Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the international 
Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control”– pp.116, 121 
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formation of scientific knowledge – the closure of scientific debates.  
 
Closure 
The concept of closure as presented by Engelhardt and Caplan (1987) is very 
similar if not identical to the concept of “stabilisation” of a scientific fact, as discussed by 
Latour and Woolgar (1986) and both of them resemble the “tipping point” of a moral norm 
as discussed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1996). The common feature of the three terms is 
that they signify a moment in which actors with conflicting views and differing roles and 
positions in the social system agree on a fact or a norm and accept it as an integral part of 
their understanding of the material environment (in the case of scientific facts) and their 
own identities (in the case of normative change). I will come back to this discussion in my 
theoretical model of norm development. The term closure “indicates the conclusion, ending 
or resolution of a controversy”,127 which according to the authors inevitably involves 
ethical and political layers, if not directly then implicitly as a part of the “scientist’s cultural 
milieu”.128 The point of stabilisation “entails the escape of a statement from all reference to 
the process of construction… Up to a certain point… the inclusion of reference to the 
conditions of construction is necessary for purposes of persuasion”; after that a fact 
becomes established and the former is no longer required.129 In other words, achieving 
closure or stabilisation is indicative that a controversy has been resolved and a fact 
accepted, which is in turn evidence that interests, power, science, ethics have reached a 
common ground and formulated new knowledge.  
Studies of closure have come up with a classification of the types of ending that 
                                                 
127 H. Engelhardt and A. Caplan, eds., Scientific Controversies – pp. 2  
128 Ibid. – pp. 3 
129 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life – The Construction of Scientific Facts – pp. 176. 
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scientific debates can have. “Scientific controversies are usually seen to be the sort of 
disputes that are to be resolved by appeal to facts and to rigorous reasoning concerning 
facts”.130 The appeal of facts is that they are perceived as objective, material and can be 
reported repeatedly by more than one observer. This view however is in complete 
opposition to the results of the observations summarised above. Engelhardt and Caplan  
emphasise the findings of SSK and SCOT, as their conclusion is that when a debate has 
different layers to it, e.g., political, scientific, social, ethical, the political interests prevail 
and the political rules of closure apply.131 The types of closure can be broadly summarised 
in five categories – closure through loss of interest, closure through force, closure through 
consensus, closure through sound argument, and closure through negotiation.132 Having 
looked at empirical studies of social constructivism in IR, one can easily recognise patterns 
of closure similar to the ones listed above; the only difference is that the studies of social 
constructivism have not paid nearly enough attention to that particular part of the norm 
evolution process. Before I proceed with a discussion of the synthetic model of norm 
evolution, which is a combination of the findings of constructivism in IR, SSK and SCOT, 
I would like to briefly review the types of closure proposed by Engelhardt and Caplan, so 
that further reference to them will be possible.  
Closure through loss of interest, also called “natural death closure” or 
“abandonment”,133 indicates an end to a debate due to loss of its relevance or due to actors 
losing interest in it. This type of closure is not based on logic or material evidence. An 
example of this type of closure is found in MacKenzie’s research into the construction of 
the concept of accuracy of ICBMs, where various factors both political and social brought 
                                                 
130 H. Engelhardt and A. Caplan, eds., Scientific Controversies – pp.1 
131 Ibid. – pp.163 
132 Ibid. – pp. 14-5 
133 Ibid. – pp.13 
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about the loss of interest in the further development of this technology.134 Closure though 
force is the termination of debates on “the basis of non-epistemic factors, such as the 
authority of the state, or the withdrawal of publication facilities”.135 This type of closure 
indicates a situation where governments are, for whatever reason, no longer interested in 
supporting a debate or financing further research in a controversial field. Closure is again 
not achieved on the basis of objective knowledge and scientific research and the hunt for 
answers is suppressed by political influence. Closure through consensus is reached when 
“the participants embrace a particular view point, not through general rational arguments, 
negotiation or established procedures but through non-epistemic influences that lead to a 
community of belief”.136 Closure through sound argument is based on rational argument, 
which follows the laws of scientific inference. In controversies with heavy political content, 
however, it is highly unlikely that argumentation will be completed by resort to sound 
argument. As Engelhardt and Caplan have pointed out in such situations, it is the political 
rules that apply.137 Closure through negotiation indicates the reaching of an agreement 
between the parties involved in a controversy. “[N]egotiation closure creates (as opposed to 
discovers or discloses) a solution”.138 The study of closure and fact-stabilisation provides 
useful insights, which are not confined to the sphere of scientific knowledge and will be 
further applied to the study of norm development.   
The sociology of scientific knowledge provides a useful theoretical foundation for 
this research as it calls into question the social processes of scientific knowledge formation. 
There are two main contributions of SSK theories to the current research. One of them is 
                                                 
134 D. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy – A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance – pp.405 
135 H. Engelhardt and A. Caplan, eds., Scientific Controversies – pp. 6 
136 Ibid. – pp.14 
137 Ibid. – pp. 163. 
138 Ibid. - pp.15 
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the study of the dynamics of scientific fact creation, which emphasises the interplay among 
different actors and the use of social and political power. These studies have produced 
important conclusions that can be applied to the understanding of the process of creating 
behavioural norms. The other theoretical contribution is the deepening of our understanding 
of the moment of closure in scientific and other social debates. This social moment and the 
way in which it is reached, I argue later, plays an important role for determining the 
character and strength of the behavioural norm that is being created.  
 
The Synthetic Theoretical Model of Norm Evolution 
Building on the achievements of social constructivists in IR and the theorists of 
SSK and SCOT, this research proposes a model for studying in more depth the process of 
norm development. This synthetic model is an attempt to fine-tune the already existing 
body of knowledge to reflect more fully the complexity of norm construction and to 
understand more clearly the social processes involved. The process of establishing new 
behavioural norms consists of a complex web of relationships of power, influence, 
knowledge, morality, justice; examining the various stages of this process in greater detail 
will help give answers to important questions. Why do some norms develop and others do 
not? Why do norms evolve at certain moments in time, within a specific historical context? 
How do states agree to amend the standards of appropriateness to higher and more 
demanding levels? Understanding the way in which norms are negotiated will also help 
explain norm compliant state behaviour within an anarchical international society – an issue 
that has often been at the heart of IR debates.  
By using original empirical research in different spheres of international policy-
making, I am going to compare this model of norm development to the case studies and 
evaluate the findings emerging from the historical reconstruction of events. One of my 
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secondary aims is to show that norm compliance is intricately linked to the process of norm 
development, at least for the states actively involved in this process, because during the 
process of normative negotiations, state identities are re-defined and normative 
constructions widened to make room for the new prescriptions for appropriate behaviour. 
I begin with a brief classification of the participants involved in the process of norm 
creation. So far actors have been grouped according to the methods that they are perceived 
to employ in the process of norm construction.139 In my view, however, actors should not 
be classified according to these criteria, as outlined in the review of constructivist literature, 
because the proposed categories do not match the networks that actors create, but instead 
overlap in places or draw dividing lines where there are not any. It will be much more 
productive and informative to study how different actors form negotiating coalitions, what 
the power dynamics in these coalitions are, what roles different types of actors assume and 
how the negotiating coalitions influence the policy-making process. Actors form coalitions 
on the basis of their vested interests and the members of coalitions often follow the same 
logic of action. The demands of the different logic of action and the aim of the actors 
involved often pull in opposite directions. When the different logics of action can be 
reconciled and when actors manage to find common interests, the negotiating coalitions are 
at their strongest. Actors are usually associated with a particular logic of action. For 
example, global civil society and scientific communities are perceived to act according to a 
                                                 
139 As argued earlier, NGOs and advocacy networks are often perceived to resort to moral persuasion, see,  A. 
Klotz, Norms in International Relations – The Struggle Against Apartheid. (Cornell University Press. Ithaca: 
1995); M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations, M. 
Finnemore, National Interests in International Society; whereas epistemic communities and networks of 
scientists are seen as resorting to impartial scientific knowledge, see,  P. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic 
Communities and International Policy Coordination”; P. Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic 
Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone”; E. Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National 
Epistemic Communities and the international Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control” and many 
others; and TNCs, banks and other economic actors relying primarily on their material resources and 
capabilities to effectively lobby nation-state governments to adopt policies to the formers’ convenience 
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logic of argumentation in a context of appropriateness, while corporations and states are 
viewed as following a logic of consequences. These constructions, however, should not be 
assumed as they do not always hold true and are heavily value-laden, as discussed earlier. 
The logics of action and the interests of the actors should be studied on a case-by-case 
basis, which in turn will only explain the basis of coalition binding.  
Constructivist analysis of norm evolution so far has tended to assume that actors 
participate only in the formulation of norms/policies the character of which corresponds to 
their sphere of work, that is to say, scientific experts do not take part in the formulation of 
new international moral norms,140 epistemic communities are only concerned with issues 
that are strictly within their expertise,141 and global civil society actors engage mainly in 
issues with a normative character.142 I wish to prove in the course of this research that this 
classification is too rigid. Scientific and technical issues do have a normative side to them 
(even if that is confined to the normative milieu of scientists), and norms have a technical 
side, which means that appeal to scientific knowledge does not exclude the discussion of 
moral issues and vice versa. Moreover, economic actors and states although influenced by 
the logic of consequences are concerned with the development of a normative framework, 
because they exist and function within a socially constructed (often backed up by laws) 
context of appropriateness.143  
 I will proceed here with the discussion of the synthetic model theorising the 
process of norm development, where I combine the findings of the social constructivist 
                                                 
140 A. Klotz, “Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist 
Experiences” European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 8, no. 1, 2002 – pp. 57 
141 P. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”. 
142 A. Klotz, Norms in International Relations – The Struggle Against Apartheid. (Cornell University Press. 
Ithaca: 1995); M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Relations, M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society; 
143 H. Mueller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic 
of Appropriateness in International Relations” – pp. 410-8 
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literature in the sphere of international relations and the social construction of scientific 
knowledge and technology. Constructivists of IR have paid close attention to the social 
processes related to the creation and implementation of norms and have conducted 
elaborate empirical studies, which will be useful in my attempt to further theorise the 
process of norm development. SSK and SCOT researchers, who have studied the processes 
of scientific fact formation and the creation and establishment of new technologies, have 
revealed the social beginning of scientific knowledge within a context of power 
relationships similar to those within any social system. Theorists of SSK have shown that 
the agenda of scientific research is influenced by demands for further knowledge coming 
from different actors – advocacy networks, states, industry, social movements, etc. The 
current research is aimed at deconstructing norms and facts and at showing that what seems 
today as the only rational, “normal” state of the world, is a social construction that we have 
built over time, and which is open to re-interpretation, questioning and change. Culture, 
knowledge, technologies, legal principles are all subject to change and concepts like 
technological determinism144 do nothing but distract attention from the human innovation 
and the ability to individuals to set the direction of change of our social system, preventing 
us from understanding the causes and effects of the processes of change within this system.  
The theoretical model of norm development that I propose has seven stages – 
formation of the initial idea, network configuration, issue formation, dialogue between 
proactive and conservative states, reaching political closure, institutionalisation/ 
operationalisation, and legalisation (Figure 1). Normative ideas do not always become legal 
                                                 
144 According to the concept of technological determinism, “the development of technology itself follows a 
path largely beyond cultural or political influence, and technology in turn has "effects" on societies that are 
inherent, rather than socially conditioned” - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_determinism ; See 
also D. Chandler, Technological or Media Determinism, Aberyswyth The University of Wales, The media 
and Communications Studies Site - http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/tecdet/tdet12.html  
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norms that are effective in governing state behaviour; the process of development can come 
to an end at any stage and normative ideas may remain undeveloped; some norms can even 
be discarded and attention to those may wane over time, which makes this model dynamic 
and open.  
Figure 1 
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Stage 1 – Initial idea 
Various factors can create the need for the development of the initial idea for a new 
norm – a disaster, or a crises, the anticipation of a disaster,145 shocking revelations of 
information about large scale human suffering,146 a need for international regulation where 
there is none.147 The initial idea can be formulated by an individual – a norm 
entrepreneur148 - or by a group of individuals – communities of experts149 - by an 
organisation – a state150 or an economic actor.151 The identity of the norm entrepreneur will 
inevitably influence the process of the development of an idea, its chances for success, the 
time that it takes for the idea to become a norm. There are different theories as to which 
actors make the most successful norm entrepreneurs – some argue that actors close to the 
                                                 
145 Anticipated disaster was the reason for the formulation of norms in the case of the use of CFCs – P. Haas, 
“Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone”, 187-224 and 
the alert of an environmental crises brought states around the table to discuss the Med Plan – P. Haas, “Do 
Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control”, 377-403; T. Farrell, 
“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army”, European 
Journal of International Relations. Vol. 7, No. 1,2001 – Farrell argues that external shock is one of the 
necessary conditions for radical change in the norms of war – pp. 20-1 
146 Examples here come from different fields – the campaign to ban the use of Land Mines – R. Price, 
“Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”; the idea for the creation of ad 
hoc war crime tribunals – C. Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals”; campaigns for woman suffrage, campaigns against foot binding in China, human rights campaigns 
in Latin America, campaigns drawing attention to violence against women – M. Keck and K. Sikkink, 
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations.; movements for the protection of 
the rights of women – N. Berkovitch, “The Emergence and Transformation of the International Women’s 
Movement” in J.Boli and G.Thomas, Constructing World Culture – International Nongovernmental 
Organisations since 1875 
147 M. Finnemore, “Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State 
Violence” in J.Boli and G.Thomas, Constructing World Culture – International Nongovernmental 
Organisations since 1875 
148 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, – pp. 897 – 
discussing the case of the creation of the ICRC, the campaign for women’s suffrage 
149 P. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control” – pp. 380; 
the issue of banning land mine use was also initiated by congresses of experts – R. Price, “Reversing the Gun 
Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”– pp.617-23 
150 N. Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use”, C. 
Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals”, E. Nadelmann, 
“Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society”, W. Thomas, The Ethics of 
Destruction – Norms and Force in International Relations, (Cornell University Press. Ithaca, New York: 
2001) 
151 W. Drake and K. Nicolaidis, “Ideas, Interests and Institutionalisation: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay 
Round”. International Organisation. Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, 37-100 
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policy-making elites have the best chance of realising their normative beliefs;152 others 
argue that only individuals or organisations who come from the periphery of the political 
system have not been corrupted by bureaucratic power and thus have undamaged normative 
ideas that are worth working for.153 Theo Farrell summarizes the constructivist position that 
proximity to authority “can aid norm entrepreneurs” but is not a “condition of success”.154 
Taking into account Checkel’s critique of the constructivists for portraying states as 
negative characters155, this research is based on the assumption that all actors are capable of 
initiating normative ideas, which are not necessarily either good or bad. The closer an actor 
is to the policy-making circles, however, the easier it is likely to be for an idea to become 
established, but contacts with politicians are not a sufficient condition for a norm to get 
established. Although causal relationships will be sought throughout the case studies to 
which this model is applied, the research hypothesis is that it is not so much the social 
position of the norm entrepreneur as it is the ability to form an effective normative network 
that influences the successful norm development process.  
The circumstances in which an initial idea has been formulated also influence the 
following stages of norm development. If an idea is formulated amidst a humanitarian 
crises or a disaster, there are chances that this idea will evolve quickly and will aim at 
making a practical difference to those suffering. Instances of human suffering have indeed 
                                                 
152 This hypothesis is proposed by the studies on military innovation, suggesting that “entrepreneurs’ 
proximity to the leadership of the target community is critical to success” – T. Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms 
and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army’. European Journal of International 
Relations. Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001, 63 – 102. The article has taken into account S. Rosen, Winning The Next War, 
(Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY: 1991); B. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY: 1984) and M. Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY: 1999)– 
pp. 83 
153 For an in-depth discussion see Frederick Frey, Survey Research on Comparative Social Change, (The MIT 
Press, Boston, MA: 1969)  
154 T. Farrell, “Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army”– 
pp. 83 
155 See Infra Notes 44, 45, 46 
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drawn public attention and increased pressure on politicians to take action.156 The lack of 
an immediate crisis, normative interest from strong states or public pressure, on the other 
hand, can protract negotiations or lead to the overall dismissal of the need to develop a 
particular norm.157 In other words, the political and normative context within which an 
initial idea is formulated is quite important for its further development and should be 
studied where such evidence can be obtained. 
 
Stage 2 – Network Configuration 
The norm entrepreneur, whether an individual, a group, or a state, needs to form a 
network of supporters in order to begin gaining critical mass and voice to initiate change in 
world politics. I am using the term ‘network configuration’ because networks need not be 
created from scratch in each instance of norm creation – actors may benefit from existing 
networks, or look to combine new activists with existing networks. The configuration of an 
influential network of supporters is one of the decisive moments of a successful campaign 
for the creation of a new behavioural norm in international relations. The support of a 
network of actors helps an idea to gain credibility and authority, which adds momentum to 
the process of lobbying national governments. Network configuration is understudied and 
the existence of pro-active networks of support is often viewed as a given. If we choose to 
ignore this process, however, we are missing out on important instances of bargaining and 
persuasion as well as a careful division of responsibilities among actors who may be very 
                                                 
156 C. Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals” discusses how 
public pressure and public memory prompted action in Bosnia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) – “The 
similarity between events in Nazi Germany and contemporary Bosnia served to cultivate close associations 
with World War II and its lessons. Considerations of the ‘Munich analogy’ necessitated some kind of 
intervention” – pp. 661 
157 In the case of the construction of atrocities regime, examined by C. Rudolph in “Constructing an Atrocities 
Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals”, the above mentioned factors were not at play in Cambodia, 
Indonesia and East Timor, and although various crimes against humanity were committed an ad hoc criminal 
court was never set up – pp. 675-8 
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different in terms of their nature and power capabilities. The success/failure of this stage 
determines whether an idea will take off or not. In other words, the stronger, more 
convincing and more authoritative the network, the greater its chances for successful 
normative persuasion.  
Stage 2 is one of information gathering by the norm entrepreneur (individual or 
group) in which the latter has to convince others to join in a coalition for the creation of a 
particular norm. In cases where transnational civil society actors have come up with the 
initial idea, they often look for the support of scientists and technical experts who can help 
establish in technical, rather than emotional terms, the realm of the problem, its 
implications, the best way to deal with it, etc.158 Clearly, technical knowledge does not 
always have to agree with normative ideas, as the case study of intellectual property rights 
in the pharmaceutical industry illustrates. The only way out of such a deadlock is 
negotiation - between the experts and the normative proponents, where both sides search 
for alternatives that would meet their requirements. Scientists and experts look to expand 
the existing body of knowledge so that solutions can be found, while social movements 
assess the implications for those who can potentially suffer. Where states are norm 
entrepreneurs, one can discern similar processes of negotiations, coalition-building159 and 
knowledge-sharing, which have an impact on the bargaining power of the group.   
Networks are often consolidated at conferences and workshops where normative 
and scientific issues are raised and groups sympathetic to the cause begin communicating. 
Social movements and NGOs seek out scientists – both within the organisations and outside 
                                                 
158 R. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” – pp.620. Price 
presents evidence of a series of conferences being held between NGOs, advocacy networks and experts of 
many spheres concerned with the production, trade, use of landmines, as well as the effects of landmines on 
individuals and communities.  
159 N. Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use”, 
W. Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction – Norms and Force in International Relations. 
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of them - as scientific knowledge is an important factor for network consolidation and for 
the formulation of the normative issue.  
 
Stage 3 – Issue Formation 
The process of issue formation often takes place at the same time as the 
configuration of the supportive network. As actors meet to discuss issues that they consider 
problematic, networks begin to emerge. Work to construct the causal relationships that help 
problematise certain issues over others is conducted in official and unofficial meetings and 
conferences. In this process the parameters of the issue at stake are specified and the actors 
need to reach agreement on the technical and moral scope of the problem that they wish to 
present policy-makers with. The stage of issue formation comprises a process of 
information sharing and negotiation. NGOs, charities, advocacy networks, corporations, 
scientists, professional analysts, inter-governmental organisations, etc., from different fields 
and with different expertise, participate in conferences and workshops where they 
communicate their concerns and findings in an attempt to find the common grounds 
between normative issues, technical concerns and the actors’ own interests160 (which may 
clash at times161). At this stage, normative issues are clad in scientific terms - as causes and 
effects, as dependent and independent variables, and as a set of actions needed to remedy 
human suffering. Scientific findings are in turn evaluated in a normative context where 
consequences are examined for their justice and equitability.  
In the process of issue formation, actors work towards establishing the technical and 
                                                 
160 The issue of land-mines, for example, had to be re-defined as being not an issue of disarmament, but an 
international humanitarian disaster, in order for states to agree to participate in negotiations – R. Price, 
“Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” – pp. 639 
161 A. Klotz, “Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist 
Experiences”; P. Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric 
Ozone”; E. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society”. 
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moral scope of the future norm. The technical scope includes reaching agreement on cause-
and-effect relationships, as well as identifying the problem resulting from these causal 
relationships and in some cases defining a technical solution to that problem. As discussed 
previously, however, science is not always unequivocal and when complex issues are at 
stake, scientists may disagree on different aspects of the technical scope of the new norm. 
Scientific knowledge is often produced to respond to demands for further clarity. I argue 
that in the process of formulating the problematic issue, it is crucial that experts reach 
scientific closure on its technical scope, just as it is crucial for civil society actors to reach 
normative closure, that is, to reach agreement on the moral scope of the proposed norm. 
The lack of closure in the scientific or normative realm does not mean that the norm will 
not progress further; rather, it means that the political negotiations that are to follow will be 
more difficult with actors continually referring to scientific or normative uncertainties.  
Scientific knowledge is useful in persuading actors of the need to act on a given 
issue. Scientific closure enhances actors’ faith in the success of a developing norm and 
creates conditions for the realisation of the need for a particular norm. Science, however, is 
a product of public, political or economic demand and may be tainted to reflect the interests 
of those who fund scientific research. “[I]n the international arena, neither the processes 
whereby knowledge becomes more extensive nor the means whereby reflection on 
knowledge deepens are passive or automatic. They are intensely political.”162 In other 
words, scientific knowledge is created within a specific social, cultural and political 
context, which is bound to affect the questions that scientists ask and what scientists 
discover. 
Civil society may also bring in biases towards the interests of the groups that are 
                                                 
162 F. Kratochwil and J. Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State” 
International Organization. Vol. 40, no. 4, 1986, – pp. 773 
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most actively involved in the creation and definition of a particular norm. These interests 
may not always be benign and social groups are not always concerned with the greater 
good for the greater number of people.  
Issue formation also relates to constructing a problematic issue within a particular 
context and choosing an institutional forum, which can best address this problem. When the 
problem of landmines was constructed against the background of conventional weapons 
disarmament treaties, it was not successful in attracting enough political attention; however, 
once it was presented as a humanitarian problem with a very high human cost, policy-
makers created the Convention Banning the Use of Landmines.163 In another example, 
which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, the protection of intellectual property 
rights in the pharmaceutical industry, was initially part of a one-size-fits-all approach to 
intellectual property, looking after the interests of innovators, constructed in a context of 
fair trade practices. When public pressure started to mount and the issue was constructed as 
one reflecting on the developed world’s morality, depriving those in the developing world 
from access to basic medicines, the norm was reshaped and redefined to cater for those who 
could not afford expensive patented medicines. Wording and contextualising an issue in the 
most effective and attention-grabbing way brings norm entrepreneurs a step closer to 
successful norm creation.  
 
Stage 4 – Dialogue with the Conservative Actors 
Some states take an active interest in the processes of network configuration and 
issue formation on some issues, alongside civil society and epistemic communities. Those 
governments who are convinced of the need for the creation of a new norm become part of 
                                                 
163 R. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” – pp. 639 
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the activist network and help raise concerns at the inter-governmental level. The states who 
support the normative status quo, together with other actors who are opposed to the 
proposed changes constitute the group of conservative actors. The dialogue stage is in 
essence another stage of negotiations, but this time mainly among states who have the 
material capabilities, the bargaining power and the administrative authority to effect change 
in international norms and regulations. This phase is critical because convincing states and 
other actors of the need for urgent action on a question not on their agenda is not an easy 
task, and if these negotiations fail a normative idea goes off the international agenda and 
back to the preparation stages.  
The dialogue between pro-active and conservative states is a complex process of 
balancing of interests, negotiating trade-offs, calculating costs and benefits, threats and 
opportunities. What makes this process of negotiations even more challenging is the 
existence of large disparities between the participants in inter-governmental negotiations, as 
they have different political agendas, strategic positioning within the global system, and 
perceptions of risk, uncertainty, economic development, etc.  
Power dialogues take place between state experts and independent experts who are 
part of the norm-promoting network; experts working for industries that are directly 
affected may also join in the discussions.164 The dialogue with states can lead to their 
agreement on the need for the creation/change of a norm in the international system or to 
their declining to deal with the proposed issue. If states are not interested or strongly 
disagree on the need or feasibility of the creation/change of a norm, this could either end 
the life of the normative idea or take it back a stage or two in its evolution for the idea to be 
                                                 
164 P. Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone”. 
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modified and made more attractive or at least less threatening for states’ interests. Once 
states have agreed in principle to the need of creating a new norm regulating behaviour, we 
can say that they have reached the point of political closure on the normative issue. 
The dialogue between pro-active and conservative states usually takes place over 
protracted periods of time. It may take years for states to agree even in principle that there 
is a need for a new norm to further regulate their behaviour. Non-state actors take active 
part in these negotiations by providing information, expertise, by lobbying national 
governments, by mobilising public opinion, etc. States, however, are better equipped to 
complete these negotiations, as they often have leverage against each other in the world 
system. Government officials can bargain their way through normative negotiations by 
means of offering and accepting trade-offs, as well as by means of threats and coercion. 
 
Stage 5 – Reaching Political Closure 
The concepts of stabilisation, closure, and tipping all denote a social moment in 
which a scientific fact or a norm becomes accepted as default and as a part of the 
operational environment of actors. As discussed earlier, the specificity of this point stems 
from the fact that in one way or another, the differences between scientists, civil society, 
political actors, industry representatives, which are seemingly irreconcilable, are resolved 
and they reach an agreement to establish a behavioural norm. This social moment is 
extremely important even though it remains understudied. Political closure, I argue, 
similarly to scientific closure, as studied by Engelhardt and Caplan, may come in different 
forms. Political closure may be a result of genuine consensus; it may be reached by 
coercion and threat; closure may be a product of political bargaining and trade-offs. The 
manner in which closure is arrived at affects the creation of more or less effective 
behavioural norms. When closure is forced, for example, the created norm is likely to be 
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contested in the future and controversies are likely to re-open closures. Political closure, it 
must be kept in mind, however, is different from normative and scientific closures in that 
the former are horizontal closures, reached among like-minded actors, who are willing to 
find a point of consensus. Political closure, on the other hand, is vertical, involving both 
states and non-state actors. It is often based on the smallest common denominator among 
actors’ interests, and even on coercion or political pressure by the more powerful. Political 
closure needs to be studied separately from the former two examples because of the 
dynamics of power, which are completely different among states and between states and 
other actors. Political closure is based on normative and scientific closures and in cases 
where the latter are solid, emerging from genuine consensus, political closure has the 
likelihood of being more stable, resulting in more effective norms.  
State negotiations draw together activists from transnational civil society, 
independent experts and other organisations interested in the development of the normative 
idea. Since most negotiations are conducted at the United Nations or one of its agencies, 
procedures have been put in place, over the years, to involve non-state actors in the 
processes of norm negotiations.165 When states discuss changes to the international 
normative environment the debates attract the attention of economic actors as well. 
International businesses, TNCs, and industry organisations often choose to set their agendas 
at the national level where they have better access to policy-makers through established 
channels of lobbying. Depending on the normative issue, economic actors may choose to 
build coalitions at the international level, and these often command impressive material 
resources. In any case, economic power tends to always be represented at international 
                                                 
165 The United Nations have created a mechanism via which NGOs can gain consultative status with some of 
its agencies. In 1996, the UN Committee of Non-Governmental Organisations was created (CONGO) to 
facilitate relationships with NGOs - http://www.ngocongo.org/ngopart/index.htm   
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negotiations.  
The point of closure is reached when the majority of states involved in these 
political negotiations agree on the need to create a new norm. This crucial moment needs to 
be examined in more depth. According to the sociologists of knowledge, the point of 
stabilisation is a social moment when the new norm loses its reference to the process of 
negotiation and the actors involved in its formation, and becomes part of the recognised 
moral context of international relations.166 Similarly, constructivists in IR define the tipping 
point as the point when “the old norms [begin to] produce social disapproval”.167 Therefore, 
this is also the moment in time when the need to regulate behaviour with a clear normative 
prescription is accepted by states. Those states who are normative entrepreneurs tend to 
internalise the new behavioural norm early during the negotiations. Their governments 
often create domestic legal norms on the new normative issue to reflect on their conviction 
on the new normative principles. The states who oppose the need for a new norm may be 
lured into agreeing by means of persuasion, coercion, or bargaining. But these states are 
also the ones who avoid compliance where possible.  
Proof that political closure has taken place can be found in intergovernmental 
debates, where discussions move on from the normative negotiations on the need for a new 
norm to more practical negotiations of how best to achieve the objective of the new norm. 
Further proof that political closure has taken place is the changing nature of political 
debates – from normative and scientific (truth-seeking) to more technical, concerned with 
spelling out clear normative principles. Political closure signifies the beginning of a process 
of internalisation of a normative prescription. Evidence that closure has taken place can be 
found in the negotiating records, in political speeches and reviews of governmental 
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conferences.  
The concepts of closure of a debate, a resolution of a scientific dispute, a norm 
cascade have been studied only in so far as to identify them as a part of the scientific, 
historic, political and social processes of truth-seeking. The “closure project”168 has focused 
attention primarily on the classification of the existing types of closure and on the historical 
study of the types of closure applied to issues with different composition of social, political 
and scientific elements.169 More research, however, is needed to assist in devising clearer 
mechanisms of detecting and measuring political closure, as it is a complex and 
multilayered social event.  
 
Stage 6 – Legalisation 
Not all behavioural norms reach the stage of legalisation, as some remain customary 
practices and tacit understandings. Legalisation is a complex process because states 
primarily, but also other non-state actors involved in the discussions of legal texts, are 
particularly meticulous about the use of language and even punctuation. Legalisation can 
take years to complete and sometimes norms lose the momentum of the negotiations 
leading up to the decision to legalise and may become meaningless in political terms by the 
time they are legalised. The process of legalisation can be sped up by demands of industries 
for efficiency, by strong political personalities, by information of large scale human 
suffering, by pressure from the public and so on. What is important, however, is that 
legalisation is effective and not purely superficial. States are careful when they spell out 
obligations that will be binding them in the future and are likely to affect national interests, 
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domestic agendas, and strategic calculations. States which have been conservative in the 
previous stages often see in the process of legalisation a chance to avoid being bound and 
responsible for their actions in a particular normative area, or a chance to bargain on other 
normative issues, making their acceptance of one document contingent upon benefits in 
another sphere of international politics. There has been a growing interest among IR 
scholars in studying the processes of legalising new and existing standards of behaviour,170 
as the process involves not only political negotiations, but also technical legal knowledge 
and expertise and reflects a side of international relations that has been largely ignored by 
the traditional theories. 
 
Stage 7 – Insitutionalisation/Operationalisation 
There has been an increasing tendency to legalise international norms and to spell 
out clear rules, parameters to state obligations, and timelines for adopting specified 
policies. However, the process of legalisation has often not succeeded in producing strong 
enough mechanisms and clear prescriptions that are sufficient to enduce norm-compliant 
state behaviour. Further legal documents – like specific agreements and protocols – are then 
negotiated when the initial pressure from public opinion, normative, scientific and business 
networks has died away. Secondary agreements and protocols provide an opportunity to 
fine-tune international norms, to improve their effectiveness and further clarify, if needed, 
their meaning and scope. The process of institutionalisation may take place both in stage 
six and stage seven, and relates to the creation of institutions to oversee the functioning of 
and compliance with the new norm. Institutionalisation is a vital part of norm development 
but is a purely administrative process. 
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This research argues that in its evolution every norm passes through the above 
stages at least once. The process of norm development does not guarantee that ideas and 
normative beliefs will always evolve into an institutionalised, operational international 
norm. However, this theoretical model does provide some clarity on the process of norm 
development, on the roles of the different actors involved, on the importance of the 
interplay between scientific knowledge and normative beliefs, and on the way in which 
these shape a new norm. It also leads to an inquiry into the link between norm-compliance 
and the process of negotiating new norms. 
The research tools of the social constructivists and the sociologists of knowledge 
will be useful in providing a more holistic and in-depth understanding of the processes 
leading up to the creation of new norms, as they are sensitive to the influence of such 
factors as social dynamics, power relationships, and shared understandings.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS FROM THE USE OF TORTURE 
 
 
After centuries of practicing torture in different forms, for various purposes and 
under the veil of diverse justifications, humankind, indirectly represented by the UN 
General Assembly, finally decided to draw up a prohibition of the practice of torture in a 
legal document with more solid standing and weight – the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT). Why did this process of outlawing the use of torture work in 1984 and not earlier or 
indeed later? Was there anything specific in the context of the timing? What was the 
catalyst that triggered off the creation of the new norm? And indeed, how did this catalyst 
influenced states in proceeding towards further limitations of their sovereignty? My 
research of the processes leading up to the creation of CAT in 1984 will seek answers to all 
of these questions.  
Some suggest that humankind matures, evolves, becomes civilised and this 
evolution explains the creation of new norms of state behaviour.171 Studies of torture in 
medical journals, social and historical accounts, reveal that humankind (or at least some 
authoritative parts of it) indeed evolves, if only to invent newer and more ingenious ways to 
break down the human body and spirit without physically killing an individual.172 
Optimism and pessimism about human morality have been in constant flux throughout the 
process of researching this very grim topic. Sparing the reader gruesome tales of death, 
survival and the continuation of life of trauma and pain, I will present a review of processes 
and campaigns by means of which I aim to reconstruct the historical development of the 
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norm banning the use of physical and psychological torture for whatever purpose, by any 
authority. 
My account of the processes leading up to the creation of the behavioural norm that 
prohibits the use of torture will begin with a brief examination of the history of the practice 
of torture. The latter holds clues and recurring themes that are of great importance to our 
understanding of the underlying nature of torture as well as the type of prohibition needed 
to make torture as morally unjustifiable and as for example slavery or genocide. The 
failures of previous campaigns to outlaw the use of torture have the potential to teach us 
essential lessons of what makes some campaigns successful while others remain 
insufficient to make the needed difference.   
I will track the varying purpose and justification for the use of torture from the 
dawn of civilisation, through the glorious times of Ancient Greece and Rome and all the 
way through to the European Enlightenment. I will then draw attention to a period of 
European history (19th century) when according to various accounts of historians and 
philosophers, judicial torture came to be outlawed in Europe,173 before  it was brought back 
to life during the two world wars, and the post-war world. The end of the Second World 
War, infamous for its inhuman atrocities, marked the beginning of a new normative era 
where human dignity and integrity acquired a prominent place and an ever-increasing 
importance in international politics. Medical and psychological research conducted with 
concentration camp survivors of WWII in search of appropriate methods of rehabilitation 
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and compensation, began to show the width and depth of problems experienced by 
survivors of torture and other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and punishment.174 
Medical experts and researchers were starting to take active interest in examining the 
effects of torture on individuals and in proving scientifically what type of torture has been 
applied. In the meantime, political history was unfolding with decolonisation and self-
determination of peoples taking place which led to increased violence used by imperial 
powers and local political groups grasping for political power. A number of authoritarian 
regimes came to power in Central and South America in the 1970s, during the peak of the 
Cold War when the Soviets were determined to withstand any political opposition at home, 
and torture was one way of achieving this political agenda. In this hostile and violent 
political climate Amnesty International embarked on a world-wide campaign to abolish 
torture, which eventually led to the creation of CAT.  
The core research of this chapter is centred on Amnesty’s campaign, which ran 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. This normative movement was supplemented by other 
more technical campaigns concerned with the use of torture and the involvement of medical 
professionals in these inhumane practices. The primary purpose of this case study is to 
examine how the historical facts and material evidence fit the theoretical model of norm 
development. A secondary aim is to show how the interplay of normative ideas and 
scientific knowledge created a solid foundation for a successful normative campaign, which 
left very little room for manoeuvre to states who were unwilling to bind their behaviour 
with a new norm. The overview of the history of torture reveals the dynamic of the use of 
torture and the failures of previous campaigns to outlaw its use, which can provide useful 
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insights as to what had gone wrong and why. Thus, by the end of this chapter, there will be 
not one but two types of proof of what circumstances aid and hinder the evolution of 
behavioural norms. 
One of the most complex issues in this campaign is the creation of a comprehensive 
definition of torture. Defining the working terms is of vital importance to any research. 
However, since part of this chapter is dedicated to the study of how the legal definition of 
torture was arrived at, using the current legal definition might result in circular reasoning. 
Accordingly, I will offer a working definition of torture, which will be employed up until 
the moment when I come to consider the construction of the current legal definition of this 
practice. In their first report on torture published in 1973, Amnesty International used the 
following explanation of what their campaign considered torture to be: “Torture is the 
systematic and deliberate infliction of acute pain in any form by one person on another, or 
on a third person, in order to accomplish the purpose of the former against the will of the 
latter.”175 Although the above definition is a clear depiction of the contemporary practice of 
torture, it by no means represents the limits of the use to which torture has been put through 
the ages. Europeans had indeed come to be a step away from outlawing judicial torture in 
the 19th century,176 but the practice became common place again (although under different 
justification) during the Second World War and was later redesigned in the 1970s to serve 
the interests of oppressive regimes in power which were prepared to use any means 
necessary to retain control in politically volatile times. 
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Brief History of Torture 
From the tribal world to the XVIII century 
Torture is a much older practice than we often think. Most historical accounts take 
us as far back as Ancient Greece and Rome.177 But George Riley Scott, in his book 
expressly dedicated to compiling an exhaustive account of the history of the practice of 
torture, reminds us that there is hardly “a savage or primitive race which does not employ 
torture either in its religious rites or its code of punishment”.178 Scott continues to point out 
that “torture is rarely absent from the theosophic, initiatory and other rites adopted by the 
savage tribes. The callous attitude of primitive man (sic) towards bloodshed, the lack of 
sympathy for suffering, and the phlegmatic reaction to death itself, are all in accord with 
the exhibition of stoicism in circumstances of danger or suffering”.179 In other words, ‘the 
systematic and deliberate infliction of acute pain’ to fellow individuals for purposes of 
initiation, punishment, or mere extermination (in the case of prisoners of war) has been an 
inseparable part of the social life of humans from the dawn of human existence.  
Ancient Greece and later the Roman Empire saw the institutionalisation of justice-
giving and the centralisation of this power in the hands of a chosen few 180 (VIII-V BC). 
Torture, some historians say, was a procedure applied only to slaves and only when they 
had been convicted of a crime, while “torture of the citizen was forbidden”.181 The free-
man (sic), however, could only be tortured in cases of accusations for treason; in other 
words, the free citizen should very rarely be subjected to torture. This however was not 
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case in practice, as confirmed by the observations of historians - Gibbons indicates that “the 
extension of legal torture to cases of treason virtually annulled the principle by which the 
free-man (sic) was supposed to be exempt from the quaestio except in these supposedly 
rare cases of treason, because it was a comparatively easy matter to bring a variety of 
offences into this somewhat elusive category”.182 Peters notes a similar trend, dated to the 
period between II –IV centuries: “ [it was] indicated by a rescript of the Emperor 
Valentinian in 369… that although torture could be routinely applied in the case of treason, 
and exceptionally by personal command by the emperor, it was, nevertheless, widely and 
indiscriminately applied to freemen (sic) for far less offences”.183 What becomes clear from 
these historical accounts is that the use of torture once authorised is hard to control even 
when the perimeters of its use are strictly limited.  
The following centuries saw the continuing application of torture – “the Christian 
Church adopted the Roman law of torture in regard to treason, applying it to heresy, which 
they construed to be ‘treason against God’”.184 Torture became the natural punishment for 
anyone accused of heresy. A curious historical finding of Scott is that “[o]nce anyone was 
suspected of heresy the public waited neither for guidance nor authority from Church or 
State… They tortured the suspect until a confession was secured, and then without more 
ado burned him at the stake… The penalty of burning may be said therefore to have been 
devised in the first place, not by the State, but by the public”.185 In other words, the spread 
of torture as punishment for heresy was a bottom-up development, if we are to classify 
these social dynamics in contemporary terms. While this practice was justified by the 
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Church, the use of torture for judicial purposes was denounced at a very high level.186 
These double standards of the permissibility of the use of torture indicate that from the 
early days of the exercise of judicial torture, the practice had its opponents mainly due to 
the possibility of punishing innocent persons. Historical sources show, however, that 
regardless of objections by the Church and by philosophers, both religious prosecution and 
the judicial system in Europe continued to use the methods of torture carried on from 
Roman times.187  
The Holy Inquisition is clearly the peak of the use of torture as a punishment for 
heresy - historically spreading from XII to XVIII century, geographically encompassing 
almost all of today’s Western Europe – Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and France.188 
The Catholic Church ruled by means of terrorising the populace and using its unrestrained 
power over everyone irrespective of political, economic, or social status. Apart from the 
Holy Inquisition, the secular judicial system became quite fond of torture itself. Torture has 
been documented as an “irregular police procedure” in the twelfth century.189 This practice 
quickly evolved within the legal system that was developing under the political order of the 
Catholic Church, to become the “queen of proofs”.190 Torture was not only established as a 
legitimate part of the legal proceedings in criminal cases, but also as an official instrument 
for extracting confessions. This instrument was initially quite crude – if a confession under 
torture was confirmed by a confession away from the torture chambers, this amounted to 
enough evidence for a judge to give out a guilty verdict. The use of torture as part of the 
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law of proof was refined by the German law on criminal procedures – Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina of 1532.191 Further limitations were introduced - for example, a person 
who is tortured cannot be subjected to ‘suggestive questioning’, he/she is not expected to 
merely confess guilt but to give out details of the crime, which need to be verified in turn192 
etc. All these rules were “designed to enhance the reliability of the confession of guilt”193 
and limit false confessions under torture. At this point in the 16th century torture could not 
have been abolished because there was no other mechanism of judicial proof to replace it, 
so moral arguments, no matter how strong, stood no chance in producing any practical 
difference. To sum up, in the period between the 12th and 18th century, torture was an 
integral part of the criminal branch of the legal system; it was practised openly and 
supposedly served a clear purpose – to provide sufficient evidence for indictments.   
Torture was practiced openly in many other parts of the world – China, Japan, India; 
America, Africa, the West Indies, and Mauritius were all involved in the slave trade, and 
slavery was intricately related to torture as the latter was one of the methods of ensuring 
obedience and control.194 What all these early accounts of torture have in common, is that 
torture was used from a position of power to suppress dissent and to ensure obedience and 
unconditional submission to a certain authority – be it the Church, the slave master, or the 
social order. And although the Catholic Church denounced judicial torture publicly as early 
as the 4th century, even though the Church was one of the most influential actors of the day, 
the moral condemnation alone did not suffice to discontinue the practice. 
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Torture in the XVIII and XIX century  
 Movements to Discontinue the use of Judicial Torture 
The 18th century was the time when judicial torture was first outlawed by European 
rulers – judicial torture was discontinued in England in 1640, in 1740 Frederick the Great 
abolished torture in Prussia, in 1786 the practice was abolished in Italy, in 1789 France 
followed suit, then came Russia in 1801, Spain in 1812, Japan in 1873.195 The abolition of 
judicial torture, however, was insufficient to rule out torture altogether, since the practice 
remained an acceptable punishment.  
The abolition of judicial torture marked an important normative turning point in the 
history of outlawing the use of torture. Understanding the dynamics of the process leading 
up to this abolition will be useful in gaining an insight into the process of changing social 
constructions. There are two rivalling explanations for the discontinued use of judicial 
torture. The first one is that the humanitarian spirit of the Enlightenment, along with the 
powerful rhetoric of respected philosophers, influenced the rulers, who in turn changed the 
laws196. The second explanation is that a revolution in the law of proof took place, which 
was the cause of the abolition of judicial torture, since neither the political authority, nor 
the judiciary, had any further interest in preserving it.197 Both these explanations pose 
important questions that are relevant to the contemporary inquiry into the development of 
the norm against the use of all types of torture. A question stemming from the first 
explanation above is whether moral arguments in themselves have the power to change the 
perception of those who are in a position to alter the social rules. Another question, 
prompted by the rivalling explanation, is whether norms evolve purely as a result of social 
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changes – if that is the case, then norms cannot be seen as catalysts for social change, but 
rather the effects of it. And another question that arises is why the political powers of the 
day backed up judicial reform and institutionalised it, after they had failed to outlaw 
judicial torture earlier. The discussion of the outlawing the use of torture will return to these 
questions and I will begin by examining the above explanations in light of their critics.  
As mentioned earlier, the argument to discontinue the use of torture in the judicial 
process dates as far back as the 4th century and the writings of St Augustine. Philosophical 
argument only managed to make a difference in the 18th century, according to Scott, when 
famous names such as Cesare Beccaria in Italy and Voltaire in France published their 
strong views and justifications against the use of judicial torture. The work of Beccaria is 
considered particularly influential:  
No man (sic) can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can society take from him the 
public protection, until it have been proved that he has violated the conditions on which it was 
granted… If guilty, he should only the punishment ordained by the laws, and torture becomes useless, 
as his confession is unnecessary. If he be not guilty, you torture the innocent; for in the eyes of the law, 
every man (sic) is innocent, whose crime has not been proved… Besides, it is confounding all 
relations, to expect that a man (sic) should be both the accuser and the accused; and that pain should be 
the test of truth, as if truth resided in the muscles and fibres of a wretch in torture. By this method, the 
robust will escape, and the feeble be condemned.198 
This carefully constructed argument makes sense in the context of the European 
Enlightenment when the value and importance of the human individual, along with revised 
notions of justice had taken centre-stage in the social sciences.  
Arguments against the use of torture, however, were not new at this time and there 
is no evidence of an explicit causal relationship between these arguments and the abolition 
of torture. According to Langbein, who is the author of the rival explanation for the 
abolition of judicial torture, argues that the ‘classical explanation’ is not sustainable 
because philosophers alone could not change the policies that monarchs chose across 
Europe. “The critique of judicial torture… did little to demonstrate the workability of a 
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criminal justice system shorn of the power to investigate under torture”;199 that is to say, the 
lack of a mechanism to replace judicial torture has prevented the philosophers from making 
a change in the past and there was no reason to believe that this should change in the 18th 
century. 
Needless to say, Langbein provides a considerably more solid argument for the 
abolition of judicial torture in 18th-century Europe. According to his research, there was a 
revolution of the law of proof, which made torture obsolete200 and an evolution in the 
methods of punishment, which spared many from death (often preceded by torture).201 The 
16th and 17th centuries were the time when judges gradually obtained the power to make 
decisions on the basis of ‘circumstantial evidence’, namely evidence different from a 
confession or the accounts of two witnesses. This radical move away from the old type of 
proof is due, in the words of Langbein, to a gradual change in the method of governance, 
where “judicial discretion could be tolerated because it could be controlled. The 
centralisation and professionalisation of the judiciary that occurred in the absolutist states 
of the 16th and 17th centuries was an essential prerequisite for a system of free judicial 
evaluation of the evidence”.202 The need to secure obedience for the relatively weak 
governments emerging in the Middle Ages was no longer so pressing.203   
Langbein’s holistic approach to the study of the history of the abolition of torture in 
the 18th century provides a more solid argument and a clearer scientific explanation. It 
emphasizes once more that the socio-political context of events may sometimes prove 
crucial to our analysis of the driving forces behind social change.  
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Torture during World War I and II 
World War I and II saw the resurrection of unchecked human cruelty – millions 
died on the battle fields in WWI, while WWII became infamous for the number of civilian 
deaths, the attempts to exterminate all Jews, the gruesome cruelty of concentration camps 
and the conduct of scientific research on humans. The end of WWII marked an important 
watershed in world history – the resolve of ‘never again’ pushed states to develop universal 
norms for the protection of individual human rights,204 an international organisation was 
formed that was to represent the coming together of states around the world, the norm of 
state sovereignty was re-confirmed in the very Charter of the above organisation and the 
right to self-determination of peoples was established as one of the basic principles of 
international law.205 The end of WWII marked the beginning of an era, in which human 
rights were gaining importance and in which gross violations of human rights would incur 
personal accountability.206 The institutional, legal and social studies of human rights 
violations were accompanied by medical and psychological studies of concentration camps 
survivors.207 This is the first instant in human history when scientific knowledge about the 
consequences of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment began to evolve. The 
scientific findings took time to gain importance and to surface in the medical literature and 
the peak of publications of this sort was not reached until the 1970s.208 One should not, 
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however, give these developments more credit than they are worth. Much of the medical 
research of the period following the end of World War II was not so much philanthropic as 
practical in character. Medical research of concentration camp and labour camp survivors 
was meant to provide information on the basis of which governments and local authorities 
can calculate and give out compensation and social benefits.209 This early research laid the 
foundations of further studies into the effects of extreme mental and physical suffering, 
which helped the campaign for the abolition of torture secure solid scientific evidence.  
Thygesen cites an important scientific turning point in the late 1940s from 
Denmark, where “the Medico-Legal Council, when asked, determined that ‘there cannot in 
[their] opinion be any doubt that the distress described here (namely nervous illness and 
mental suffering) must be regarded as illness in the normal medical meaning of the 
word’”.210 That is to say, the psychological symptoms and suffering of torture survivors, 
which cannot be measured in a traditional objective manner, were for the first time 
recognised as a sufficient basis of monetary compensation,211 as well as a medical condition 
in contemporary medicine. These first steps of evolving scientific knowledge supplemented 
much larger social and political processes in the years leading up to 1984. In the spirit of 
the holistic approach to social developments, I will now turn to the normative and political 
context created by the end of WWII. 
 
Normative and Political Context of the Post-War World 
The political and normative environment in which an idea is born is closely linked 
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both to the nature of the idea and to its chances for success. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink talk 
about the importance of context, which they have named “world time”.212 According to 
these authors, the increase in volume of behavioural norms helps the evolution and success 
of new norms; that is to say, in a rapidly expanding normative context, new norms 
‘cascade’ quicker.213 Therefore, I feel that it is crucial here to examine the political 
processes and the normative environment in the years preceding the creation of CAT 
because they are partly responsible for the creation and acceptance of this document. 
A number of fundamental political changes took place after the end of the Second 
World War. The Cold War began, constructing a bipolar international context, with each 
superpower (the USA and the USSR) forming its own set of allies, supporters, and spheres 
of influence. This bipolar climate had indirect implications for the revival of the practice of 
torture because strategic security (or rather insecurity) issues were prevailing over issues of 
human justice. We can clearly read this in Bull’s account of the international society of 
states of 1979, who is convinced that “international order is prior to human justice”214 and 
that the current “international order does not provide any general protection of human 
rights, only a selective protection that is determined not by the merits of the case but by the 
vagaries of international politics”.215  
While the use of torture was not limited to either side of the Cold War, Amnesty 
International observed that “the developing system of the protection of human rights was 
centred in Western Europe”.216 The rest of the world was relatively unconcerned about 
human rights, or the containment and control of the use of torture, which made the 
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normative campaign to outlaw this practice rather challenging. The support of Western 
European nations, however, became the political foundation of this normative campaign. 
In addition to the bipolar climate of the Cold War, there were other powerful 
political processes that were taking place outside of Western Europe and North America. 
The 1960s saw the crumbling of colonial empires after “the myth of white supremacy, 
which had already underpinned colonial rule”217 began to erode. Peoples in the colonies 
were eager to exercise their right to self-determination. The process of decolonisation went 
peacefully in some parts of the world but not in others – the examples of Algeria as one of 
the bloodiest self-determination campaigns, which became infamous for its violence and 
cruelty218; and the politics of apartheid in South Africa219 - illustrate this. 
Violence and terror were brewing in South America as well, where authoritarian 
regimes came to power in the 1960s and 1970s – Brazil (1964), Chile and Uruguay (1973), 
Argentina (1976).220 Following the Cuban revolution and the Cuban missile crisis (1962), 
the United States were growing fearful that Soviet Communist influence might spread like 
wild fire on their very doorstep,221 which meant that much effort was put in covert CIA 
operations to destabilise democratically elected socialist governments across Central and 
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South America. The most notable case, which also became one of the catalysts of Amnesty 
International’s campaign to outlaw torture, was the military dictatorship of General 
Augusto Pinochet of Chile, who “instituted a pitiless campaign of repression against leftist 
groups in the country… Military governments in Argentina and Brazil also clamped down 
hard on domestic dissidents during the 1970s, striking out at communist, socialist, and 
liberal democratic elements alike”.222 Some parts of Europe also witnessed the hard hand of 
political violence under oppressive regimes – most notable examples are Spain and 
Greece.223 Reports were leaking out of the USSR as well where, following the cruelties of 
the Stalinist regime, Brezhnev was re-constructing his methods of suppressing opposition 
by using psychiatry to redefine and ‘treat’ dissidence as a form of mental illness.224 Torture, 
violence, and disappearances were the only way for all these regimes to hold on to power 
and to terrify their population into obedience. It thus becomes clear that “torture was to be 
part of political struggle [in the period 1945-1970s] used either by the colonial power as a 
weapon against national liberation forces, or by local governments against domestic 
opposition”.225 The common denominator of torture in this period was that it was 
government-sponsored violence, it was often covert, and governments were reluctant to 
submit to demands for openness and the protection of human rights.  
The normative context of the times was also quite complicated. The principles of 
human rights protection were hard to ignore following the end of atrocities that took place 
during WWII. Important precedents had been set – one of those was the principle of 
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individual accountability for participation in gross violations of human rights. The War 
Crime Tribunals of the Nuernberg and Tokyo established, on the one hand, that “a state’s 
treatment of its citizens in peacetime was appropriate for general international 
regulation”;226 and, on the other hand, that “[there is] a system of international law under 
which individuals are responsible to the community of nations for violations of rules of 
international criminal law, and according to which attacks on the fundamental liberties and 
constitutional rights of peoples and individuals… constitute international crimes not only in 
time of war, but also in time of peace”.227 These newly established normative ideals clashed 
with the Cold War normative reality where the principle of sovereignty was still 
overwhelmingly powerful. The two superpowers were finding it difficult to reach 
agreements of principle, especially on questions of human rights. The newly formed post-
colonial states wanted a different international agenda from the traditional ‘high politics’ of 
the security and geo-strategic considerations of the Cold War. They needed an agenda 
concerned with development, human rights and cooperation. The United Nations were 
trying to balance the conflicting demands of state sovereignty and individual human rights, 
while ensuring that the Cold War did not turn hot.  
Amidst this very unsettled climate of the early 1970s Amnesty International 
undertook a campaign to ban the use of torture in any circumstances. Before the findings of 
this research are applied to the theoretical model of norm creation, a timeline of the 
international and regional developments that prohibit the use of torture is presented in 
Figure 2.1. This timeline represents the processes, actors, and dynamics that shaped and 
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formed the idea to ban the use of torture and lead unequivocally to the Convention Against 
Torture. The timeline focuses exclusively on the historical development of this behavioural 
norm and is the backbone of the historical reconstruction of events leading up to the 
creation of CAT in 1984, and the optional protocol that followed.  
 
Figure 2.1 
TIMELINE OF THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS THAT 
PROHIBIT TORTURE 
 
 
1946  ECOSOC sets up the Commission on Human Rights, whose first task is to draw up the 
International Bill of Rights  
10-12-1948   Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Art.5 reads “No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” 
1949 Geneva Conventions – Art. 3 – forbids ‘cruel treatment and torture of persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities’ and also proscribes ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment’  
1949/1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(signed in Rome) – Art. 3 – “No one should be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” 
1957 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners – adopted by the UN Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders – “Corporal punishment, 
punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments shall 
be completely prohibited as punishments for disciplinary offences”.  
16-12-1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – Art. 7: “No one should be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one 
should be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation”.  
1969 The American Convention on Human Rights – signed in San Jose- Costa Rica – under the 
auspices of the Organization of American States, Art.5, para 2 reads “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons 
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person”.  
1973 The delegations of Sweden, Austria, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, and Trinidad and Tobago 
– submitted a draft resolution according to which the General Assembly would decide to 
examine the question of torture.  
Nov 1974 UNGA resolution 3218 – Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment - adopted with 125 votes in favour, 
1 abstention and 0 votes against – envisages the development of an international code of 
ethics for police and the drafting of principles of medical ethics.  
Nov 1974 Resolution 3219 – Protection and Human Rights in Chile    
June 1975 AI organised a seminar on an international code of police ethics in the Hague – participants 
included police authorities and members of policy forces and of national and international 
police organisations from 8 European countries.  
August 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced the Helsinki Agreement 
August 1975 A Resolution on the Role of the Nurse in the Care of Detainees and Prisoners – adopted by 
the International Council of Nurses in Singapore 
October 1975 The World Medical Association adopted the Tokyo Declaration – containing Guidelines for 
Medical Doctors concerning Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment in relation to Detention or Imprisonment  
Dec 1975 UNGA Resolution 3452 – Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – 
Art. 3 – “No state may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a 
justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
Dec 1975 UNGA resolution 3453 – to consider issues of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment 
1977 Jean-Jacques Gautier founded the Swiss Committee against Torture (CSCT) 
1977  World Psychiatric Association – adopted the Declaration of Hawaii – “the psychiatrist must 
never use his professional possibilities to violate the dignity or human rights of any 
individual or group… The psychiatrist must on no account utilize the tools of his 
profession, once the absence of psychiatric illness has been established. If a patient or some 
third party demands actions contrary to scientific knowledge or ethical principles the 
psychiatrist must refuse to cooperate”  
1978 There existed 3 separate drafts of the convention against torture – 1) CSCT – Gautier along 
with the Henry Dunant Institute; 2) Government of Sweden; 3) International Association of 
Penal Law 
Dec 1979 UNGA Resolution 34/169 contained an Annex, which spelled out the Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials.  
1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights – signed in Nairobi under the auspices of 
the Organisation of African Unity – Art. 5 – “All forms of exploitation and degradation of 
man (sic), particularly… torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment 
shall be prohibited”.  
1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights – Art. 7 - “No person shall be subjected to 
torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened with injury either to himself or to 
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anyone related to or held dear by him.” 
1981 The International Conference on Islamic Medicine adopted the Declaration of Kuwait  
1982 UN Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly 
Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – Principle 2 – “It is a gross contravention 
of medical ethics, as well as an offence under applicable international instruments, for 
health personnel, particularly physicians, to engage, actively or passively in acts which 
constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts to commit torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
1984 Amnesty published its report Torture in the Eighties 
Dec 1984 UNGA adopted the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.  
1985 The UN Centre for Human Rights established the post – Special Rapporteur on Torture  - 
Peter Kooijmans 
Dec 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 
1987 ACAT and other national groups formed an International Federation. 
Nov 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment 
1988 European Principles of Medical Ethics – adopted by the European medical regulatory 
associations 
Dec 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment 
Dec 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture is adopted by UN Resolution 
A/RES/57/199 
June 2006  The Optional Protocol to the UNCAT enters into force after 20 states ratify it 
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Theoretical Model and Empirical Findings 
 
Formulating the idea 
At the end of the Second World War there was a popular resolve to outlaw the 
purposeful hurting and maiming of the human body for political reasons, which was 
reflected in the creation of various international declarations and conventions for the 
protection of human rights. With the advance of the Cold War – the nuclear stand-off 
between the superpowers, the dividing of the world into spheres of influence, the processes 
of self-determination and self-governance in the newly independent countries – the political 
will to make the protection of human rights a top priority faded away. The international 
political context of the 1970s was one of turbulent change, “industrial militancy, student 
revolts, neo-nationalist terrorism and shadow armies of the right”.228 It was this political 
turmoil that not only gave the initial impetus to the campaign for the abolition of torture but 
also helped to sustain the determination of its supporters all the way through to 1984.  
By the early 1970s it seemed as though the 25 years that had passed since the end of 
World War II had managed not only to dilute the resolve of nations to cater for individual 
human rights, but also to obliterate the public memory and revulsion at the large scale 
atrocities of torture, dictatorship and inhumanity. Dictatorial regimes were employing all 
possible means to eradicate opposition and political dissent (Algeria, South East Asia, 
Chile, Argentina, USSR). The United States was more interested in not allowing the spread 
of Communism than in alleviating the suffering of individuals under authoritarian rulers. 
The US foreign policy was one of appeasement of political leaders in the name of attracting 
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their allegiance to the cause of anti-communism and capitalism.229 Atrocities as gruesome 
and widespread as those committed by the Nazis in the Second World War were taking 
place unchecked because the US was more worried about the ‘domino-effect’ of spreading 
Communism. Western Europe remained the stronghold of human rights protection. 
Although political violence was not an alien concept (Greece, Spain and Portugal all 
experienced periods of dictatorial regimes) and the Communist bloc was the next door 
neighbour, the Western Europeans were the driving force behind the campaign against 
torture.230 
It was in this unstable and often hostile political climate that Amnesty International 
highlighted for the first time the magnitude of the problem of the spreading use of torture, 
declaring in its 1973 Annual Report that the practice had taken “epidemic proportions”.231 
Amnesty International was not alone in sounding the alarm – the International Commission 
of Jurists (ICJ) was conducting independent studies into the legal practices of various 
countries in the world, acknowledging in its reports that there were breaches of human 
rights and torture was used on prisoners who were often held without trial.232 The United 
Nations were also concerned about the use of political coercion and discrimination, 
reported from Chile, South Africa, Argentina, Algiers, to name but a few.233  
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no.4, 1969) and further allegations of torture in Turkey, Uruguay, South and North Vietnam, Spain, Greece, 
South Africa.  
233 See “Study of Reported Violations of Human Rights in Chile, with Particular Reference to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” in Commission on Human Rights, Report of 
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While the UN concerned itself only with the most striking cases of gross violations 
of human rights (focusing mainly on Chile and South Africa), to the ICJ the continued use 
of torture was a problem of political will, in view of the already existing legal provisions 
that contained a prohibition on the use of this practice. Amnesty International emerged as 
the moral entrepreneur of the campaign against torture because the organisation observed 
the problem of torture in its entirety – as a breakdown of legal procedure, as a political 
method of coercion and intimidation of the opposition, as a social problem of the morale 
and ethics of those who participated in torture and other inhuman treatment of fellow 
individuals.234 Amnesty began a campaign to establish a new behavioural norm and to 
effect a comprehensive prohibition on the practice of torture.  
The organisation produced a number of country reports aimed at raising awareness 
of what went on under some military dictatorships.235 It participated in and organised a 
number of conferences discussing the use of torture and the possible avenues for its 
effective prohibition. Amnesty’s Report on Torture of 1973 highlighted that:  
                                                                                                                                                    
the 32nd Session (2Feb- 5Mar 1976), ECOSOC, Official Records 60th Session, Supplement 3 (UN Doc Index: 
E/5768, E/CN.4/1213) – pp. 16-19; “Telegram to the Government of Chile” in Commission on Human 
Rights, Report of the 32nd Session (2Feb- 5Mar 1976) – pp. 71; Summary Records of the 2065th meeting of 
the 29th Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held on 15th Oct 1974 (UN Doc Index: A/C.3/SR.2065) 
– pp. 79; Summary Records of the 2066th meeting of the 29th Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA 
held on 15th Oct 1974 (UN Doc Index: A/C.3/SR.2066) – pp. 81-3. 
234 The comprehensive approach of Amnesty International becomes obvious from the reports of the early 
conferences on the issue of torture where participants split between different working groups addressing 
separate aspects of torture – the legal, the medical, the political, and the socio-economic. See Amnesty 
International, Report on Torture; Amnesty International, Conference for the Abolition of Torture – Final 
Report. Paris, 10-11Dec 1973; Report of the “International Seminar on Torture and Human Rights” – Palais 
de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 3-5 Oct 1977, published by Amnesty International, London; Amnesty International 
Publications, London; Amnesty International, Report on an Amnesty International Medical Seminar 
“Violations of Human Rights: Torture and the Medical Profession”, Athens, 10-11 March 1978; N. Rodley, 
The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1999, 2nd edn.) – pp. 
20-1. 
235 Amnesty International, Iran, (Amnesty International Publications, London: 1976); Amnesty International, 
Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions, (Amnesty International Publications, 
London: 1976); Amnesty International, Report of an Enquiry into Allegations of Ill-treatment made against 
the Security Forces in Northern Ireland by Persons arrested on 9 August 1971, (Amnesty International 
Publications, London: 1972); Amnesty International, Report on allegations of Torture in Brazil, (Amnesty 
International Publications, London:1974); Amnesty International, Tortured to Death in Uruguay: 22 known 
cases, (Amnesty International Publications, London: 1976). 
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The widespread use of torture is alarming in itself, but what is especially alarming is that the consensus 
against torture is being weakened not only by its constant violation but by the attitude of people in 
general. Many people are indifferent and some appear ready to accept the practice, and to say so in 
public.236 
 
Amnesty began a campaign which was to be different from any other campaign 
against torture so far, as efforts were concentrated on rendering the practice of torture 
inexcusable under any circumstances. Torture was to be made, in the words of Amnesty’s 
Chairman Sean MacBride, “as unthinkable as slavery”237 and this was an important novelty. 
Historical overviews of the use of torture confirm that what all previous campaigns to 
prohibit the use of torture had in common was that they were not aiming for a complete ban 
on the practice.238 This in turn confirms that the attempt to build an unconditional 
consensus against torture, as discussed in Amnesty’s Report on Torture, is one of the most 
important characteristics of the campaign of 1972.  
One argument that seemed to undermine the consensus against torture at the time 
was a philosophical question presented as a hypothetical scenario.239 The classical example 
questioning the permissibility of the use of torture in extreme situations is comparatively 
simple – it concerns the “ticking bomb” scenario in which the authorities (police, 
government, judicial authority) can approve the use of torture if they believe that they have 
in their hands a terrorist who has planted a number of bombs in a big city, where there is no 
time to evacuate the city and the only way to spare innocent civilian lives is by applying 
                                                 
236 Amnesty International, Report on Torture. – pp. 18 
237 E. Prokosch “Amnesty International’s Anti-Torture Campaign” in Forrest, Duncan (eds.) A Glimpse of 
Hell – Reports on Torture Worldwide. (Cassell, London: 1996) – pp. 26 
238 G. R. Scott, A History of Torture – pp.44-6 – the author discusses the limitations placed on the use of 
torture as judicial procedure and juxtaposes that to the lack of such restrictions on the use of torture as 
punishment 
239 Although formulated as a philosophical hypothetical, the debate over the permissibility of torture under 
narrowly specified circumstances can be spotted in sociological, medical and political journals, which further 
confirms the complexity of the issue and the diversity of viewpoints – B. Paskins “What’s wrong with 
Torture?” British Journal of International Studies, no.2, 1976 – pp. 140-44; H. Shue “Torture” Philosophy 
and Public Policy, vol.7, no.2, 1978 – pp.141-3. 
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physical or psychological pressure on that individual.240  
The critique of the permissibility of the use of torture is based largely on some of 
the implicit assumptions in this classical scenario, which undermine its apparent clarity and 
deprive it of its determinism.241 Firstly, there is always the question of whether the 
authorities have the right person for interrogation – in emergency situations innocent people 
get dragged into the interrogation process – “the category of victims ripples out into the 
society catching ‘not only the terrorists but their friends, their neighbours, even strangers 
whose political views are remotely similar”.242 Secondly, studies have shown that different 
individuals respond to physical pain in different ways – in the words of the former chief 
interrogator for Israel’s General Security Services (Shabak) “in some cases, the more 
aggressive you get, the more these men [speaking of religious extremists] will withdraw 
into their own world, until you cannot reach them”;243 other times physical pain and 
psychological suffering may cause disorientation, amnesia, hallucinations and one is never 
certain as to how factually correct the acquired information would be, not to mention the 
possible situation where the subject of interrogation makes false confessions or gives out 
incorrect information in order to make torture stop.244 Thirdly, “in desperate situations 
punishment for terrorist crimes can often become retaliation, readily inflicted by acts of 
torture”,245 without convictions and due process of law. Fourthly, “as [interrogators] 
become more reliant on torture they are less likely to use other methods of interrogation, 
                                                 
240 This example is cited in all publications quoted in op.cite 67, 68, 69, 70.  
241 Amnesty’s Report on Torture claims that the classical apology for torture does not fit the facts -  Amnesty 
International, Torture in the Eighties  – pp.6 
242 G. Jones “On the permissibility of Torture” Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 6, 1980, pp.11 - citing Jonsen 
and Sagan(1978) Man and Medicine, 3 
243 M. Bowden, “Now Let’s Talk” The Sunday Telegraph – Review, Dec.7, 2003 
244 N. Gordon and R. Marton (eds.) Torture – Human Rights, Medical Ethics and the Case of Israel. (Zed 
Books in association with the Association of Israeli-Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights, Tel Aviv. 
London: 1995) – pp. 4 
245 G. Jones “On the Permissibility of Torture” – pp. 11 
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and their ability to assess the effectiveness of torture diminishes”.246 The classical apology 
for the use of torture becomes the “just once” excuse that turns into an institutionalised 
practice and “erodes the moral and legal principles that stand against a form of violence 
that could affect all of society”247 and this could not be more clearly illustrated than the 
history of torture in Ancient Greece and Rome. Shue draws an analogy between a saying in 
jurisprudence which holds that “hard cases make bad law” and the hypothetical 
philosophical case where “artificial cases make bad ethics”.248 
Amnesty International, working closely with the International Commission of 
Jurists and other regional and local human rights NGOs, accumulated information about the 
atrocities and human rights violations that political regimes were committing worldwide 
and that helped the coalition formulate the need for a new international norm that would 
help prevent such acts of violence and cruelty. Amnesty exposed the scale of the problem in 
its first report against torture, indicating that torture was widespread in more than 60 
countries around the world.249 The original focus of Amnesty’s activities to support and 
care for prisoners of conscience explains the interest of Amnesty in matters concerning the 
rights of prisoners, their well-being in custody along with issues of freedom of political 
opinion. In other words, the continued interest of the organisation in these issues coupled 
with the political climate in which state interests came prior to individual rights and the 
growing awareness of the widespread use of torture by governments, made Amnesty 
International one of the main moral entrepreneurs on this campaign. The Campaign Against 
Torture began with a petition to the UN General Assembly, which had more than one 
million individual signatures from all over the world and requested the UN ‘to outlaw 
                                                 
246 Amnesty International, Torture in the Eighties  – pp.7 
247 Ibid.  
248 H. Shue, “Torture” Philosophy and Public Policy, vol.7, no.2,1978 – pp. 141 
249 Amnesty International, Report on Torture, – “World Survey of Torture”- pp.109-218 
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immediately the torture of prisoners around the world’.250  
In conclusion, the identity and specific characteristics of the actors who initiated 
this normative campaign influenced the seriousness with which their claim was received by 
the society of states. Amnesty International is an influential NGO, and a trusted network 
partner with consultative status in ECOSOC, the ILO, UNESCO; the International 
Commission of Jurists is made up of highly qualified professionals, closely networked with 
government circles and awarded consultative status by ECOSOC and other UN agencies; 
the interest of UN agencies provided a vital normative and institutional impetus too. The 
novel approach that Amnesty adopted – campaigning for a total ban on the use of torture – 
was, as we will see, a significant characteristic of this campaign, which helped it become 
stronger from the start.  
 
Network Configuration 
Network configuration and issue formation in the case of the Convention Against 
Torture took place simultaneously at a number of conferences that brought together very 
different actors, as will be demonstrated later. The two processes are examined separately 
because they have distinct dynamics. Whereas network configuration involved a process of 
finding the commonalities between the actors from the different fields drawn in the 
campaign, the process of issue formation focused on the definition of the nature and scope 
of the problem.  
The Campaign Against Torture involved a large array of states and non-state actors. 
For purposes of manageability, I focus my study only on those actors who were most 
influential in developing the norm prohibiting the use of torture. Non-state actors who 
                                                 
250 E. Prokosch “Amnesty International’s Anti-Torture Campaign” – pp. 27 
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seemed to have a direct impact on the development of the new behavioural norm included 
professional organisations from the legal and medical fields whose efforts were linked by 
Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross to form a strong 
coalition (Figure 2.2). Smaller social groups such as the Swiss Committee Against Torture, 
the World Council of Churches, the International Association of Penal Law and other grass-
roots and professional organisations also played a role by adding their voice to the 
campaign but, as we shall see, the most pressure was exerted by a handful of powerful non-
state organisations and communities of experts. The network of support for the outlawing 
of torture began to materialise out of a much larger network of actors involved with the 
strengthening of the human rights regime. Expert groups such as the British Medical 
Association,251 or the International Commission of Jurists,252 the Council for International 
Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)253 and many more, have all been involved in 
campaigns to persuade governments to create more rigorous standards for the protection of 
human rights, prior to their involvement in support of Amnesty’s campaign.  
Figure 2.2 
                                                 
251 http://www.bma.org/ap.nsf/Content/About+the+BMA+-+An+outline+history+of+the+BMA – visited on 
19th June 2004.  
252 http://www.icj.org/article.php3?id_article=2957&id_rubrique=11&lang=en ; and H. Tolley, The 
International Commission of Jurists – Global Advocates for Human Rights. (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, USA: 1994) – pp. 31-45 and 79-113 
253 http://www.cioms.ch/what_is_cioms.htm  
 101
 
NETWORK 
CONFIGURATION
 
 
 
MEDICAL 
ASPECT 
Medical 
professionals 
working on the 
creation of codes of 
medical ethics 
(World Medical 
Association) 
Volunteers and 
professionals 
working on the 
creation of 
knowledge for 
purposes of 
rehabilitation of 
torture survivors 
(British Section of 
AI) 
Volunteers from 
non-governmental 
organisation 
working for the 
protection of 
medical personnel 
under threat of 
torture (AI) 
Medical 
professionals 
working on the 
creation of scientific 
knowledge (Danish 
Medical Group) 
 
 
LEGAL  
ASPECT 
 
 
MORAL 
ASPECT 
 
ICRC 
Amnesty 
International 
Legal 
professionals 
concerned with 
the creation of 
effective 
protection (IAPL) 
Legal 
professionals 
concerned with 
the generation 
of political will 
(ICJ) 
Volunteers 
concerned with 
the creation of 
institutional 
procedures to 
ensure 
compliance with 
the norm (Swiss 
Committee 
Against 
Torture) 
 102
At the time when Amnesty International began their campaign, scientific knowledge 
about the effects of torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment was limited 
and scattered,254 the ethical segment of the campaign had the broad support of public 
opinion but that was not enough to impress policy makers, and the legal campaign, while 
well supported by international human rights legislation (See the timeline in Figure 2.1), 
had yet to yield practical results. The network of support emerged with the task of 
consolidating knowledge, expertise and ethics in order to communicate persuasively the 
need for action against torture. 
To understand more clearly the configuration of this complex network of support, I 
will start by examining the make up of the two professional segments of the campaign – the 
medical and the legal, and will then show how these were drawn closer together by 
organisations that committed themselves to the protection of human rights and dignity. It is 
important to note here that some states were very supportive of the campaign for the 
prohibition of torture and were to a large degree responsible for the discussions and work 
done at the United Nations General Assembly. The role of these states will be discussed in 
more detail in the following stages of the campaign, as at this stage most of the work was 
done by non-state actors. 
The medical segment of the normative network is interesting not only in terms of its 
configuration but also in terms of the interplay between the forces of demand and supply of 
technical knowledge, which have had an enormous impact on the creation of the actual 
                                                 
254 “It was not until after the end of World War II that general opinion and the medical world became 
interested in the suffering by those maltreated by torture and their chronic pathological reactions – or rather, 
their normal reactions to pathological treatment” (L. Eitinger, “Torture – a perspective on the past” Journal of 
Medical Ethics, vol.17, 1991, Supplement – Proceedings of the International Symposium on “Torture and the 
Medical Profession” – University of Tromso, Norway, June 5-7, 1990 – pp. 9) and it was certainly not until 
the mid-1970s that knowledge began to amass on the physical and psychological sequelae of torture victims 
(See – Danish Medical Journal, Vol. 27, no. 5, Nov. 1980) 
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Convention Against Torture. Medical professionals, as members of various scientific 
associations, approached the issue of torture from different angles, which produced 
unequivocal scientific consensus. Four distinct areas of interest for scientific communities 
developed over time – one group of medical professionals focused attention on the 
acquisition of medical knowledge of the sequelae (both physical and psychological) of 
torture and ill-treatment for the purposes of rehabilitation and medical treatment of torture 
survivors. These medical professionals will be designated as Medical Theme 1 (MT1). A 
second cluster of experts were concerned with studying the sequelae of torture and ill-
treatment as a source of scientific proof for purposes of obtaining compensation and social 
benefits for torture survivors, as well as for purposes of participation in judicial proceedings 
to provide conclusive evidence for those who suffered ill-treatment – Medical Theme 2 
(MT2). A third grouping of both doctors and nurses were concerned with the issue of 
medical ethics in general and the participation of doctors, both directly and indirectly, in 
torture and ill-treatment, which includes resuscitation of patients for more torture, medical 
exams declaring patients fit for torture, the provision of false information on patients’ 
records that conceals or undermines the torture applied, the participation of doctors in the 
invention of new methods of torture, and, last but not least, experimentation on humans – 
Medical Theme 3 (MT3). And the last theme – Medical Theme 4 (MT4) – was the concern 
of doctors and nurses for colleagues who may be under threat of being tortured themselves. 
The efforts of all these medical professionals assisted the realisation of the complexity and 
the seriousness of the implications of the use of torture. They were compounding scientific 
knowledge, which was very influential in this normative campaign. Some medical groups 
were working on more than one of the above themes, but as we will see, with time they 
tended to focus on obtaining specialist and in-depth knowledge on one of the aspects 
presented above.  
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MT1 is most clearly reflected in the work of the British and Danish Medical 
Sections of Amnesty International. It was the British Medical Group, however, that found 
its focus on this medical theme, as it provided the context out of which the Medical 
Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture was born.255 The Danish Medical Group 
slowly shifted attention to issues under MT2 in the late 1970s and early 1980s.256 
Observations of the work done under MT1 are based on two major sources – the 
biography of Helen Bamber and publications of Amnesty’s medical groups in medical 
journals. Helen Bamber was an exceptional individual who managed to form a power node 
within a large normative network due to her strong beliefs, will-power and determination. 
Her efforts towards easing the suffering of those affected by torture have been truly 
remarkable and have contributed much towards understanding the experiences of torture 
victims. The involvement of Bamber with the treatment and rehabilitation of torture victims 
and concentration camp survivors began as early as the immediate aftermath of World War 
II when she joined the Jewish Relief Unit and worked under the auspices of the UN Relief 
and Rehabilitation Association.257 In the early years of the Campaign Against Torture, 
Bamber became a member of Amnesty International and soon came to assume an executive 
position (a chair of the Hampstead group, later elected to the Executive Council of the 
British Section of Amnesty). Bamber worked directly with torture survivors and in the mid-
1980s she felt that the urgent actions of Amnesty did not fulfil the needs for rehabilitation, 
care and socialisation of those who were rescued from the torture chambers.258 This led in 
                                                 
255 http://www.torturecare.org.uk/about/aboutHistory.htm  
256 http://www.rct.dk/usr/rct/webuk.nsf  
257 N. Belton, The Good Listener – Helen Bamber Life Against Cruelty.– pp. 74-5; 
http://www.torturecare.org.uk/about/aboutHistoryHelen.htm  
258 Ibid. – pp. 275 – “The intimacy of the linkage between torture and cure had never seemed so obvious… it 
was no longer simply about writing letters and demanding the end of individual imprisonment, but about 
ending a whole set of practices and habits. Three strands were weaving together in [Helen Bamber’s] life: the 
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1985 to the creation of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. The 
Foundation began to function initially under the auspices of the Medical Section of 
Amnesty International and with the professional support of three Royal Colleges, of 
Surgeons, Physicians and Psychiatrists.259 The work of this remarkable individual shows 
the connections that are built between issues, organisations, and individuals in the process 
of network configuration and issue formation. Individuals are the building blocks of these 
social networks, and the moral standards of these individuals are the glue that holds these 
networks together. 
The focus of Medical Theme 1 is intricately related to that of Medical Theme 2. 
Nowhere was this more obvious than in the work of the Danish Medical Group of Amnesty 
International. It was formed in 1974 by Dr. Inge Kemp Genefke, shortly after Amnesty 
began its worldwide Campaign Against Torture.260 The medical group was engaged with 
active scientific research into the sequelae of torture and ill-treatment and its primary 
concern was with the accumulation of knowledge of the after-effects of torture, which 
would then allow medical professionals to treat survivors and legal professionals to use 
medical evidence in a court of law. The Danish Medical Group participated in and 
organised professional seminars specifically focused on torture, in an attempt to popularise 
their concern and to gather more knowledge from professionals with similar experience. 
Attention was focused on the study of Greek torture victims in 1975 and 1976,261 exiled 
                                                                                                                                                    
urge to campaign for human rights; the belief that medical ethics were poorly understood and vulnerable to 
abuse; and the need to pay attention to the victims” 
259 http://www.torturecare.org.uk/about/aboutHistory.htm  
260 O. V. Rasmussen and I. Lunde, “Evaluation of investigation of 200 torture victims”. Danish Medical 
Bulletin, vol. 27, no.5, 1980 – pp. 241; A. Gellhorn, “Violations of Human Rights: Torture and the Medical 
Profession”. The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 299, no. 7, 1978 – pp. 358; O.V. Rasmussen, 
“Medical Aspects of Torture”. Danish Medical Bulletin, Supplement 1, January 1990 – pp. 2 
261 U. Abildgaard, G. Daugaard, H. Marcussen, P. Jess, H. Draminsky Petersen, and M. Wallach, “Chronic 
Organic Psycho-Syndrome in Greek Torture Victims”. Danish Medical Bulletin, Vol.31, no.3, 1984 – pp. 
239. 
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Chileans in Denmark, exiled Uruguayans in France, Argentinians in Italy, missions were 
sent to Northern Ireland and Spain, all in the period between 1975 and 1982.262 The 
majority of publications revealing the findings of the Danish Medical Group were in the 
Danish Medical Bulletin, which is a renowned professional journal published in English. In 
other words, the Danish Medical Group was actively working to both produce and diffuse 
scientific knowledge. There have been many difficulties in the process because so little was 
known about the psychological after-effects of physical abuse and not many people were 
willing to come forward and be subjects of such research. The physical sequelae of torture 
presented their own set of problems, as the human body often heals, leaving little proof of 
ill-treatment.  
In 1982, the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group managed to extend its 
activities and reach the conventional professionals – doctors and nurses who worked in 
hospitals. Dr Inge Kemp Genefke initiated the creation of the Rehabilitation and Research 
Centre for Torture Victims (RCT), which was housed at the National Hospital of 
Denmark.263 Alongside the medical examinations, which were leading to the creation of 
knowledge on physical and psychological sequelae of torture and ill-treatment, patients 
were given highly skilled professional care aimed at their rehabilitation and the handling of 
any emergency situations.264 The RCT marked a moment when more marginal, 
unconventional research was accepted and taken into the conventional medical profession, 
which gave more weight and authority to the former’s findings.  
The concern of MT3 (medical ethics) is not new but has been subdued for some 
time before it was brought to the attention of the profession in the 1970s. One of the first 
                                                 
262 O.V. Rasmussen, “Medical Aspects of Torture”. Danish Medical Bulletin, Supplement 1, Jan 1990 – pp. 3 
263 http://www.rct.dk/usr/rct/webuk.nsf/fWEB?ReadForm&Load=RTIG-4L5JTU  
264 Ibid.  
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works to stir the medical profession with its revelations was Maurice Pappworth’s book 
Human Guinea Pigs, which came out in 1967. Pappworth, a British doctor, described in 
detail 205 experiments with patients on the British wards of the National Health Service, 
naming the doctors who had conducted the experiments. Bamber, who was his assistant at 
the time, recalled that the reaction to the book both from the public and the profession was 
one of criticism and denial.265 This illustrates how unwritten codes of medical ethics had 
not sufficed to protect patients at the time. Although the general reaction towards the 
publication had been negative, the theme had been picked up by the British Medical 
Journal and distinguished professors began to side with Pappworth.266 This move amongst 
the British medical circles laid the foundations of the creation of codes of professional 
ethics. According to the historical overview of the activities of the World Medical 
Association (WMA), the latter has been heavily influenced by the British Medical 
Association in the process of the construction of the Code of Medical Ethics.267 
The World Medical Association became the focal point of international discussion 
of medical ethics, which was one of the first concerns of the organisation in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II.268 The practices in concentration camps, the medical 
experimentation that turned into torture and the use of medical expertise for the 
extermination of people, outraged the world and raised many questions about the moral 
norms that were influencing doctors and other medical personnel.269 The WMA denounced 
“the violations of medical ethics and the crimes committed by doctors in times of war… 
                                                 
265 N. Belton, The Good Listener – pp. 204-6 
266 Ibid. – pp. 206 
267 http://www.wma.net/e/history/tokio.htm  
268 http://www.wma.net/e/history/golden_years.htm  
269 Amnesty International, the French Medical Commission and Valery Marange,  Doctors and Torture – 
Collaboration or Resistance? (Bellew Publishing. London: 1989) – pp. 7 
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[and recognised the] need to implement safeguards in human experimentation.”270 These 
concerns were re-enforced by the practices of dictatorships and military regimes around the 
world which made use of doctors and medical knowledge in appalling ways. In 1952 the 
WMA created a permanent Committee on Medical Ethics. A request for help was taken to 
the Committee by the British Medical Association in 1974 with regards to the growing 
crisis in Northern Ireland and the mounting concern of the doctors of the armed forces 
involved.271 With the help of BMA and other national medical organisations and the 
Committee on Medical Ethics, in 1975 the WMA drew up the ethical guidelines for 
medical practices concerning torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment. These are known as the Declaration 
of Tokyo.272 The Declaration of Tokyo inspired the United Nations, which requested the 
World Health Organisation to compile a code of professional ethics for medical staff as 
early as 1975.273 The final version of the Draft Code of Medical Ethics was approved by the 
UN General Assembly in 1979.274 These events reveal the complex interactions between 
various actors on a number of different aspects of the norm outlawing the use of torture. 
The cooperation among them ensured that the medical community presented a thorough 
evaluation of the problem of torture, which was evidence that could not be ignored. 
Medical Theme 4 relates to the protection and assistance to doctors who have 
become victims of torture themselves. Amnesty has reported that in some instances health 
                                                 
270 http://www.wma.net/e/history/golden_years.htm  
271 http://www.wma.net/e/history/tokio.htm  
272 Ibid. 
273 J. Burgers and H. Danelius, The UN Convention Against Torture – pp. 21; Amnesty International, Annual 
Report 1974-1975. (Amnesty International Publications, London: 1975) – “Campaign for the Abolition of 
Torture” – pp. 21 
274 The Draft Code of Medical Ethics was the result of the joint efforts of the World Health Organisation and 
the Council for International Organisations of the Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in consultation with the World 
Medical Association and other non-state epistemic communities – A. Gellhorn, “Medicine, Torture and the 
United Nations”, The Lancet, vol.315, issue 8165, 1980 – pp. 428 
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professionals may be subjected to human rights violations and has provided details of 
individual cases of doctors who have been under threat of imprisonment or torture and have 
had to flee their countries.275 MT4 has thus become part of the larger concern for 
individuals under threat of torture. 
The legal aspect of the network of supporters was represented mainly by the 
International Commission of Jurists – an organisation of professionals which sustained the 
interest and support of its members throughout the campaign for the creation of a norm 
prohibiting the use of torture and the consequent instrument for the safeguarding of this 
norm - the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture. The ICJ comprises both 
individual jurists and other national organisations276 and cooperates closely with a wide 
range of NGOs and IGOs.277 According to the historian of the ICJ, during the seven years 
between 1963 and 1970, when Sean MacBride278 was elected Secretary-General, the 
commission acquired an interest in international legal reform and standards setting.279 Since 
the ICJ was primarily concerned with the creation and the improvement of legal 
instruments for the protection of human rights, MacBride’s relations with Amnesty 
                                                 
275 Amnesty International Health Professional Network – 
http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/health-index-eng ; Amnesty International, the French 
Medical Commission and Valery Marange, Doctors and Torture – Collaboration or Resistance? (Bellew 
Publishing. London: 1989) – pp. 73-80 
276 H. Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists – Global Advocates for Human Rights. (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA: 1994) - pp.38 
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International meant that the two organisations could combine their efforts and expertise.280 
MacBride was thus another one of the links between the moral campaign and the expert 
campaign for the creation of an effective ban on torture.  
In the international campaign against torture, the ICJ “used their technical expertise 
and elite contacts to lobby public officials for limits on state power”.281 The organisation 
took an active part in the creation and adoption of various standards of professional ethics 
and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and Offenders. The ICJ 
was also an important participant in the discussions of the Draft Convention Against 
Torture and took part in the drafting of other regional documents dealing with the issue.282 
The ICJ cooperated closely with a couple of organisations that have greatly contributed to 
the campaign with their enthusiasm, expertise and practical ideas. One of these 
organisations is the Swiss Committee Against Torture (CSCT). It was found by Jean 
Jacques Gautier in 1975.283 Gautier was a banker and a lawyer, but above all a deeply 
religious man and that was the source of inspiration for his philanthropic actions.284 The 
CSCT was very active in drawing attention and support for the campaign against torture. 
Gautier began his work with a very specific idea – to produce an effective legal norm 
against torture, which will have provisions to avoid impunity.285 It was only due to the 
close cooperation between Gautier, De Vargas and MacDermot (the Secretary General of 
the ICJ at the time) that this idea materialised and later became the foundation of the 
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Optional Protocol to the CAT.286  
Another organisation that deserves attention is the World Council of Churches in 
International Affairs – it too became involved in the efforts to prohibit the use of torture in 
close cooperation with AI and the ICJ. The actions of Churches against torture have been 
documented in various publications – the Catholic Institute for International Relations, for 
example, published a report on torture in South West Africa, which was banned prior to 
publication by the South African Authorities. The report included a number of letters by 
priests to the authorities expressing concerns about the use of torture by police and the 
negligence of medical staff towards torture victims; it further demanded that torture be 
condemned “without any qualifications or relativization”.287 US Churchmen who visited 
Uruguay in 1972 reported the widespread use of physical and psychological torture on 
political prisoners in the country.288 The CSCT reported on their joint activities with the 
World Council of Churches in the campaign against torture289 and the ICJ published a 
report from the 30th Meeting of the World Council of Churches’ Central Committee, which 
discussed the need to celebrate the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by taking special actions to eliminate torture.290  
The International Association of Penal Law (IAPL) was an integral part of the 
campaign against torture, as it submitted a Draft Convention Against Torture to the UN 
General Assembly. IAPL had been working closely with the ICJ, Amnesty International, 
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the CSCT, and the ICRC to prepare the draft, which, as became known later, was very close 
in substance to the proposal submitted by the government of Sweden.291 The activities of 
the organisation, however, have not been expressly focused on the fight against torture and 
this is why IAPL is only considered here as a marginal actor.  
The medical and the legal aspects of the campaign against torture were drawn 
together by two powerful moral entrepreneurs - Amnesty International and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. These two organisations worked to enhance the cohesion 
needed for a better chance for the campaigners to lobby nation-states. AI and the ICRC 
fused the ethical, medical and legal aspects of torture to form an authoritative network for 
the protection of individuals against the excesses of secret state activities or anyone else.  
For its part, Amnesty International organised a number of conferences bringing 
together the representatives of the legal and medical professions. The Conference for the 
Abolition of Torture in Paris 1973 was split into four commissions dealing, in turn, with 
issues of individual and institutional responsibility, of the social and political factors 
affecting torture, of the international, regional, and national legal factors affecting torture 
and with the medical aspects of the latter.292 The Conference ended with a list of 
recommendations for action by the legal profession, the medical experts, trade unions, 
business enterprises, educational and religious organisations, etc.293 Another seminar, 
organised by Amnesty International in Strasbourg, emphasised the need for the creation of 
codes of professional conduct, especially in spheres that are prone to abuse, such as medical 
ethics, police ethics, military ethics, and legal ethics. This seminar was attended by more 
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than 90 participants, representing nation states and organisations such as the WMA, the 
World Psychological Association, the International Commission of Jurists, the ICRC, and 
the International Association of Lawyers.294   
The International Committee of the Red Cross played an important role as well, 
acting as a bridge between the medical and the legal aspects of the issue of torture. On the 
one hand, the organisation had extensive first-hand experience with torture victims, as the 
ICRC is the only organisation which can visit prisoners both in peace-time and war, even 
behind enemy lines.295 On the other hand, the ICRC has the trust of and some influence 
over national governments due to its high professionalism and continued political 
neutrality. The ICRC has played an important role in constructing the principles of the 
Geneva Conventions and consequently in successfully lobbying states to accept them, 
making it an organisation with ample experience of norm creation and persuasion. 
Normative closure was easily reached in the campaign against torture, as is 
illustrated by the widespread consensus that this practice should be made illegal. Since 
there was little disagreement that torture is wrong, most of the negotiations among non-
state actors were centred on discussions of how best to formulate the issue so that policy-
makers have limited room to wiggle out of their responsibilities to uphold human rights. 
Several important conclusions stem from this discussion of network configuration. 
Firstly, normative networks can be in a perpetual state of flux. They may be unstable as the 
configuration of the participating actors changes with the progress of norm evolution. Some 
actors leave the campaign – like Helen Bamber, who after years of working with Amnesty 
International became the founder of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Torture 
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Victims and shifted her humanitarian efforts to the field of care and rehabilitation of 
survivors. The World Medical Association and other regional or national medical 
associations also left the overall campaign against torture after the Codes of Medical Ethics 
were agreed upon by the UN General Assembly. There were also actors who became active 
partners in the campaign at a later stage. In the case of CAT, these actors were national 
governments (such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Costa Rica and Paraguay) who 
were in favour of the normative idea to prohibit the use of torture. 
The second concluding point is that the various themes advanced by the network of 
supporters are interdependent. The medical and ethical aspects of the campaign, for 
example, are so closely interrelated that their separation is artificial. Medical knowledge 
influenced moral norms and vice versa to the extent that it is hard to say which influence is 
stronger and which influence came first.296 Legality and morality too are inseparable as 
legal norms are not merely technical scripts - they reflect the morality and sense of justice 
of the society that they govern.  
The normative network against the use of torture became very strong and 
influential. Medical research of the sequelae of torture provided solid scientific proof that 
torture is a very cruel practice that leaves behind physically and psychologically broken 
individuals. The information-gathering by doctors and legal professionals that took place 
independently in the 1960s and 1970s helped the issue of torture surface on the 
international agenda. In this case, scientific knowledge not only sided with the normative 
idea but also provided a strong impetus for its evolution. Global civil society represented by 
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Amnesty, the World Council of Churches, the Swiss Committee Against Torture and other 
NGOs, supported by the accumulated knowledge and expertise, became a normative 
network that was hard to ignore even in the climate of the Cold War. The social demand for 
the development of medical knowledge soon became political (when nation-states got 
involved in the campaign) and the issue began to gather vital momentum. 
 
Issue Formation 
Setting the limits of what exactly constitutes torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment or punishment is central to outlawing these practices. Issue formation is the stage 
at which the network of support for the new norm determines the substance and limits to 
the new norm. Issue formation is most influential when based on scientific closure and 
consensus, and this campaign was successful in reaching consensus and gaining 
overwhelming support.  
The historical records of previous unsuccessful campaigns to reject the use of 
torture display a striking similarity at this particular stage. Previously, the practice of 
torture had not been discarded in its entirety; instead, tentative lines had been drawn 
between the circumstances in which its use was permitted. While torturing slaves, for 
example, was acceptable in Ancient Greece and Rome, torturing the free citizen was not.297 
And while torturing the free citizen was generally not acceptable, torturing the free citizen 
in cases of treason was. In the Middle Ages – the Church disapproved of and denounced the 
use of torture by the courts, but lynching atheists, followers of other faiths, suspected 
witches or even scientists was perceived as normal.298 Even when most European kingdoms 
had denounced the use of torture to extract confessions in a trial, torture as punishment, no 
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matter how cruel and grim, was acceptable.299 Even in the 18th century when the number of 
the polemics written against the use of torture was growing, the problem of the utility of 
torture in some circumstances was difficult to refute. Even Bentham, a disciple of Beccaria 
(one of the firmest opponents to the use of torture), conceded that “under certain 
circumstances [torture may] contribute to utility and therefore deserve consideration”.300 
The tactics of setting limits on the circumstances under which torture was permitted 
backfired every time, as the limits of the permissible use were stretched to the extent where 
torture became uncontrollable, which Bentham did not fail to foresee in his thesis.301  
The stage of issue formation thus includes not only the formulation of a norm in 
technical terms but also incorporates an agreement on its parameters and normative scope, 
i.e., whether the norm applies in all circumstances or only in some, whether there are 
exceptions to it or not, and so on. Defining torture is no easy task as the experience of 
physical or psychological ill-treatment is different for every individual. Moreover, the 
practice itself has deep political, legal, medical, social roots and all these need to be 
addressed for a solid norm to come into existence. Amnesty International, as the moral 
leader of the campaign to support this newly evolving norm, discussed the problem of 
definition in its first comprehensive Report on Torture (1973). The authors commented on 
the short-comings of some of the already existing legal texts before they proceeded to 
propose a more comprehensive definition. The Geneva Conventions, for example, take 
torture to mean: “suffering inflicted on a person to obtain from him or a third person 
confessions or information”.302 Here Amnesty emphasises the lack of reference to degree, 
                                                 
299 Ibid. – pp.91-4 
300 M. Ruthven, Torture – The Grand Conspiracy, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London: 1978) – pp. 18 
301 Bentham anticipated the difficulty of separating the use of torture from its abuse, but failed to propose any 
solution to this problem – P.E. Twinning, “Bentham on Torture”, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, vol. 3, 
1973, 305-56 cited in M. Ruthven, Torture – The Grand Conspiracy, – pp. 21-2 
302 Amnesty International, Report on Torture – citing First Geneva Convention 1949, Art. 12 (2) – pp. 31 
 117
which is covered by the term ‘suffering’ and the latter is not sufficient to safeguard 
individuals. On the other hand, as earlier noted in Gardiner’s Report on interrogation 
methods for detainees in Northern Ireland, “what people can stand in relation to both 
physical exhaustion and mental disorientation [varies greatly]… [and] no precise limits for 
interrogators… can safely be specified”.303 If the term ‘suffering’ was too broad and 
individual resistance to pain was impossible to establish universally, Amnesty had a 
difficult task of coming up with wording that would both not compromise the individual’s 
well-being and not allow perpetrators to avoid justice by denying they have caused 
suffering.  
 Amnesty also expressed disapproval with the wording provided by the European 
Commission of Human Rights, which said that “torture is…generally an aggravated form 
of inhuman treatment… [where] the notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such 
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular 
situation is unjustifiable”.304 The issue of justifiability is one to which Amnesty draws 
special attention as a possible slippery slope.305 Justifiability often rests on the concept of 
effectiveness, which means that if torture is found to be effective, then it could be 
recognised as justifiable, becoming an easy case in favour of the use of torture, without 
even compromising the recommendations of the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Amnesty International has made it clear in its discussion of the pitfalls of existing 
definitions that it is irrelevant whether torture is used for extracting information, or for 
political repression, whether the practice is effective in achieving its aims or not: “no act is 
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more a contradiction of our humanity than the deliberate infliction of pain by one human 
being on another, the deliberate attempt over a period of time to kill a man [sic] without his 
dying… it is the ultimate human corruption”.306  
The definition arrived at by Amnesty International in its first comprehensive report 
on torture is the following: “Torture is the systematic and deliberate infliction of acute pain 
in any form by one person on another, or on a third person, in order to accomplish the 
purpose of the former against the will of the latter”.307  
The medical professionals, who were concerned with the problem of torture, 
concentrated their efforts, as previously discussed, around four distinct medical themes, 
which helped produce a more comprehensive understanding of the practice that needed to 
be outlawed. Scientific knowledge regarding the after-effects of torture began to evolve 
tentatively after the end of World War II when concentration camp and labour camp 
survivors were in desperate need of both medical and psychological treatment and care.308 
What began as a scientific study to establish a medical basis for disability compensation,309 
consequently extended to the comparison of the sequelae exhibited by concentration camp 
and torture survivors and thus the basis of medical knowledge in this sphere.310 In-depth 
scientific knowledge took time to evolve – it was not until the late 1960s and the 1970s that 
specialised medical discussions emerged on the pages of medical journals and other 
specialised publications. The publications of Amnesty International and medical journals 
allow us to begin to examine and understand this complex process of knowledge 
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development.311  
Medical research and scientific debates on the pages of professional journals were 
one way of building a structured understanding of the consequences of torture and other 
cruel treatment. A multitude of medical conferences have dealt not only with the creation 
and establishment of scientific facts, but also with the problem of drawing up unified 
guidelines about the ethical norms binding doctors and other medical personnel.  
A number of important conclusions have been reached by medical professionals, 
which have helped define the technical and moral scope of this problem. These conclusions 
have been supplemented by the independent findings of other non-state actors, which points 
towards closing the scientific debate on the need to regulate behaviour in such a way as to 
make torture unjustifiable. Firstly, it was established that the effects of torture constitute “a 
disease of a traumatic nature… This means that torture should be studied in regard to 
symptoms and diagnosis to gain insight into etiology, treatment and profylaxis”.312 This 
conclusion has been supplemented by the resolve of doctors participating in the Medical 
Conference in Athens in 1978 to produce systematic clinical studies that meet the criteria of 
clinical science in order to improve the care for patients while creating knowledge that 
could be passed to other doctors.313 Secondly, medical research over the years has shown 
that there are sequelae that are explicitly related to particular kinds of torture (allowing this 
type of structured knowledge to be used in the legal system) but also that humans react 
                                                 
311 Amnesty International, Conference for the Abolition of Torture – Final Report. Paris, 10-11Dec 1973. 
(Amnesty International Publications, London: 1973) – pp. 35-65; Amnesty International, Evidence of Torture: 
Studies by the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group. (Amnesty International Publications. London: 
1977); Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report (Amnesty International Publications, London: 
1977) – pp. 34-39; Report of an Amnesty International Medical Seminar “Violations of Human Rights: 
Torture and the Medical Profession”, Athens, 10-11 Mar 1978, AI Index: CAT 02/03/78 – Report of Working 
Party III – pp. 22-3; O.V.Rasmussen, “Medical Aspects of Torture”; Danish Medical Bulletin – Vol. 27, No. 
5, 1980 – containing a report of the seminar “Sequelae and Rehabilitation of Concentration Camp Victims, 
Sailors from the Second Worla War, Hostages and Torture Victims” held in Copenhagen, Dec 8-9, 1979. 
312 Report of an Amnesty International Medical Seminar “Violations of Human Rights: Torture and the 
Medical Profession”, Athens, 10-11 Mar 1978, AI Index: CAT 02/03/78 – pp. 18 
313 Ibid. – pp. 22 
 120
differently to the type of extreme stress that torture and ill-treatment cause.314 The 
continuing scientific research into the after-effects of torture echoes a statement made by 
Amnesty International experts in 1971 – interrogations procedures aimed at “causing 
malfunction or breakdown of a man’s [sic] mental processes… constitute as great an assault 
on the inherent dignity of the human person as more traditional techniques of physical 
torture”.315 It is widely accepted in medical circles today that when people are subjected to 
imprisonment and continuous extreme stress related to the anticipation of or indeed to 
suffering physical or mental damage, they “develop long-lasting physical and mental 
sequelae”.316  
The growing understanding of the after-effects of torture and the outrage at human 
experimentation signalled the need for the creation of unified principles of medical ethics. 
At its very first conference on the abolition of torture, Amnesty International made 
recommendations to the medical profession to safeguard their research against the 
possibility of it being used for torture or other forms of ill-treatment, and to refuse 
participation in torture and in training others for the use of medical knowledge to harm 
individual humans.317 The principle efforts towards the creation of these codes have been 
expended by the members of the WMA in the Declaration of Tokyo,  
It is the privilege of the medical doctor to practise medicine in the service of humanity, to preserve and 
restore bodily and mental health without distinction as to persons, to comfort and to ease the suffering 
of his or her patients. The utmost respect for human life is to be maintained even under threat, and no 
use made of any medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity. 
1.The doctor shall not countenance, condone or participate in the practice of torture or other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures, whatever the offence of which the victim of such procedures 
                                                 
314 O. V. Rasmussen, “Medical Aspects of Torture” 
315 Amnesty International, Report of an Enquiry into Allegations of Ill-treatment made against the Security 
Forces in Northern Ireland by Persons arrested on 9 August 1971 (Amnesty International Publications, 
London : 1972)– pp. 38 
316 U. Abildgaard, G. Daugaard, H. Marcussen, P. Jess, H. Draminsky Petersen, and M. Wallach, “Chronic 
Organic Psycho-Syndrome in Greek Torture Victims”. Danish Medical Bulletin, Vol. 31, no. 3, 1984 – pp. 
239; P. Riis, “The many face of inhumanity and the few faces of its psychic and somatic sequelae”, Danish 
Medical Bulletin, Vol. 27, no.5, 1980 – pp. 213 
317 Amnesty International, Conference for the Abolition of Torture – Final Report - pp. 15 
 121
is suspected, accused or guilty, and whatever the victim’s beliefs or motives, and in all situations, 
including armed conflict and civil strife318 
This declaration, along with the Resolution on the role of the nurse in the care of 
detainees and prisoners (1975) and the Declaration of Hawaii (1977) signalled the resolve 
of medical professionals to uphold their moral principles in their work and to protect their 
colleagues under regimes hostile to the principles of freedom, the protection of human 
rights and the well-being of their citizens. The declaration of the WMA and WPA inspired 
the UN General Assembly to further institutionalise such normative principles as another 
safeguard against the sovereign powers of oppressive regimes.319 These ethical guidelines 
helped construct the use of torture as unethical and unacceptable, and thus promoted 
scientific closure to the political plane, planting the above principles into the general social 
normative context. 
Although the acceptance of the principles of medical ethics go some way towards 
defining the scope of torture and creating some individual safeguards, effective change in 
the attitudes and actions of states can better be achieved by establishing firmer international 
legal standards. There are two major methods to establish and define principles of law, and 
thus two sources of issue formation – the legal professionals, concerned with the 
construction of new principles which are then proposed to policy-makers; and the courts of 
law, which in the process of interpreting the law and making decisions lay the foundations 
of new principles.  
The efforts of the legal profession were reflected most clearly in the efforts of the 
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ICJ. The organisation has been particularly active in terms of liaising with other non-
governmental organisations, as well as with international governmental organisations, 
including UN agencies, to work on the general principle of upholding the rule of law, 
protecting human rights and protecting individuals.320 The ICJ used various tactics to 
influence nation-states, such as sending trial observers, producing country reports, 
organising public protests and committees of inquiry, applying diplomacy or outright 
negative publicity.321 Pressure on nation-states was seen as one of the ways to change the 
attitudes of governments towards the issue of torture. A report of the Secretary General of 
the ICJ confirmed that the practice of torture was not only contrary to the laws of almost 
any nation but also that there existed explicit prohibition of torture in a number of 
international legal instruments.322 Hence, the problem as formulated by the ICJ was the lack 
of political will on the side of states to implement these regulations and to abide by them.323 
The solution was to generate the necessary political will and to ensure that if more legal 
provisions were created, they would be effective in directing states to avoid the use of 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
Various courts of law adjudicated issues relating to victims of torture and other ill-
treatment. As early as 1969, the European Court of Human Rights examined the issue of 
torture in the Greek Case, finding for the first time that particular methods of extracting 
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information constituted torture.324 The report of the European Commission of Human 
Rights in these proceedings addressed two important aspects of torture – its definition and 
its justifiability. In its Article 3, the European Convention on Human Rights prohibited the 
use of torture, and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in similar words as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5),325 thus the elaborate discussion of 
the meaning of these terms had implications that reached far beyond the borders of the 
European Union. The European Commission on Human Rights stated:  
‘All torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also degrading.’ 
Inhuman treatment covers ‘at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or 
physical, which in the particular situation is unjustifiable’ 
Torture connotes inhuman treatment ‘which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or 
confessions, or the infliction of punishment and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman 
treatment’ 
‘Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him 
before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience’326 
The minority report of Lord Gardiner on “the five techniques” of in-depth 
interrogation (keeping detainees hooded, depriving them of sleep, food and water, 
subjecting them to continuous monotonous noise, keeping them standing against the wall in 
a required posture) that were used by the British Government in Northern Ireland, clearly 
placed these techniques in the realm of the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment327. 
Although Lord Gardiner commented that these proceedings were strictly within the domain 
of domestic jurisdiction and hence sub judice before the European Court on Human Rights, 
the impact of this report was significant in that it clearly distinguished between acceptable 
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and unacceptable, moral and immoral treatment of prisoners. The report also declared that 
emergency conditions were not a sufficient reason to justify the use of secret and illegal 
interrogation methods.328 The question of whether the use of torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment could be justified by emergency situations was discussed by the 
European Court in the Greek Case, where some believe that the Court left the question 
open to interpretation.329 In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom (1976) the European 
Commission of Human Rights corrected this misunderstanding by concluding that “The 
Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct. Article 3 makes no provision for 
exceptions and… there can be no derogation therefrom even in the event of a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation”.330 
The process of legally formulating the problem of torture benefited greatly from the 
growing medical understanding of the consequences that torture survivors experience. 
Although it is very rarely that a direct link is drawn between the advancement of medical 
knowledge and the development of the law, this link exists and legal professionals have 
made good use of it. The findings of medical experiments on the effects of solitary 
confinement, the exposure to noise and the anticipation of ill-treatment have provided the 
basis on which lawyers claimed that the use of such techniques amounts to ill-treatment. 
Hence, the findings of Lord Gardiner’s report and the conclusions of the court in the Irish 
Case have not been reached independent of the development of scientific knowledge. The 
existence of the network of supporters who have concentrated their efforts on accumulating 
evidence that torture should be prohibited has thus made it easier for actors from different 
                                                 
328 Ibid. – pp. 22 
329 N. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law, – pp. 78 
330 Ibid.  – pp. 79 citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 19 Yearbook 512, 750 (1976); M. O’Boyle, “Torture and 
Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. United Kingdom”. 
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fields to work in unison and in the name of the same cause. 
Closure on the technical parameters of the proposed norm to outlaw the use of 
torture was reached gradually, not so much due to conflicting views of the actors involved, 
as due to the complexity and multilayered character of the norm. Technical knowledge and 
standards were created in more than one professional field in a sustained effort to prevent 
torture perpetrators from avoiding justice. Evidence of technical closure can be found in the 
unified position of non-state actors in their attempt to persuade states to adopt a new norm, 
and also in the lack of debate over the technical parameters of the norm. Professional 
ethical principles emerged and were agreed on at the international level; legal decisions at 
the national and regional levels signalled the acceptance of the prohibition to use torture; 
medical professionals agreed that the consequences of torture were of a traumatic nature 
and rendered the practice unacceptable in the ‘civilised world’. All of these developments 
indicated an expanding agreement, which was becoming so solid, as to not allow states 
much room for political manoeuvre.  
 
Dialogue with the Conservative Actors 
The study of network configuration and issue formation has drawn attention mainly 
to the work of non-state actors – NGOs, epistemic communities, professional organisations. 
It was ultimately down to states, however, to create instruments that can effectively guide 
and regulate the behaviour of national governments. The existing research on the Campaign 
Against Torture has tended to consider separately the work done by non-state actors and the 
activities of states who supported the need of a prohibition on the use of torture.331 Reports 
                                                 
331 J. Burgers and H. Danelius, The UN Convention Against Torture – Chapters 2 and 3; C. Ingelse, The UN 
Committee Against Torture – An Assessment (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Netherlands: 2001) – 
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from various conferences organised by Amnesty International show, however, that 
delegations from some states have participated in the discussions along with non-state 
actors.332 In other words, the distinction between non-state and state actors is not sufficient 
to classify the position of the actors in favour or against the development of this norm. 
When reports of non-state conferences and work-shops on the issue of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment are examined in conjunction with the records of the discussions 
that have taken place at the UN General Assembly and its Third Committee,333 it becomes 
obvious that the governments whose representatives had taken part in the conferences, were 
also the ones who initiated and played a leading role in UN discussions of state attitudes 
and actions regarding the problem of torture.334 These states, which linked the activities and 
efforts of non-state actors to the influence of the UN, played the role of moral leaders 
among the member-states. Those states that attempted to downplay the problem of torture 
or in any other way deny the need for an effective international instrument to ban its use 
will be considered here as the conservative actors. In this campaign there were no states 
that explicitly defended the use of torture, even though there was ample evidence that many 
                                                                                                                                                    
Chapters 2 and 3 – these two publications consider primarily the work of states on CAT and give only 
marginal attention to the work and influence of non-state actors. 
332 Amnesty International, Conference for the Abolition of Torture – Final Report. – pp. 15; Resolution 
adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union “Amnesty International Campaign Against Torture – The Problem 
of Torture in the World”, 11th Oct 1974, Tokyo; Report of the “International Seminar on Torture and Human 
Rights” – Palais de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 3-5 Oct 1977, published by Amnesty International, London – to 
name but a few. Some of the delegations which have been present at all conferences include – Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Greece, Germany (FR), Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK 
and the USA.  
333 The Committee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs, more often referred to as the Third 
Committee is one of the subsidiary organs of the UN General Assembly. It is one of 6 main committees. The 
UNGA refers to the Third Committee “agenda items relating to a range of social, humanitarian affairs and 
human rights issues that affect peoples all over the world” – http://www.un.org/ga/61/third/third.shtml  
334 Verbatim Records of the 2065th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 15th Oct 
1974 – paragraphs 20, 22, 29; Verbatim Records of the 2066th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA 
– 29th Session, 15th Oct 1974 – para. 1,3, 28; Verbatim Records of the 2067th Meeting of the Third Committee 
of the UNGA – 29th Session, 16th Oct 1974 – para 18, 31 
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governments had authorised its practice.335 Open support for torture as state policy was 
made unthinkable by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which states had at 
least in principle agreed on the individual’s right to be free from torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The normative context of the 1970s had 
fundamentally changed with the coming into force of the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights (1966). The task of the moral leaders in the beginning of the campaign 
against torture was thus to generate consensus for the creation of an effective instrument 
banning the use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The records of the discussions 
on this issue can be found in the meetings of the Third Committee of the UNGA.  
The problem of torture was raised at the United Nations by Amnesty’s petition 
which carried more than a million signatures.336 In November 1973, the delegations of 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago prepared a draft 
resolution, which stated that the General Assembly will examine the issue of “torture, and 
other inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and 
imprisonment in a future session”.337 Apart from being the moral entrepreneur in the 
campaign against torture, Amnesty International, along with other NGOs - ICJ, the World 
Council of Churches, Amnesty’s medical groups, etc. managed to influence the attitude of 
the states, which were the moral leaders in the UNGA. Amnesty’s neutral reports on 
tortured individuals worldwide338 provided the backbone of the campaign;339 the 
                                                 
335 Amnesty International published country reports implicating governments that authorised the use of 
torture; the International Commission of Jurists published articles on the human rights situation in general and 
on the use of torture in particular from various regions of the world 
336 J. Burgers and H. Danelius, The UN Convention Against Torture – pp. 13; N. Rodley, The Treatment of 
Prisoners Under International Law – pp. 20-1 
337 J. Burgers and H. Danelius, The UN Convention Against Torture – pp. 13; 
http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm - Resolution 3059 “Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment” – GA 28th Session, 2163rd plenary meeting, 2nd Nov 1973. 
338 Amnesty International, Report on Torture, citing more than 60 countries, which use torture at home 
339 N. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law – pp. 21 
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conferences of NGOs and professional organisations came up with practical proposals for 
effective measures that could ease the suffering of individuals;340 the reports of the ICJ 
heralded the weaknesses of legal systems to address problems stemming from torture and 
other ill-treatment.341 The influence of the work of Amnesty, ICJ, IAPL has been 
acknowledged by nation states at the UNGA meetings,342 as well as by authors who have 
provided detailed accounts of the historical development of the Convention Against 
Torture.343 The basis of the relationship between states and the non-state actors has been the 
provision of information. Securing a constant flow of professional advice and information 
of atrocities, as well as possessing a fast-flowing channel for disseminating information, 
made these non-state actors valuable allies in a coalition to create a new behavioural norm. 
Although much of the background work for the creation of the new norm was done 
primarily by these non-state actors, the political effort committed to the cause by the 
supportive states was undoubtedly critical.  
The discussions of torture followed closely the situation in some Latin American 
                                                 
340 Amnesty International proposed two approaches to the eradication of torture – firstly, there were proposals 
for the creation of codes of professional ethics – see Amnesty International, Conference for the Abolition of 
Torture – Final Report. Paris, 10-11Dec 1973. (Amnesty International Publications, London: 1973); Report of 
the “International Seminar on Torture and Human Rights” – Palais de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 3-5 Oct 1977, 
published by Amnesty International, London; Amnesty International, Report on an Amnesty International 
Medical Seminar “Violations of Human Rights: Torture and the Medical Profession”, Athens, 10-11 March 
1978, AI Index: CAT 02/03/78; Amnesty International, Codes of Professional Ethics. (Amnesty International 
Publications, London: 1984); secondly, there were practical proposals made to governments to change state 
behaviour on the issue - Resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union “Amnesty International 
Campaign Against Torture – The Problem of Torture in the World”, 11th Oct 1974, Tokyo 
341 See, H. Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists – pp. 82-92; “Human Rights in the World – 
Torture Continues”, The Review International Commission of Jurists. June, 1973, no. 10, 10-33; C. Yeo,  
“Psychiatry, the Law and Dissent in the Soviet Union” The Review – International Commission of Jurists, 
Vol. 14, June 1975, 34-41; “Lawyers Against Torture” The Review – International Commission of Jurists, 
vol. 16, June 1976, 29-41 
342 Verbatim Records of the 2066th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 15 Oct 1974 
– paragraph 25; Summary Records No. 35 from the 32nd Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held 
on 1Nov 1977 (UN Doc Index A/C.3/32/SR/35) – para. 14, 17; Summary Records No. 38 from the 32nd 
Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held on 3Nov 1977 (UN Doc Index A/C.3/32/SR/38) – para. 20 
343 J. Burgers and H. Danelius, UN Convention Against Torture  – pp. 13, 19-20; N. Rodley, The Treatment of 
Prisoners Under International Law – pp. 21, 23-4; C. Ingelse, The UN Committee Against Torture – An 
Assessment, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Netherlands: 2001) – pp. 67-8 
 129
countries and other authoritarian regimes worldwide, with special attention being paid to 
the large-scale atrocities unfolding in Chile. Hence, it is safe to say that the norm 
prohibiting the use of torture and other ill-treatment was elaborated in direct response to a 
humanitarian disaster taking place at the same time. This context of an increased sense of 
urgency speeded up negotiations and decision-making in the international context. 
The discussions at the Third Committee of the UNGA in 1973 and 1974, following 
resolution 3059, which outlined the concerns of the UN General Assembly with the 
question of torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and 
the resolve of the organisation to examine this issue further,344 were entirely engaged with 
the situation in Chile – representatives of states from different parts of the world expressed 
their concerns about the scale of the use of torture.345 The representative of Chile used three 
lines of defence – that torture was not a governmental practice, although there might have 
been isolated incidents; that other states, in particular the USSR, was using torture against 
its own citizens; and that, in any case, the concern with the domestic affairs of Chile ran 
counter to the principle of sovereignty laid out in Art.2 (7) of the UN Charter.346 Although 
the coalition against the practice of torture seemed quite strong, the growing cohesion of 
the non-aligned movement and the increasing concern to uphold the principle of 
sovereignty against attempts to meddle with the domestic policies of states stood in its 
way.347 The conservative actors attempted to change the agenda by downplaying the 
                                                 
344 General Assembly 28th Session, 2163 Plenary Meeting, 2nd November 1973 
345 Verbatim Records of the 2065th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 15th Oct 
1974; Verbatim Records of the 2066th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 15th Oct 
1974; Verbatim Records of the 2067th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 16th Oct 
1974; Verbatim Records of the 2068th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 18th Oct 
1974 
346 Verbatim Records of the 2067th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 16th Oct 
1974 – pp. 86-7, 92 
347 Verbatim Records of the Plenary Meeting of the UNGA – 29th Session, 2244th Meeting, 26th Sept 1974 – 
pp. 193-7 
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problem of torture and by emphasising the importance of the principles of sovereignty, non-
intervention and self-determination.348 The normative leaders, however, were not prepared 
to let the discussion of torture slip away. Delegates from Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, 
France, Norway, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany focused on persuading the other 
delegations of the need to establish an international norm that effectively outlawed the use 
of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.349 The pro-active delegations not only 
vigorously advocated policy-creation, they were engaged in constructing and supporting the 
texts of various resolutions for action, codes of professional ethics and the drafts of the very 
Convention Against Torture.350  
The dialogues at the Third Committee of the UNGA were making slow progress but 
through extensive discussions the list of supporters for the new norm was growing (for the 
dynamics of the international negotiations, see Figure 2.3 below). Poland declared its full 
support for all draft resolutions condemning torture,351 as did Denmark,352 Romania,353 
Pakistan,354 and Yugoslavia.355 The campaign against torture continued with small, 
                                                 
348 Summary Records of the 2067th meeting of the 29th Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held on 
16th Oct 1974 (UN Doc Index: A/C.3/SR.2067) – pp.86-88 – records from the speech of the Chilean delegate; 
Verbatim Records of the Plenary Meeting of the UNGA – 29th Session, 2244th Meeting, 26th Sept 1974 – pp. 
193-197 – the delegate from Yugoslavia was trying to change the focus of discussion to issues related to the 
concerns of the non-aligned movement – namely, apartheid, the New International Economic Order, 
demilitarisation.  
349 Verbatim Records of the 2065th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 15th Oct 
1974 – paragraphs 20, 22, 29; Verbatim Records of the 2066th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA 
– 29th Session, 15th Oct 1974 – para. 1,3, 28; Verbatim Records of the 2067th Meeting of the Third Committee 
of the UNGA – 29th Session, 16th Oct 1974 – para 18, 31 
350 N. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law  - pp. 28-9 - The Netherlands prepared 
the draft of what became UNGA Resolution 3218 (pp.25-6); at the 5th UN Congress on the prevention of 
crime and the treatment of offenders, the Swedish and Dutch delegations submitted a draft declaration for the 
protection of all persons from being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
351 Verbatim Records of the 2066th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 15th Oct 
1974 – para. 10 
352 Ibid – para 15, 16, 17;  
353 Ibid. – para 18 
354 Verbatim Records of the 2067th Meeting of the Third Committee of the UNGA – 29th Session, 16th Oct 
1974 – para 4 
355 Ibid. – para 48 
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tentative steps, which were not running against the concerns of Chile and the other non-
alligned states (including African and Middle Eastern states who disagreed with the 
development of the new norm).  
Figure 2.3 
DIALOGUE WITH THE CONSERVATIVE ACTORS 
 
  
States not in 
opposition to the 
creation of the new 
norm 
States openly 
expressing 
support for 
current status 
quo 
States that do not 
participate actively in 
the creation of the 
new norm 
States 
expressing
open 
opposition
1973 
 
Sweden,  
the Netherlands,  
Austria,  
Trinidad and Tobago 
(normative  
entrepreneurs)  
Chile, USSR, 
South Africa, 
Yugoslavia  
Poland, Romania, 
Denmark, Pakistan none 
1974 
Sweden, the 
Netherlands, UK, 
France, Norway, 
Austria, the Federal 
Republic of 
Germany,USA 
Chile, 
South Africa,       
USSR 
Portugal,Mexico,Gree
ce,Australia,Belgium,
Saudi Arabia, Syrian 
Arab emirates, Costa 
Rica, Lesotho, Spain, 
Ireland 
none 
1976-7 
Same as above, 
Poland, Romania, 
Denmark, Pakistan 
    none 
1978 All of the above    none 
 
The information included in the above table is based on the Discussions and the opinions voiced at the Third 
Committee of the UN General Assembly. 
 
In November 1974 the UNGA adopted Resolution 3218, which indicated the need 
to develop codes of professional ethics for police and other law-enforcement officials, 
requested the WHO to take into account the work of the WMA and draft an outline of the 
principles of medical ethics, and decided that the General Assembly would deal with the 
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issue of torture and other inhuman, cruel, degrading treatment or punishment in its next 
session.356 In 1975, the 5th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders took place and gave a further impetus to the campaign. The Congress was 
attended by “representatives from 101 states, [many of whom] were at the highest level of 
influence and competence”.357 The Congress’s General Rapporteur noted that the heated 
discussions reflected “passionate concern over the use of torture”.358 The adoption of 
resolutions 3452 and 3453 in December 1975 is evidence of the building up of normative 
momentum. Resolution 3452 contained the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from being subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.359 This declaration was an important stepping stone in the evolution of the 
norm outlawing the use of torture. Mr. Schreiber, who was at the time the Director of the 
Division of Human Rights, commented that the ease and swiftness with which this 
declaration was adopted was indicative of the importance that the organisation attached to 
the problem of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.360 However, the American 
representative found the voting unanimity suspicious in that governments seemed to adopt 
the resolution too easily, while the problem of torture persisted around the world.361 Indeed, 
some conservative actors might have acted in the hope of adopting a weak document, while 
wishing to continue their unrestrained domestic powers. Another possible explanation is 
                                                 
356 http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm - Resolution 3218 - Torture and Other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment - GA 29th Session, 2278th 
plenary meeting, 6th Nov 1974. 
357 Summary Records No. 62 from the 31st Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN 
Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.62) – Mr Schreiber (Director, Division of Human Rights), para. 38 
358 N. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law – pp. 34, citing Fifth UN Crime Congress 
Report – para. 379. 
359 http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm - Resolution 3452 - GA 30th Session, 2433rd plenary meeting, 9th 
Dec 1975 
360 Summary Records No. 62 from the 31st Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN 
Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.62) – para. 38 
361 Summary Records No. 67 from the 31st Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN 
Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.67) – para. 7, 11, 11a 
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that some states might have hoped that a speedy adoption of a resolution would side-line 
the discussions of torture and the issue could then be quickly forgotten. This might account 
for the rigorous discussions that followed in 1977 when Sweden advocated the need for the 
creation of a binding convention against torture, to which I will return in the next stage.  
Resolution 3453 of 1975 requested the Commission on Human Rights to “study the 
question of torture and any necessary steps for: ensuring effective observance of the 
Declaration… and the formulation of a body of principles for the protection of all persons 
under any form of detention or imprisonment”.362 The discussions at the Third Committee 
continued throughout 1976 without any practical outcomes. Many states continued to 
express their support for the evolving new norm.363 Delegates often turned their attention to 
the situation in Chile, which made the Chilean representatives uneasy and defensive. They 
used the previously discussed tactics – accusing other governments of using torture as well, 
claiming that their own government is falsely accused of practicing torture and hiding 
behind the principle of sovereignty and freedom from intervention in internal affairs.364 
This impasse needed to be overcome for the norm to continue to evolve.  
In this stage of norm development the logic of persuasion and argumentation played 
a more effective role than the logic of consequences in the debates. Since the issue of 
torture had no direct strategic consequences to the national security of states, governments 
could not use the logic of consequences as a reason to discontinue or hinder negotiations in 
                                                 
362 http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm - Resolution 3453 - GA 30th Session, 2433rd plenary meeting, 9th 
Dec 1975. 
363 Summary Records No. 63 from the 31st Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN 
Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.63) – Portugal (para 23-6); Mexico (para 28-32); USSR (para 33-36); Greece (para 
42-4); Australia (para 45-7); Belgium (para48). Summary Records No. 64 from the 31st Session of the Third 
Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.64) –Sweden (para 1-4); Netherlands 
(para 5-9); USSR (para 13-5); Saudi Arabia (para 15-17) 
364 Summary Records No. 65 from the 31st Session of the Third Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN 
Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.65) – Chile (para 36-41; 43-5); Summary Records No. 66 from the 31st Session of 
the Third Committee of the UNGA held in 1976 (UN Doc Index: A/C.3/31/SR.66) – Chile (para. 92-4). 
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this particular issue area.365 Without these hidden breaks that states use to exit discussions 
and within a context of appropriateness created by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, conservative actors did not have much space to manoeuvre, not least because they 
did not wish to stand out of the community of ‘civilised nations’.  
The work of non-governmental and professionals organisations outside the UN was 
very useful and influential too. In the years of the Cold War, governments distrusted each 
other (this shows in the defensive statements of the Chilean delegates at the UN) and the 
only possible way of collecting information about atrocities was through organisations that 
are not related to governments. Grass-roots organisations have been more effective in 
accumulating information about individual cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
In some Latin American and African countries, for example, where the Church is an active 
social institution, the clergy and bishops have often been the first people to sound the alarm 
about ill-treatment of prisoners.366 The International Commission of Jurists has on a 
number of occasions sent lawyers to oversee political trials where human rights violations 
were suspected to have taken place.367 Doctors of the Danish Medical Group under 
Amnesty International have visited countries to meet with torture survivors and have helped 
                                                 
365 Strategic negotiations particularly in the realm of de-militarization – land mines, nuclear weapons, 
chemical and biological weapons – often find deadlock because of the high stakes in national security that 
some states find unsurpassable.  
366 H. Hunke and J. Ellis, Torture – A Cancer of Our Society, – the authors point out the concern of the 
Catholic church, dating back as far as 1967 and provides an account of some of the actions that they Church 
has undertaken; H. Thoolen, Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – the need for and 
International Convention Against Torture, (Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Geneva: 
1978); Country Report – Paraguay (1979) The Review – International Commission of Jurists, No. 22, June 
1979 – pp. 11-13 – the report discusses the role and achievements of the Paraguayan Conference of Bishops. 
367 The history of the activities of the ICJ – H. Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists – Global 
Advocates for Human Rights – dedicates a chapter to the work of the ICJ to protect victims – pp. 79-94; 
“Human Rights in the World – Torture Continues”, The Review International Commission of Jurists. June, 
1973, no. 10, 10-33; C. Yeo, “Psychiatry, the Law and Dissent in the Soviet Union”, The Review – 
International Commission of Jurists, Vol. 14, June 1975, 34-41; “Lawyers Against Torture” The Review – 
International Commission of Jurists, vol. 16, June 1976, 29-41; Country Report – Malaysia (1979) The 
Review – International Commission of Jurists, No. 22, June 1979 – pp. 6-10; Country Report – Paraguay 
(1979) The Review – International Commission of Jurists, No. 22, June 1979 – pp. 11-13 
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survivors who have managed to flee their country, collecting information and providing 
medical care.368 These are only a few examples of the valuable contributions that non-state 
actors have made to different segments of the campaign against torture. Another aspect of 
the input of non-state actors is the multitude of conferences that they have organised. As 
discussed earlier, many of the conferences organised or co-sponsored by Amnesty 
International have been a meeting point of experts, professionals and state delegations.369 
Much of the information exchanged at these conferences was reflecting the current 
scientific debates on the medical, psychological and social consequences of torture 
experienced by the victims, by their families, by the torturers and the administrative 
personnel evolved. Conferences and workshops were thus some of the mechanisms that 
ensured the flow of information from the civil society and scientific communities to the 
policy-makers.  
The stage of bargaining and persuasion in the evolution of this particular norm 
passed rather smoothly and without too much public attention (apart from that of the non-
state actors who were directly involved). The pressure on the conservative states was 
mounting and there seemed to be no good reason to back out of negotiations (or in this case 
the process of persuasion). It was also difficult to find a sufficient reason to oppose the 
development of the new norm, which was established almost unexpectedly in 1977. 
 
                                                 
368 O.V. Rasmussen, “Medical Aspects of Torture”; N. Gordon and R. Marton, (eds.) Torture – Human 
Rights, Medical Ethics and the Case of Israel. (Zed Books in association with the Association of Israeli-
Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights, Tel Aviv. London: 1995); P. Berger “Documentation of Physical 
Sequelae” Danish Medical Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 5, Nov 1980 – pp. 215-6; O.V. Rasmussen, and I. Lunde 
(1980) “Evaluation of investigation of 200 torture victims”. Danish Medical Bulletin, vol. 27, no.5, 241-3. 
369 See lists of participants and contents of discussions - Amnesty International, Conference for the Abolition 
of Torture – Final Report. Paris, 10-11Dec 1973.; Amnesty International, Report on an Amnesty International 
Medical Seminar “Violations of Human Rights: Torture and the Medical Profession”, Athens, 10-11 March 
1978, AI Index: CAT 02/03/78; Report of the “International Seminar on Torture and Human Rights” – Palais 
de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 3-5 Oct 1977; Report on the International Meeting “Doctors, Ethics and Torture”, 
Copenhagen, 23 Aug 1986. Danish Medical Bulletin, Vol. 34, no. 4, Aug 1987, 185-216 
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Political Closure 
Closure on the norm prohibiting the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment was reached with Resolution 32/62 of the UNGA, 
which requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare a draft convention against 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.370 Closing the 
debate on the permissibility of the use of torture was due partly to the search for a solution 
to the problem of how to make the Declaration against torture effective and partly to the 
mounting reports from various NGOs of continuing atrocities committed by governments 
around the world. AI, the ICJ and the CSCT strongly advocated the creation of a 
convention against torture.371 The debates at the UNGA, which preceded the political 
closure, were focused on the question of whether there was a need for yet another legal 
instrument prohibiting the use of torture.372 On 28th Oct 1977, Sweden, one of the most 
active states on this issue, submitted a draft resolution (A/C.3/32/L.13) to the General 
Assembly requesting that work on the creation of a convention against torture begin.373 The 
discussions that followed at the meetings of the Third Committee took the form more of 
praise of the effort and commitment of support than of a debate between opponents. No 
opposition was raised in all four sessions of the Committee, which examined this 
question.374 Forty delegations became sponsors and co-sponsors to the draft resolution; the 
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latter was adopted without a vote by the Third Committee and then by the UNGA.375  
The discussions at the Third Committee were quite revealing of the intentions and 
concerns of the participating states. The delegations of Sweden and the Netherlands pointed 
out that although an agreement on the moral issue was achieved, their work was not 
complete until a legally binding international instrument was put in place.376 Other 
delegations expressed their support, emphasising their deep regrets that torture was still 
taking place around the world, expressing concerns for some of the most striking cases of 
torture, which came to the attention of the world community (Chile, Steve Biko in South 
Africa, the conflict in the Middle East) and commenting on the need for an effective 
instrument that would induce urgent action.377  
The point of closure in the case of the convention against torture was reached 
smoothly and without much commotion. The build-up to it was a lengthy process of 
arduous persuasion, but all the preliminary work done by NGOs, epistemic communities 
and professional organisations, along with the pro-active states, paid off in this crucial 
stage. The historical records reflecting the progression of the efforts of the normative 
campaign against torture make it appear as a natural evolution. However, the norm 
prohibiting the use of torture under any circumstances, by any authority or individual was 
established and affirmed in the international normative context by the agreement of the 
members of the UNGA on the need to create a convention that would entail legal 
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obligations.  
The case of Filartiga v. Pena, in the US, made legal history in 1980, but also re-
confirmed that political closure had taken place. The case was adjudicated by a US Court 
under the Alien Tort Claims Statute, which allows US Federal Courts “to take original 
jurisdiction over tort actions brought by aliens ‘committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United Nations”.378 Both Dr Filartiga (the plaintiff – whose son was killed 
in police custody) and Pena (the defendant – a member of the police department) were from 
Paraguay where the events unfolded. Since the Paraguayan legal system failed to charge the 
police department with the murder of Filartiga’s son, Filartiga and his daughter decided to 
try and use the Alien Tort Act against Pena who was temporarily in the United States.379 
The Court of the Second Circuit confirmed its jurisdiction over the proceedings, stating: 
Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations… is the right to be free from physical torture. 
Indeed,… the torturer has become – like the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani 
generic, an enemy of all humankind.380 
This historical decision of the Second Circuit Court of the United States confirmed 
officially that the norm prohibiting the use of torture has become part of the body of 
customary international law.  
Once it was agreed that an effective prohibition of torture should be created, all 
efforts and discussions were concentrated on the wording and the construction of the 
convention, confirming that negotiations have reached a point of no return. The agreement 
on the existence of the norm prohibiting the use of torture was no longer questionable; 
derogation from the norm would incur public criticism.  
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Legalisation 
The Swiss Committee Against Torture forwarded a proposal for a convention 
similar to the Geneva Conventions, allowing a set international body to visit places of 
detention without requiring initial approval by the governments so as to produce reliable 
and precise reports.381 The ICJ, as discussed previously, however, proposed that all efforts 
be concentrated on the creation of the strongest possible convention and attempts for 
improving its effectiveness be preserved for a later stage.382 
 Resolution 32/62 requested the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to prepare a 
draft convention. Since discussions were foreseen to be prolonged and difficult, the CHR 
proposed that an open-ended working group be created to draw up the first draft of the 
convention.383 The working group was to meet prior to the annual meeting of the 
Commission and then report on the progress made.  Sweden and IAPL both submitted draft 
conventions. The proposal of IAPL reflected the work of NGOs and specialist organisations 
and was prepared at a Conference in Syracuse in 1977. IAPL worked closely with the ICJ, 
Amnesty International, and the ICRC and later sought the opinion of a large number of 
experts.384 Consequently it became clear hat IAPL’s draft differed very little from the 
Swedish draft.385 It is worth noting here that representatives of Sweden had attended almost 
all conferences organised or sponsored by Amnesty.386 Moreover, Amnesty International, 
the ICJ, and the ICRC were represented at all meetings of the working group, preparing the 
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draft convention under the Commission on Human Rights. This is yet another example of 
the close cooperation among state and non-state actors in this normative campaign.  
The Swedish draft convention was an elaboration of the already existing declaration 
against torture. The discussions that took place in the working group of the CHR are 
available from the official records of ECOSOC – 34th to the 40th session of the Commission 
on Human Rights (1976 to 1984). The Swedish jurist, Justice Hans Danelius and the Dutch 
delegate to the UN, Herman Burgers, compiled a handbook on the Convention against 
Torture in which they describe in intricate detail the deliberations of the working group 
under the CHR.387 Here, I will focus only on those parts of the convention that have been 
influenced by the field work of the non-state actors and the scientific knowledge obtained 
by the professional groups. 
In 1978, the CHR was concerned mainly with procedure forpreparing the draft 
convention and with the presentation of the proposed drafts.388 It was not until the working 
group met in 1979 that substantive discussions on the text of the convention began. Article 
1 of both the Declaration against torture and the draft convention contain the definition of 
torture (and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).389 Needless to 
say, these were some of the longest discussions. The Swedish draft proposed that article 
one be identical in the declaration and the convention. The delegations of the US, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Denmark, and the UK all proposed that changes be introduced and the 
definition made both more elaborate and less open to interpretation (because interpretation 
can open the door for undermining the definition).390 The suggestions of Portugal and 
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Switzerland were both in the sphere of the use of medical knowledge: Portugal proposed 
that the “abuse of psychiatry” had to be included as a form of torture, while Switzerland 
insisted that “medical or scientific experiments, if not serving any therapeutic purpose”, 
also form part of torture.391 It is impossible to deny that continuous reports of the abuse of 
psychiatry in the USSR,392 the discussion of human experimentation393 and the growing 
volume of medical knowledge regarding the after-effects of torture, all contributed to the 
concerns that these states voiced. The US representative raised the question whether a 
difference should be made if torture is practiced by public officials, and proposed that the 
term public official should be further specified.394 Amnesty has commented on the role of 
public officials in the practice of torture in a number of its reports.395  
The Swedish delegation took into account the discussions and proposals discussed 
above and finalised article 1, which was later adopted without a vote by the UNGA and 
became the opening article of the Convention: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.396 
The discussion within the working group moved on to the question of the 
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obligations of states, which are contained in articles 2 and 3 of the original draft. While 
Article 2 of the Swedish draft obliged states to “ensure that torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment does not take place within [their] jurisdiction”,397 
other delegations pointed out that while states can “adopt measures to prevent torture”, they 
could not “undertake to ensure that torture would never occur”.398 The final version of this 
article, adopted by the Working Group, reads as follows: “Each State Party shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in 
any territory under its jurisdiction”399 (this is also the text of the paragraph as included in 
the Convention of 1984). Article 2, paragraph 2, put an end to the deliberations as to 
whether torture could be justified in emergency circumstances, thus incorporating the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Greek Case and the Irish Case.400 
The lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crime Tribunals are echoed in Article 2, 
paragraph 3, which announced that “an order from a superior officer or a public authority 
may not be invoked as a justification of torture”.401  
The discussions at the working group continued by article and topic, including 
issues such as expulsion and extradition,402 punishment for torture,403 jurisdiction over the 
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offence of torture404 and further procedural issues, which concerned more the 
implementation of the norm than its substance. Some of the longest discussions concerned 
the issues of implementation405 and universal jurisdiction,406 both clashing with the 
principle of state sovereignty. The draft convention was ready by 1981, when only minor 
corrections were discussed,407 and the issue of torture was only briefly touched on until 
1984.408  
The stage of legalisation was completed by the adoption of the Convention against 
Torture by the UNGA on 10th December 1984. The General Assembly considered only the 
texts left in brackets by the Commission on Human Rights and ECOSOC and adopted the 
text almost as prepared by the working group.  
 
Operationalisation 
The Convention against Torture entered into force in 1987;409 however, concerns 
with the operationalisation of the norm remained. One particular proposal for 
operationalisation was formulated by Jean Jacque Gautier and put forward to the Swiss 
government as early as 1976.410 Gautier’s idea was based on the notion of creating a system 
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of international visits to places of detention where torture often takes place in secrecy, 
which would disrupt the use of torture.411 The Secretary General of the ICJ, Niall 
McDermot, who thoroughly supported Gautier’s project, proposed that negotiations on this 
particular mechanism be included in an optional protocol instead of in the main text of the 
convention. There were fears that state disapproval of an international visiting mechanism 
would slow down the already difficult negotiations on the text of the actual convention.412 
Effective operationalisation of the norm outlawing the use of torture was indeed 
very slow, as the Optional Protocol of the Convention Against Torture took ten years to 
negotiate and was successfully adopted only in 2002.413 In 1984 Amnesty International 
published its report Torture in the Eighties, which drew attention to the fact that while 
states were working on the creation and adoption of the convention against torture, some 
governments still made use of this gruesome practice.414 Amnesty, the Swiss Committee 
Against Torture, the ICJ and the ICRC sponsored a colloquium in 1983 on “How to 
Combat Torture”, which marked the beginning of the campaign in favour of an Optional 
Protocol against Torture. The Colloquium was attended by representatives of governments 
who were in support of such mechanism.415 In the next year, Amnesty, CSCT, and other 
NGOs formed a coalition against torture – The Coalition of International NGOs Against 
Torture (CINAT),416 which was going to keep the attention on the issue and demand the 
continued efforts of states to make the convention effective. The efforts of NGOs towards 
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the creation and adoption of the Optional Protocol has been praised by the report of the 
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and the Association for the Prevention of 
Torture.417 Regional conventions against torture developed but those did not eradicate the 
need for an international mechanism to effectively monitor the ban on torture. The most 
proactive states in the negotiations of the Optional Protocol were Costa Rica, Barbados, 
Nicaragua and Panama, supported by the countries of the European Union.  
In June 2006 the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture finally 
received enough number of ratifications and entered into force, which marked a historic 
moment for the prohibition against torture.418 
 
Conclusions 
The development of the norm prohibiting the use of torture maps very closely the 
theoretical model proposed in Chapter 1. The development of scientific knowledge required 
by the moral campaigners and the legal professionals induced increasing concerns over the 
use of torture and growing interest by many states (especially in Western Europe, which 
remained the stronghold of human rights during the Cold War) to take meaningful actions 
to curb the use of this barbarian practice. Normative demands generated scientific 
knowledge, which coupled with the principles of universal human rights and pressure 
applied by some states and many non-state actors, created a new behavioural norm. It was 
constructed in such a persuasive manner that even states who opposed the change of the 
normative status quo found it hard to exit the negotiations for the establishment of this 
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norm. In the case of the prohibition of the use of torture, the components of the successful 
new norm included a strong and engaging ethical proposal, medical knowledge, which 
satisfied the requirements of scientific knowledge, legal expertise, which sided with the 
normative proposal backed up by the emerging scientific knowledge, and political support 
initially by a group of strong and affluent states, which grew in membership to such size 
that it became hard to ignore. 
The creation of the norm banning the use of torture attests to the role and power of 
non-state actors in international policy-making. The former also emphasises the importance 
of scientific knowledge even in areas that seem to be purely ethical in nature. This study 
provides further evidence of the effectiveness of combining the theoretical achievements of 
the social constructivists of international relations and the social constructivists of scientific 
knowledge – a connection worth exploring in further depth.  
The political events in the last five years, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
New York, have brought the problem of torture back into the social and political spot light. 
Shortly after the attacks, the United States began a ‘War on Terror’, which resulted in some 
changes of domestic legislation and curbing civil liberties in some Western countries, as 
well as direct military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. The search of the leaders of the Al-
Qaeda terrorist network renewed the normative debate on the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario and 
once more brought into question the utilisation of torture methods in situations and on 
individuals who are perceived to threaten national security.419 Organisations like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights First continually expressed fears about individuals held 
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without trial and about the treatment of prisoners in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.420 US 
policy-makers maintained that the methods of interrogation used did not constitute torture, 
although some of them caused stress, and anxiety, and included hooding, isolation, sleep 
depravation, etc. It is important to note here that the use of ‘torture light’ or ‘non-lethal 
torture’ has consistently been denied by the US government, which signals that the Bush 
administration accepts the normative principle that torture is illegal, while looking for 
technical loopholes. Another high-profile US breach of the CAT convention has been the 
interpretation offered by the Bush administration to the effect that “the ban on cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment under the UN Convention Against Torture did not apply 
to Americans working overseas”,421 resulting in a policy of ‘rendition’, whereby CIA 
employees were allowed to use methods of interrogation in foreign prisons, which would 
not be allowed in the United States.422  
The United States came under sustained pressure from the EU countries and civil 
society groups for the policy of rendition and during her visit to Europe in December 2005, 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice signalled a shift the US policy on this question. 
Analysts are still trying to determine whether this is a real shift in US policy, as Rice 
declared that “US interrogators were barred from using cruel or degrading practices 
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wherever in the world they were”.423 A further development in US domestic politics is the 
successful vote in the US House of Representatives to ban cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment of foreign terrorist suspects, proposed by Senator John McCain.424 How 
successful this policy would be in practice remains to be seen.  
The principles of the CAT were reinforced even further by the decision of seven UK 
Law Lords on 8th Dec 2005 that evidence obtained by torture carried out abroad is 
inadmissible in court.425 One of the members of the panel, Lord Carswell, stated that 
“allowing torture to be used would involve the state in moral defilement”.426 This decision, 
although expected, has far-reaching consequences, because it not only re-states the UK 
position on the issue regarding the use of torture, but also imposes a normative and 
technical obligation on other governments not to use torture on detainees, because evidence 
obtained under torture will not be acceptable to the legal process.  
These developments, although displaying some of the weaknesses of the 
Convention Against Torture, have also emphasised its strength as a guiding principle on the 
issue of the use of torture.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
Norms prescribing the protection of inventions, innovations, products and 
technologies have existed for more than five centuries, the oldest ones dating as far back as 
Renaissance Italy. The protection of intellectual property (IP) has, however been 
considered an issue of domestic politics in the same way as the protection of physical 
property until the 20th century. Although the first international conventions on intellectual 
property were signed in the 19th century (the Paris and the Berne Conventions), they only 
established general guidelines of international standards of IP protection, and provided no 
enforcement mechanisms. With the growth of knowledge-intensive industries such as the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, information technologies, computer software, and 
with the globalisation of trade and services, businesses began to demand higher levels of 
intellectual property protection and international safeguards for their scientific and 
technological breakthroughs.  
In 1994 the member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
signed an agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPs), which 
established international norms for the protection of intellectual property rights under the 
mandate of the newly created World Trade Organisation (WTO).427 The TRIPs agreement 
regulates such diverse areas as the protection of patents, copyright, trademarks, utility 
models, industrial designs, geographical indicators, collective marks, certification marks 
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and trade secrets.428 One of the industries covered by the agreement is the pharmaceutical 
industry, which has attracted a lot of public attention in relation to the effects of TRIPs on 
the availability and affordability of essential medicines. The application and effects of the 
norm protecting all knowledge created in the pharmaceutical sphere has raised a number of 
issues of ethical, social, political, economic and legal character and has since 1994 not been 
completely implemented due to the constant opposition from developing countries and 
various civil society organisations. 
Several controversies are at the heart of the debate over international protection of 
intellectual property rights in general and IP rights in the pharmaceutical industry in 
particular. Firstly, there is the issue of definition and the question of what exactly 
constitutes intellectual property rights, and the controversy on whether intellectual property 
should they be considered in the same way as individual physical property. It is one thing 
protecting trademarks, technologies, paintings, computer software, since all of these are 
tangible products; but it is a completely different matter protecting knowledge and ideas – 
establishing when they occurred or were created, their degree of novelty and who should 
own them. Knowledge and ideas may be said to have a communal character, i.e. they are 
not exhausted by public usage and can be utilized by many simultaneously,429 which makes 
the question of ownership and the regulation of use even harder to resolve.  
Secondly, granting ownership over knowledge and ideas raises the question whether 
knowledge is a public or private good.  Since knowledge is contextual and most new ideas 
are born in an already existing framework of knowledge, this would suggest that the 
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products of the human mind are public rather than private goods,430 entitling societies to 
share them instead of granting their owners monopolistic rights. In other words, if new 
ideas are grounded in existing knowledge, then individuals or organisations should not be 
entitled to claim ownership over them. The matter is further complicated by the availability 
of public funding for research in some areas now protected by TRIPs. Universities and 
government-owned laboratories often pass crude knowledge to private companies who then 
develop and market various products and patent this knowledge. Critics are outraged that 
societies are often made to pay for knowledge once through general taxation and a second 
time for the use of patent-protected knowledge. 
Thirdly, there is the controversy over whose interests should come first – the 
interest of innovators who are looking to recoup their costs of innovation or the interests 
societies who cannot always afford access to new knowledge. Intellectual property rights 
should be about finding a balance between rewarding the innovators by allowing them 
some form of protection, while disseminating the new technology, knowledge or ideas, 
among members of society, which is not simply a matter of economic calculations, but has 
an inherently political character.431 If the former takes precedence over the latter, society 
will end up with monopolistic owners of knowledge and technologies who may abuse their 
position in the name of profit maximisation. If, however, new information is shared without 
regulation, then inventors are not rewarded for their effort and innovation and this, 
industries argue, is a disincentive for creativity, which is to the detriment of society.432 
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According to some development specialists, such arguments forwarded by industries are 
unreasonable and “a negation of creativity…generated by non-profit motives in both 
industrial and non-industrial societies”.433 Constantine Vaitsos proposes that the 
introduction of property rights in the sphere of knowledge and ideas creates an artificial 
scarcity that is aimed at generating an economic rent and securing control over markets and 
not at creating incentives for inventive activity.434 In economic terms, scarcity exists when 
“needs and wants exceed the resources available to meet them… and where the price 
mechanism usually offers the most efficient way to allocate scarce resources”.435 When 
knowledge and ideas are socially constructed as scarce resources, consumers will learn to 
‘value’ them,436 thus avoiding the trap of non-scarce resources, which are usually free. In 
other words, Vaitsos argues that the proponents of IPRs are merely after increasing their 
profits and not so concerned with incentives for inventions. 
The protection of intellectual property in the case of the pharmaceutical industry 
extends beyond the public vs. private ownership of knowledge debate, because the products 
of the pharmaceutical industry have a direct impact on human life and health. The right to 
health is a fundamental human right437 and access to medicines is closely linked to this 
matter. When medicines are patented and the generic competition eliminated,438 drugs will 
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become more expensive, and while multinational drug companies will begin recouping 
their research and development (R&D) costs, more medicines will be put out of reach of 
those in the underdeveloped world or indeed those without health insurance. Thus, a further 
problem specific to the pharmaceutical case is the reconciliation of the conflicting priorities 
of private business and public health. 
This chapter examines the complex interplay between economic power, social 
concerns, technical knowledge and moral beliefs and the search for a common ground 
between them. I discuss how the economic might of international corporations backed up 
by the political influence of major developed states managed to offset the concerns and 
determination of developing countries to oppose trade policies that would hurt their 
populations. Further I discuss how the normative campaigners who drew attention to the 
ethical concerns for individual health and life managed to form coalitions with developing 
countries that were successful in securing changes to limit the scope of TRIPs in specific 
circumstances.  
The development of the international norm for the protection of intellectual property 
needs to be examined in its specific historical, political and economic context, as the latter 
have further relevance for our understanding of the interplay of various factors that 
influence norm creation. Events that may seem unrelated to the new norm because of their 
character – such as the end of the Cold War, the terrorist attacks on the US, the changing 
image and relevance of the UN in world governance – have all had an impact on the 
creation, the modification and implementation of the TRIPs agreement as it stands today. 
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These political events have been a catalyst for political dynamics, which have changed the 
pace and final outcome of the TRIPs negotiations.  
 
Brief History of Intellectual Property Protection 
Exclusive rights to practice a certain craft, privileges, monopolies and grants of 
authors’ rights to limit the publication of books were awarded by the sovereign rulers in 
Florence and Venice as early as the 15th century.439 Up until the 19th century the protection 
of intellectual property was confined to the domestic jurisdiction of nation-states.440 
Although international instruments existed prior to the Agreement on TRIPs, these were 
only statements of principle and contained no enforcement mechanisms. Even the 
organisation that was created to overlook the application of the IP conventions, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), was relatively powerless either to change any of 
the existing rules or indeed to insure their implementation.441 Intellectual property 
protection in the pharmaceutical industry was also limited to individual states’ discretion, 
which many states chose to exercise negatively by prohibiting patents in this industry, due 
to the social implications that those might have.442 The German Patent Act of 1877, for 
example, prohibited the patenting of inventions regarding medicines.443 Many of today’s 
developed countries only introduced pharmaceutical patents in the 1960s and 1970s, some 
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as late as the 1990s.444 In 1988 WIPO undertook a study for the negotiating group dealing 
with TRIPs in the Uruguay Round, which revealed that 49 of the 98 member states of the 
Paris Convention excluded pharmaceutical products from patent protection.445 It is worth 
noting that the members of the Paris Convention include both developed and developing 
countries. In other words, there is a long history of keeping medicines and products of 
pharmaceutical research out of the reach of patent provisions, both domestically and 
internationally, and this is due partially, if not entirely, to the high social price of such 
protection.  
The earliest instruments for the protection of intellectual property are traced back to 
Renaissance Italy: the first general patent law was passed by the Venetian Senate in 
1474.446 Another early system of patent law was set up in England in 1624.447 The purpose 
of patent laws at that time was not to reward invention but to encourage new businesses to 
set in and to limit monopolies,448 which is the opposite of the rationale for contemporary 
patent legislation. Patents up to the 18th century granted privileges and rights and were a 
symbol of approval by the sovereign.449  In Europe these privileges mainly had to do with 
the right to print books, as they were considered threatening the authority of monarchs and 
the Church alike.450 
Growing industrialisation led to the improvement of the domestic machinery for the 
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protection of copyright, patents, and trademarks, while increasing volumes of foreign trade 
meant that in the absence of any international agreements, states had to work out bilateral 
mechanisms to protect intellectual property. When invited to the International Exhibition in 
Vienna in 1873, German and American inventors declined to participate due to fears that 
their inventions might be copied by other participating delegations and exploited 
commercially in other countries.451 These fears, coupled with the growing concerns for the 
protection of domestic industries from increasingly successful foreign counter-parts, led to 
the creation of the first international convention for the protection of inventions, trademarks 
and industrial designs – the Paris Convention of 1883.452 In 1886 another international 
convention was created for the protection of literary and artistic works – the Berne 
Convention.453 
The development of new knowledge-intensive industries such as the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry, and agricultural research, which were all particularly strong in 
pre-World War I Germany, required the expertise of a large number of scientists.454 Big 
industrial cartels developed in the US after the war as well,455 as it was becoming clear that 
the basis of the economy was shifting from industrial design to the creation of scientific 
knowledge and information. The cartels relied on their ample resources to attract scientists 
and thus gain a competitive advantage. Since these organisations were primarily profit-
oriented, they became interested in the protection of their industrial secrets and newly 
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created knowledge, as that was the basis of increased profits and competitiveness.  
The First World War, coupled with the Great Depression of 1929 brought about two 
important changes in the attitude of the US towards intellectual property protection. After 
US companies came to regret their heavy reliance on the German chemical industry,456 they 
had a vested interest in developing both their own knowledge and technologies and their 
own standards of intellectual property protection. The 1930s were also a time of growing 
suspicion for international liberal economics (to which many attributed the economic 
depression), which led to “greater government involvement in economic affairs and the 
vigorous assertion of economic nationalism in the interwar years”.457 This signalled that as 
early as the inter-war years industries and government held the same position on standards 
of intellectual property protection. 
Following the end of World War II, the US emerged as the predominant economic 
and technological power, which gave US corporations greater freedom to impose their 
terms of trade and to use their growing expertise in intellectual property rights to the best of 
their advantage.458  Reconstruction funds, technology and knowledge started to flow from 
the US to Western Europe, Canada, South America and Asia.459 When setting up 
subsidiaries abroad, companies were careful not to disperse too much knowledge where 
they could use their own specialists: for example, instead of training local workers, which 
might have provided them with ‘expensive’ technical knowledge, companies sent their 
native manager, in order to avoid opening possibilities for free-riding.460 For many newly 
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independent countries (mainly South America and some parts of Asia) this was the start of 
a cycle of dependency in which the US corporations managed to withhold knowledge and 
technological know-how while reaping high profits on the back of low-cost labour and 
natural resources. 461 
At the international level, the organisation in charge of administering the Paris and 
Berne Conventions – the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (BIRPI) - was reformed and relocated from Berne to Geneva in 1960 in order to 
be closer to the United Nations and other international organisations based in Geneva.462 
The growing importance of IP protection in the 20th century required a larger organisation 
with an ever-expanding agenda. The Convention creating the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) was signed in Stockholm 1967463 and in 1974 the organisation 
became part of the UN system with a mandate to administer intellectual property matters.464 
WIPO inherited the work of BIRPI, administering the Paris and Berne conventions, and 
was also in charge of managing the work of other UN agencies in relation to intellectual 
property (UNCTAD, UNESCO). Currently WIPO has 182 member states. Prior to the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, WIPO, together with UNCTAD, were the only 
organisations administering IP issues at the international level. WIPO reached the capacity 
of its potential at the Diplomatic Conference to revise the Protection of Industrial 
Property.465 The organisation hosted the negotiations regarding the revision of the Paris 
Convention, which ended in a deadlock. The developing countries led by the Andean 
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Group,466 Brazil and India tabled a proposal that demanded the Paris Convention to be 
revised in such a way as to “cater more effectively to the special needs of developing 
countries”.467 Their intentions were simply to lower the standards of IP protection 
applicable to them468 and thus to gain a more equal start in the process of their own 
industrialisation and economic development. The OECD countries, influenced by the 
opinion of various national industry associations, were opposed469 on the grounds that the 
demands of the developing countries were unreasonable and such a revision would not 
improve their development opportunities.470 In a forum such as WIPO, where every country 
has one vote, the united front of the Group of 77 (G77)471 and the total opposition of the 
OECD countries created a stalemate that could not be resolved. In view of the inability of 
WIPO to settle disputes between developed and developing countries, to resolve 
negotiations that had reached a stalemate, or to enforce international agreements and under 
the influence of the industrial sectors of the US, Europe and Japan, the US government 
proposed a different solution to the problem of how to raise the international standards of 
IP protection.472 They sought to change the forum and focus of the discussion in a way that 
might yield better results. This change was based on redefining the issue of IP protection as 
closely related to international trade, and thus bringing the discussions to a forum where the 
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G-7 states could exert more effective influence. 
The economic crisis of the 1970s, fuelled by the rising prices of crude oil and falling 
prices of foodstuffs, helped developing states unite under a common agenda and attempt to 
shake up the international system with proposals for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) presented to the United Nations.473 US industries were hurt by the raising fuel 
prices created by OPEC and felt further pressure from the increasing technological 
production capabilities of Japan and South East Asia. Western Europe and Canada were 
concerned by the amount of influence US corporations had in their home economies, which 
led to debates with the US on issues of competition.474 The developing countries were 
engaged in a concerted effort to negotiate new economic rules,475 while the economies of 
East Asia (the ‘Asian tigers) and, most importantly, Japan were experiencing unforeseen 
growth.476  
The campaign to create new rules for the international protection of intellectual 
property can be said to have begun with the failed attempt to create a code for the trade in 
counterfeit goods at the Tokyo Round of the GATT trade negotiations (1973-1979), where 
a conglomerate of US industries managed to persuade the US and the European Economic 
Community delegations that international rules needed to be established to limit the effects 
of trade in counterfeit goods.477 This undertaking failed due to lack of broader support for 
the issue, but it left a significant mark on the GATT agenda. It sent a signal to the corporate 
world that trade negotiations can be used to deal with questions of counterfeit goods and 
other issues of intellectual property and that the US and EEC governments were conducive 
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to persuasion to address such questions. Issues of intellectual property were dealt with by 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation, which had limited enforcement mechanisms 
and hardly any power at all. 
In 1982 an article entitled “Stealing from the Mind” appeared in the New York 
Times, marking the determination of US corporations to stop what they called the theft of 
US knowledge and invention.478 The campaign that US industry initially began was to limit 
the trade in counterfeit goods.479 Their approach towards the US government included 
lobbying and creating reports on lost revenues to countries that produce and trade in 
counterfeit products. Drahos and Braithwaite argue that in the context of the early 1980s, 
the article written by the president and chairman of Pfizer was a risky move, as there was 
no certainty what the reaction from the US government would be, nor was it clear how 
WIPO and the developing countries (many of which important markets for Pfizer) would 
respond to these accusations.480  
The Uruguay Round of the Ministerial meetings of GATT began in 1986 and took 
almost eight years to close.481 In those years important political changes took place in the 
international system. The Cold war, and thus the ideological opposition between East and 
West, ended in 1989. The triumphant liberal political ideology, with a strong emphasis on 
liberal economics, brought about an increased drive to liberalise international trade. The 
end of the standoff between the superpowers created a favourable environment for an 
increased role of international institutions, as well as an air of widening international 
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cooperation. We have been experiencing a rapid legalisation at the international level, 
where states have been creating more legal principles and aiming at improving the 
effectiveness of international law.482 The international normative context was extending to 
take account of the individual and his/her human rights. Liberal norms similar to the ones 
advocated in American domestic politics – the right to protect private property, fairness, the 
support for innovation, and so on - were becoming the basis of the developing new 
international norm for the protection of intellectual property. 
The concept of intellectual property rights has dramatically changed its meaning 
over the centuries, reflecting the command of the sovereign at one point, the needs of 
industries at another, and the need for protection of the vulnerable at yet another stage of 
economic development. The norm requiring the recognition of and respect for intellectual 
property rights has not been normatively consistent over the years, unlike in the case of the 
norm prohibiting the use of torture, where a steady progression towards the same goal had 
taken place. In the case of the norm prohibiting the use of torture, the historical struggle for 
the establishment of the norm was mainly concerned with tightening the legal instruments, 
whereas in the case of the intellectual property norm the same uniformity of meaning seems 
to be lacking. Meanings changed with the requirements of the various stages of economic, 
social and political developments in different countries. We seem to be coming to a stage, 
however, where the construction of IP protection has taken a more stable form, since only 
the scope of the protection awarded and the mechanisms of administering IPRs seems to 
have changed considerably over the past century. 
The campaign for the creation and modification of the international norm protecting 
intellectual property rights in general and the case of the pharmaceutical industry in 
                                                 
482 J. Goldstein, M. Kahler, R. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Introduction: Legalisation of World 
Politics”, International Organisation, Vol. 54, no. 3, Summer 2000, 385-399 
 163
particular will be examined in further historical detail here in the context of the theoretical 
model of norm development proposed in Chapter 1. Figure 3.1 below provides a timeline 
of events and agreements that have contributed to or influenced the process of norm 
development in this case study. 
 
Figure 3.1 
TIMELINE OF THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS THAT 
PROVIDE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL PATENTS AND PATENTS 
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
1474  Venetian Senate passed the first general patent law 
1557 Queen Mary grants printing privileges to a craft guild known as the Stationers 
1623 English Statute of Monopolies – England’s early attempts to limit the scope of patent law in 
such a way as to add to the public wealth 
1711 First design patent statute passed in France to encourage creativity in the silk manufacturing 
guild in Lyons  
1793  US Congress passed the original Patent Act 
1836 New United States Patent Act entitled “An Act to promote the Progress of Useful Arts, and 
to repeal all Acts and parts of Acts heretofore made for that purpose” 
1873  International Exposition in Vienna 
1883  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1886  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works 
1893 Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property – established in Berne, Switzerland to 
overlook the Paris and Berne Conventions 
1952 The Universal Copyright Convention was drafted under the auspices of UNESCO in an 
attempt to include the US and other countries in South America in international treaties 
1967 The World Intellectual Property Organisation is established as one of the UN specialised 
agencies 
1973 European Patent Convention 
1973-1979 Tokyo Round of GATT Negotiations – the US and EEC put forward a proposal for an Anti-
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Counterfeit Code, which recommended that measures be taken internationally to curb trade 
in counterfeit goods.  
1974  US Trade Act Section 301 
1978 The European Patent Convention created a European Patent Office in Munich to confer 
patents recognised throughout the EU (except Denmark and Ireland). 
1979 The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiation is created to institutionalise 
business advice to the president 
1980 – 1984 Diplomatic Conference for the Protection of Industrial Property – held under the auspices of 
WIPO and aimed at the revision of the Paris Convention 
1982 Harare Protocol on Patent and Industrial Designs within the Framework of the African 
Regional Industrial Property Organisation. 
Sep 1986 Punta Del Este Meeting of Trade ministers, culminating in the Ministerial Declaration 
opening the Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
1986-1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – Uruguay Round of negotiations to establish the 
World Trade Organisation along with the creation of an Agreement on Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
Apr 1994 TRIPs agreement adopted at Marrakech as Annex C of the Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Jan 1995 WTO Agreement including the Agreement on TRIPs entered into force 
1995 Ralph Nader and James Love create the Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) 
Jan 1996 United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) was developed 
Oct 1996 Health Action International organised the first major NGO meeting on health care and 
TRIPs in Bielefeld, Germany 
Jul 1998 “Bridging the Gap” – 12th International AIDS Conference, Geneva 
Jan 1999 Health GAP (Global Access Project) Coalition is created in the US 
Mar 1999 AIDS and Essential Medicines and Compulsory Licensing, Meeting sponsored by Medecins 
Sans Frontiers (MSF), Health Action International (HAI) and Consumer Project on 
Technology (CPT). Geneva, 25-27 Mar. 
Oct 1999 MSF is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the money from which, the organisation decides to 
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spend on creating the Neglected Disease Fund. 
Nov 1999 Increasing Access to Essential Drugs in a Globalised Economy Working Towards Solutions 
– Conference organised by HAI, MSF, and CPT, Amsterdam, 25-26 Nov. 
May 2000 53rd World Health Assembly – meeting of the World Health Organisation, which was 
attended by MSF, CPT and HAI – Geneva, 15-21 May. 
July 2000 World AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa, July 9-14 
2000 Andean Community Common Regime on Industrial Property 
Feb 2001 Oxfam, UK launches the ‘Cut the Cost’ campaign 
Nov 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference – Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health 
Mar 2002 The Crisis of Neglected Diseases: Developing Treatments and Ensuring Access, Mar 12-14, 
New York – organised by MSF, CPT, Oxfam and HAI 
Jul 2002 14th International AIDS Conference, Barcelona 
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Theoretical Model and Empirical Findings 
Formulating the idea 
The initial idea for introducing international standards of intellectual property (IP) 
protection to all industries (including pharmaceuticals) was formulated by a select group of 
some of the biggest US corporations in the early 1980s.483 IP issues have been on the 
agenda of US business for the whole of the 20th century,484 but their application had been 
hampered by strong anti-trust and monopoly legislation. It was a combination of changing 
domestic legislation, the changing US economic position in the world and developments 
within the international economic environment that assisted US businesses in persuading 
the US government of the importance of international intellectual property protection. 
Although the position of the US government on any particular issue is extremely important, 
one still needs to keep the importance of power alone in perspective. According to Graham 
Dutfield, “TRIPs was achieved against the odds… it was a remarkable accomplishment to 
persuade 100 countries who were net importers of intellectual property to sign an 
agreement to dramatically increase the cost of intellectual property imports”.485 In other 
words, although US domestic political and economic dynamics provide a preview of future 
normative developments, one should be careful not to jump to conclusions, since the 
international environment is not always unreservedly open to these suggestions.   
The move towards setting international standards of IP protection began within the 
US domestic legal system. It is useful to keep in mind that the principle of intellectual 
property protection was in continual competition with the anti-trust policies of the 19th and 
                                                 
483 M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property. – pp. 69 
484 Mergers indicates that in the early part of the XIX century in the US, a decision was taken that in view of 
the ‘stage of economic development, the best policy for the US was lax enforcement of foreign intellectual 
property’ – See S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law,  – pp. 64 
485 G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries,  – pp. 201 
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20th centuries.486 One can identify periods in US legal history where the importance of 
patents was considered superior to concerns about monopolies,487 followed by periods 
where this superiority was overturned.488 The decisions of the US Supreme Court are a 
good indicator of changing social perceptions at the domestic level, as the task of the 
Supreme Court is to adjudicate cases and controversies that arise under US constitutional 
law. The Supreme Court is a part of the system of checks and balances of US politics, 
which ensures that neither the executive, nor the legislature can usurp political power.489 
One of its functions is that of judicial review – that is, it is in a position to invalidate 
legislation or executive actions if those are considered in conflict with the Constitution.490 
As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes (US Supreme Court Judge) remarked, “We are 
under the Constitution but the Constitution is what the judges say it is”.491  
Lobbying is an essential part of the policy-making process in US domestic politics. 
There are various industrial lobbying organisations whose primary purpose is to get the 
demands of the interested parties through to the members of the legislature. Lobby groups 
exercise influence through the provision of technical knowledge and election campaign 
funds to members of Congress. The disadvantaged groups in the US, which are unable to 
pursue their causes through lobbying politicians, often rely on the Supreme Court as their 
                                                 
486 G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries,  – pp. 113 
487 In Henry v. A.B.Dick Co. (224 US 1, 1912) – the Supreme Court of the United States indicated that if 
conditions imposed by a patent holder upon a patent buyer are too limiting, then the patented article will not 
find a market – pp.34; and further that “[a]n attack upon the rights under a patent because it secures a 
monopoly to make, to sell, and to use, is an attack upon the whole patent system. We (the SC) are not at 
liberty to say that the Constitution has unwisely provided for granting a monopolistic right to inventors, or 
that Congress has unwisely failed to impose limitations upon the inventor’s exclusive right to use”  - pp.35 
488 See US Supreme Court – Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg Co. (243 US 502, 1917) and 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. (314 US 488, 1942) – in both cases the Supreme Court upheld the 
opinion that patent holders may not use their patent rights to impose conditions of use of patented articles that 
include non-patented consumables – 243 US 502, pp. 512 and 518; 314 US 488, pp.494.  
489 See http://www.supremecourtus.gov  
490 Ibid. 
491 David O’Brien, Storm Center – The Supreme Court in American Politics, (W.W. Norton and Co., New 
York: 2000) – pp. 171 
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“sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances”.492 The 
Supreme Court agenda and attitudes to particular issues can easily change as a result of the 
interplay of several factors – changes in the composition of the bench, for example, led to 
periods in which the Court pursued alternatively conservative or liberal economic 
policies.493 The agenda also changes due to the issues brought by litigants, as well as due to 
broader socio-economic processes.494 This is why the changes in the attitude of the 
Supreme Court to issues of patent law in the 1980s were seen as a very significant 
development. The Court has since the 1980s not reversed the direction of this change, 
which makes it all the more profound. 
In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. (448 US 176, 1980) the Supreme 
Court upheld the right to protection of patent holders against free-riding by denying 
allegations of patent misuse in the context of anti-trust legislation, on the grounds that 
“[t]he incentive to await the discoveries of others might well prove sweeter than the 
incentive to take the initiative oneself”. The Supreme Court’s decision endorsed the crucial 
importance of intellectual property over anti-trust concerns and put the protection of the 
rights of inventors and/or patent holders above competition concerns.495 In the words of 
Susan Sell, there was a “dramatically improved domestic environment for IP owners and a 
noteworthy redefinition of US interests in IP protection”.496 These domestic developments 
were reinforced by a change in the US economic position in international markets. During 
the 1970s and the 1980s a “policy discourse of a US in decline” developed among domestic 
                                                 
492 D. O’Brien, Storm Center – The Supreme Court in American Politics, – pp. 228 
493 Ibid.  – pp. 232 
494 Ibid. 
495 See US Supreme Court – Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. (448 US 176, 1980) - pp. 223; also 
in the case of General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp. (461 US 648, 1983) the SC confirmed the right of patent 
holders to receive prejudgement interest in cases of patent infringement – pp. 658 
496 S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law,  – pp. 60 
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political elites497 due to a growing trade deficit. The private sector’s move towards closer 
cooperation on IP issues across industries in the 1970s498 helped industrial lobbying groups 
take advantage of this widespread concern that the US economy is not doing well. These 
groups managed to persuade policy-makers that the decline in the US economy is partly 
triggered by the losses suffered as a result of piracy, counterfeiting and free-riding on US 
knowledge.499 These were the first steps towards linking intellectual property protection to 
trade issues, which later paved the way for the creation of the TRIPs Agreement. It was 
primarily research intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, computer software, 
semiconductors,500 and the agricultural chemical industry501 that were directly involved in 
lobbying the US government, as they felt that large proportions of their revenues were lost 
to piracy.502 The success stories of developing economies and the rapid growth in India, 
Brazil and some states in South East Asia, including Japan, fed into these fears and 
allegations.503 These economies were expanding swiftly, while the US economy seemed to 
be slowing down. Some of these trends were reversed following the oil crisis of the 1970s, 
but US industries were determined to hold on to their supremacy. One way of doing this 
was to try and protect their most precious assets – new knowledge and technologies.504  
                                                 
497 P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? – pp. 63; G. 
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499 F. Weiss, “TRIPS in Search of an Itinerary: Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay 
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Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?  – pp. 63 
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Richards, (eds.) Intellectual Property Rights: Global Consensus, Global Conflict?, (Westview Press, Boulder, 
USA: 1988) – pp. 94 
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504 P. Almeida, “The ‘New’ Intellectual Property Regime and its Economic Impact on Developing Countries” 
in G. Sacerdoti, Liberalisation of Services and Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round of GATT, 
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The transformations in the world trading system that took place in the 1970s meant 
that the competitive advantage of companies was no longer determined simply by cheaper 
natural resources and labour, but rather by the possession of cutting-edge knowledge and 
technologies. However, while research and development is an expensive undertaking, the 
increased speed of communications and technology transfer meant that information was 
dispersed more quickly and, while R&D costs grew disproportionately higher,505 product 
life-cycles in knowledge-based industries became shorter, thus impairing the ability of 
innovators to recoup their R&D costs.506 Globalisation of trade, transport and 
communications was undermining the ability of industries to protect their innovations from 
free-riders, while the cost of free-riding was becoming insignificant.  
The changing international environment, the pessimistic view of US policy makers 
about the state of their economy, the new position adopted by the Supreme Court on the 
importance of intellectual property protection, and the determination with which US 
companies worked to prove the need for increased IP protection, all contributed to the 
creation of a receptive audience in the US administration for this new idea of 
internationally enforceable IP rights across industrial sectors. Businesses realised, however, 
that getting the US government on their side was only going to be the first step towards 
ensuring international protection. Money started to flow towards top lawyers in this highly 
technical and complex field, towards social science organisations to produce justification of 
the importance of IP principles, and towards professional lobbyists to persuade the US 
government of the need to press for international standards of intellectual property 
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protection.507 The foundations for the development of the norm protecting products of the 
mind were successfully laid, not just by means of the sheer size of the business resources 
committed to it, but also by investments in the creation of technical knowledge to back up 
the argument in favour of this norm.  
 
Network Configuration 
Similar to the case of creating the norm prohibiting the use of torture, network 
configuration and issue formulation (defining IP protection as a trade-related issue) 
occurred simultaneously. The difference in the process of network configuration in the case 
of IP protection was that the aim of the participants in the campaign was to stay out of the 
public eye as much as possible and to selectively engage only such actors who were likely 
to assist in pushing the trade agenda forward. Companies were striving to protect their 
chances of maximising profits and this was an aim that would not attract the support or 
sympathy of the public. 
Studies of the negotiations preceding the TRIPs Agreement suggest that the idea for 
the creation of internationally binding intellectual property rules across industries came 
from the US private industrial sector.508 As discussed earlier, the first unsuccessful attempt 
to introduce IPR concerns to the GATT was at the Tokyo Round of Ministerial 
Negotiations (1973-1979).509 The issue was formulated as a need to curb the trade in 
counterfeit products, which was affecting trade-mark products. Although the coalition of 
                                                 
507 P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? – pp. 90-9 
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brand producing companies was quite strong (comprising around 100 multinationals)510 it 
only managed to persuade the US and the EEC to support their proposal; the much needed 
further agreement from other nation states could not be generated before the end of the 
Tokyo Round.511  
An increasing number of US corporations were beginning to realise that their profits 
were being eroded by free-riders in the developing world who would use established 
trademarks or would copy products, and designs for commercial gain. The technologies to 
copy products were generally many times cheaper than the investment in R&D, which 
compromised companies’ ability to recoup R&D costs. It was becoming clear that 
significant reform of the Paris Convention under WIPO512 was not going to materialise due 
to the deadlock resulting from the completely opposing demands of the developed and 
developing countries. Multinational corporations like Pfizer and IBM realised that WIPO 
could no longer help developed countries regulate the ‘knowledge game’.513 Companies 
combined their efforts in an attempt to influence directly the policies of the US government 
by linking intellectual property protection to trade.514 The chief officers of Pfizer and IBM 
were represented on the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiation 
(ACTPN),515 which is part of the office of the US Trade Representative.516 Pfizer, IBM, 
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Monsanto, and DuPont had a history of lobbying the US government and this time, 
combining forces with the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition and the Copyright 
Alliance, they seemed to make a breakthrough.517 Pfizer “worked in Washington to 
multiply the [Advisory Committee’s] efforts and strengthen its capacity to influence the 
multilateral policy agenda by calling on the membership of the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)518 to put the protection of intellectual property 
high on its lobbying agenda”.519 The Chemical Manufacturers Association also had an 
interest in increasing the protection of trade secrets.520 In 1984 the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA) was created to represent US copyright industries.521 Although the 
copyright industries were initially satisfied with the protection provided by the Berne 
Convention, the IIPA raised the issue of pirating and weak enforcement of the principles of 
the convention in the developing countries and thus became a strong ally in the coalition to 
increase IP protection.522 A broad and very loose alliance was emerging among groups that 
lobbied separately for the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights, software, music, 
movies, and so on. The line of complaint was similar: heavy losses were incurred by 
companies working in various fields because of free-riders abroad. Industries’ reports 
                                                                                                                                                    
516 The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiation (ACTPN) was created by the Trade Act of 
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released figures of projected losses that echoed the need for universal norms that would 
help innovators and creators in any field recuperate their investments.523  
In 1986, several months before the opening of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations, the executives of some of the biggest US-based corporations created the 
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC)524 to seek international support and provide 
governments with advice for the creation of rules governing worldwide protection for 
intellectual property rights.525 The IPC exerted its influence abroad through the CEOs of 
US companies, who were members to the committee. They would contact their counterparts 
in Europe and Japan to get them to pressure their governments into supporting the 
intellectual property agenda.526 The governments of the European Communities, Japan and 
Canada were lobbied separately by the chairman of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR). This group of countries became known as the Quad and consensus between them 
on the trade round agenda was crucial.527  
The process of network formation in the case of the international protection of 
intellectual property rights consisted of various industry-specific coalitions joining forces 
on a single issue affecting them in a similar way. The network spread across borders, 
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mainly between the governments of the most advanced economies in the world, shortly 
before the new round of trade negotiations opened in Uruguay.  
The support network for the creation of an international norm for intellectual 
property protection that would be valid across industries has some specific characteristics. 
The aims of the organisations of multinational corporations and lobbyists were instrumental 
and concentrated on creating technical norms that would allow industries to increase their 
returns. These actors were not aiming explicitly to change any normative structures; rather, 
their efforts were put towards producing more effective rules that would bring about the 
desired results. Some normative arguments regarding the moral rights of entrepreneurs and 
creators were advanced, but corporations knew from experience that, unless there were 
stringent mechanisms to ensure compliance, normative structures would be ineffective.528  
The actions of corporations were guided by a logic of consequences, which justifies 
the choice of avenues and allies that corporations sought to achieve their goal. US 
corporations were more than happy to share the expertise of their IP lawyers with various 
government agencies, but, unsurprisingly, were not as helpful towards the governments of 
developing countries. According to a study conducted by Susan Sell, “the government 
relied upon IP experts, who were also advocates, to translate the complexities into political 
discourse… therefore in this context, there [was] no neutral or objective group of civil 
servants in a position to counter-balance private demands”.529 Sell further discusses the 
phenomenon of the “revolving door” between government and private sector where 
specialists went from being employed by the government to being employed by private 
companies and vice versa,530 thus strengthening the ties of industries and policy makers 
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while ensuring expertise and shared knowledge. The success of the campaign was 
dependent neither on the number of supporters nor on the ability of corporations to get the 
public to back their position. Instead, success had to do with the level of economic and 
political influence that these companies could master. This campaign was not a public one; 
campaign records are limited and much information remains undisclosed. Large 
corporations with experience in lobbying employed all possible methods to engage policy-
makers with their agenda. Corporations built networks among themselves, CEOs chaired 
advisory committees, organisations were created to liaise with the government and so on, 
until the message was heard loud and clear in the corridors of power. The message was 
carefully constructed in terms that were likely to engage the attention of policy-makers, 
which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
Issue Formation 
Actors who have expressed the need to create a new norm have to define and 
delimit its scope. In order for this process to be completed, agreement needs to be reached 
on the technical, legal, and normative parameters of the proposed norm. Reaching scientific 
(technical) and normative closure is crucial for the normative campaign, as it lays a solid 
foundation for political negotiations. The proposed norm needs to be formulated in such a 
way as to be able to rectify the problem singled out in stage one, while at the same time 
remaining reasonable so that it would be easier to get conservative actors to support the 
new norm. The network promoting the development of universal norms of intellectual 
property protection provides a show-case example of how issue formation is done most 
effectively.  
The process of issue formulation involves constructing a problem and creating a 
solution for it. Constructing the problem involves the choice of context in which to position 
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the issue,531 the choice of an institutional forum in which best to address the problem, 
establishing the cause and effect of the problem, and proposing solutions for its elimination.   
“Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should 
do something about them”.532 As discussed earlier, issues of intellectual property were 
strictly a national matter until the 19th century533 and even the United States disregarded 
them when the government felt that a fledgling economy needed all the knowledge and 
technologies available to develop.534 The issue of intellectual property protection was 
formulated as a problem when large US businesses saw that copycats were making money 
at the expense of business investment in research and development and decided to limit this 
practice. Pfizer’s New York Times article “Stealing from the Mind” outlined the concerns of 
many industries, not just the pharmaceutical, that they were losing profits because there 
were no rules to protect their intellectual property abroad.535 Economists constructed the 
“appropriability problem”536 – copying of inventions is cheap but there needs to be a way to 
recoup expenses for industrial R&D, otherwise incentives for innovation will disappear, 
resulting in a “suboptimal level of innovation”.537 A campaign had begun to persuade 
policy-makers that this was an issue not only worthy of their attention but also calling for 
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decisive political action that would impact the welfare of many. Initially, the problem of 
intellectual property protection was constructed within the domestic economic context of 
the US. The support network formulated the issue as one of rights related to property 
ownership, fair rewards for labour and innovation.538 Since these concerns are part of the 
foundational principles of liberal economics, it was hard for the American government to 
disregard them.  
Concerns for the state of the US economy were growing and this was a good time to 
present statistics that could explain why the trade deficit was soaring and propose solutions 
to how corporations can do better in the future. Apart from knowing who to talk to and how 
to get through to policy-makers, multinational corporations knew how to make a persuasive 
case of their concerns. They used technical knowledge and expertise, which gave their 
arguments legitimacy and weight. A number of official studies (mostly industry-sponsored) 
were published to show that companies were incurring sizeable losses abroad due to foreign 
trade in pirated and counterfeit goods. The Automotive Parts and Accessories Association 
informed the Sub-committee on Trade of the United States House of Representatives that 
estimated losses of revenue that the industry had incurred due to international trade in 
counterfeit automobile parts were as high as $12 billion for 1984.539 In 1985, the IIPA 
published a report estimating that copyright industries lost over $1.3 billion to international 
piracy.540 In 1986, the Intellectual Property Committee cited statistics prepared by the US 
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International Trade Commission (USITC),541 according to which US firms had lost $23.8 
billion due to lack of international IP protection.542 Other organisations such as the Office 
of International Affairs of the National Research Council also undertook studies into the 
global dimensions of IPRs in science and technology in response to concerns raised by US 
industry and US universities.543  
Framed in this way, the issue of failing protection of intellectual property rights 
became a major explanation for the ailing US economy. The US trade deficit had, 
according to some, experienced a staggering increase of 309 per cent between 1980 and 
1985.544 Using standard methods of economic analysis, the advocates of strong 
international IP protection produced evidence that short term losses due to strengthened 
protection would be outweighed by long term benefits of increased innovation.545 This 
economic analysis assisted the lobbyists in making a strong case in favour of improved 
world-side protection. Once IP protection was constructed in technical terms as an issue not 
only of stolen knowledge and unfair enrichment, but also as a possible cause of future 
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practices such as patent, trademark and copyright infringement - 
http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_its/index.htm  
542 S. Sell, Private power, Public Law, – pp. 105; M. Wallerstein, M.Mogee, and R. Schoen, (eds.) Global 
Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, (National Academy Press, 
Washington: 1993) – pp. 4; similar figures were cited by Edward Finn Jr. “That’s the $60 billion Question”, 
Forbes, 7th Nov 1986 – p. 40 
543 See M. Wallerstein, M. Mogee, and R. Schoen, (eds.) Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Science and Technology  
544 According to D. Hughes, US trade deficit grew from $36.3 to $148.5 billion – D. Hughes, “Opening up 
trade barriers with Section 301 – a critical assessment”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 17, 1991, 393-
410, and S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law, – pp. 80 
545 Critical analysis of this seemingly solid causal relationship later proved that such correlation between trade 
deficit and global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods is not as strong as authors argue. Others may find 
curious the fact that those who conducted these studies were individuals with strong bias in favour of US 
industries and vested interests in the advance of IP protection – the authors of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Global Consensus, Global Conflict? R. Gadbaw and T. Richards are both economists for Dewey Ballantine. 
Gadbaw has served as a Deputy General Counsel for the USTR – R. Gadbaw and T. Richards, (eds.) 
Intellectual Property Rights: Global Consensus, Global Conflict? – pp. 413 
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economic decline, it became much easier to mobilise US policy makers to take some form 
of international action. Technical closure was reached among the economic experts of 
multinational corporations, who were all of the same opinion. There were no actors with an 
opposing view to challenge this closure on any level and it became the basis of the 
campaign to regulate the use of products of the mind.   
The sustained pressure from various industrial associations and the information 
coming from a variety of advisory committees and think tanks prompted US policy-makers 
to take action. Steps were initially taken at the domestic level to amend legislation and 
enable companies, through the IPC, to reach beyond US borders and enforce protection of 
information and know-how. Amendments to the 1974 Trade Act – in particular Section 301 
- enabled the president to impose bilateral trade sanctions and undertake retaliatory trade 
action against nation-states whose legal system was considered inadequate to protect the IP 
interests of US corporations (these changes will be discussed in more detail at a later point). 
The changes implemented by the US government were a catalyst for policy change at the 
international level.  
Constructing the problem of IP rights as an issue of unfair trade helped US 
corporations make the case for their preference for the GATT as the appropriate 
institutional context for the new norms. Developing countries insisted that the organisation, 
which should be in charge of setting standards of IP protection was the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO). However, WIPO’s failure, to negotiate changes to the Paris 
Convention in three successive conferences between 1980 and 1982546 convinced the US 
government and multinational corporations that this was one channel through which change 
                                                 
546 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992) – pp. 2249 citing Kunz-
Hallstein, “The United States Proposal for a GATT Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 22, 1989 
265. 
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was going to be slow and possibly ineffective, as WIPO had no enforcement mechanisms at 
its disposal.547 As discussed earlier, while the developing countries were attempting to 
persuade other WIPO members that IP protection needed to be relaxed, the developed 
countries (under pressure from industries) were concentrating on creating proposals for 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection.548 Constructing IP issues as trade 
issues was crucial, as the GATT had established enforcement procedures and a more solid 
organisational structure.  
To conclude, in this case US industries set an example of how to effectively 
mobilise support for the creation of a new norm. A few leading norm entrepreneurs, namely 
Pfizer, IBM and Monsanto, began working together to attract the support of multinational 
corporations across industries. They also used all possible routes to interact with policy-
makers on Capitol Hill – via advisory committees, industry associations, lobbying groups 
in Congress, think tanks, etc. - to get their message across. The message was that US 
industries were losing out and as a result the whole US economy was suffering because 
there were no international standards of intellectual property protection to safeguard US 
knowledge and technologies. The message was skilfully woven into academic studies, 
reports from various associations, briefings with industries in Congress, the advice coming 
from organisations that facilitated the communications between industries and government, 
e.g., the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations.549 As so many sources 
confirmed the same information and as politicians were concerned with the state of the US 
economy, practical actions were taken. Although these actions were initially at the domestic 
                                                 
547 P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 111 
548 M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy – pp. 68; T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992). – pp. 2253 
549 See supra notes 96, 112, 113, 115 
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level,550 they had global implications through the bilateral trade agreements that the US 
government was negotiating with developing countries.  
 
Dialogue with the Conservative Actors 
The dialogue over the inclusion of norms regarding the protection of intellectual 
property rights in the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was not a simple 
matter. The discussions were part of a larger framework of trade talks551 and as such the 
outcome was a product of linkage bargaining.552 This in turn means that the creation of the 
TRIPs agreement is not a product of an equal bargaining and genuine consensus. It would 
otherwise be hard to explain why in an international context where most countries were net-
importers of knowledge and technologies, rules protecting the exporting countries were 
accepted and turned into international legal principles. Legal rules favouring developed 
states emerged even though significant rifts existed among the developed countries.553 The 
developing countries were unable to mobilise in a coalition that spoke with one voice 
either, largely due to the fact that they had different interests554 and did not take the issue of 
intellectual property protection very seriously.555  
                                                 
550 Changes included the amendments of the 1974 Trade Act (Section 301), which empowered the President 
to initiate sanctions to protect US industries. 
551 The inclusion of the issue of intellectual property protection on the agenda of the Uruguay Round was a 
last minute political compromise; the TRIPs item figured almost like a footnote on the crowded agenda of the 
next round of trade talks – A. O. Adede, “Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiations” in C. Bellmann, G. 
Dutfield, R. Melendez-Ortiz (ed.) Trading in Knowledge,– pp. 25 
552 M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy,  – pp. 92 – “linkage bargaining diplomacy can be exploited to achieve 
treaties in diplomatically and politically difficult areas in which agreement would otherwise be elusive” 
553 The EU and the US opinions clashed over issues related to the protection of geographical indicators and 
appellations of origin, while Japan and the US disagreed over borrowing rights related to copyright – P. 
Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, - pp. 144-5 
554 The developing countries had varying expectations of possible gains in other areas of the Uruguay Round 
– mainly agriculture and textiles; their level of expertise on these highly technical issues was also diverse, and 
last but not least, developing countries suffered to a different degree from the effective use of Section 301 of 
US intellectual property legislation - J. Watal, (ed.) Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing 
Countries, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001) – pp. 43-4 
555 Ibid – pp. 19-35 
 183
The unfolding Uruguay Round of trade negotiations will be examined in separate 
historical stages, which will assist in identifying the conservative actors and the changes in 
their attitudes. As early as 1982, a ministerial meeting was held to begin putting together an 
agenda for the next round of trade negotiations.556  By this time, US industry, led by Pfizer, 
had clearly indicated that WIPO was not the appropriate forum for international 
negotiations on IP issues, in view of the failed attempt to revise the Paris Convention.557 
The US submitted a proposal to include negotiations on anti-counterfeiting practices in the 
next round of trade negotiations, which it was hoped would eventually lead to the creation 
of a Code regarding actions on this matter.558 The response of the developing countries was 
not encouraging – Brazil and India argued that “GATT’s jurisdiction was limited to 
tangible goods, and therefore, the GATT lacked legal competence to address an issue with 
the intellectual property area”.559 This signalled the opening of a rift between developing 
and developed countries similar to the one experienced in the WIPO forum. Initially, the 
developing countries were unified in their position that IP issues were better dealt with by 
WIPO, but that consensus was not long lived.  
Two major developments occurred in 1984 - one international and the second one 
intra-national, which helped move IP issues forward on the GATT agenda. In the 
international context, GATT appointed an Expert Group to examine the effects of 
counterfeit trade-mark goods on international trade and in this way practically admitting 
                                                 
556 T. P. Stewart, (ed.) The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992), – pp. 2260. 
557 See P. Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting. Study 
Paper 8 Commissioned by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights: 2002. Available from 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/study_papers.htm   - pp. 9 
558 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992)– pp. 2260-1 
559 Ibid. – pp. 2261 citing US General Accounting Office, Strengthening Worldwide Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights, GAO Doc. No. GAO/NSIAD-87-65 (1987) 
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that there is a chance for these issues to be able to make the GATT agenda.560 The Expert 
Group was to work closely with WIPO representatives. In the next year, the Expert Group 
presented its findings and indicated that since some issues had remained unresolved, the 
GATT should decide whether a new round of multilateral negotiations was appropriate.561  
In the meantime, the persistent pressure on US policy-makers, substantiated by 
various industries’ reports that billions of dollars were lost to free-riders, theft of 
intellectual property and trade in counterfeit goods, proved successful in persuading 
Congress to take action. The 1984 Trade Act was passed which adapted Section 301 of the 
1974 Trade Act562 and made it actionable by the President of the United States.563 These 
developments sent a clear signal to the business community – their efforts had paid off and 
the government had confirmed in legal terms their support for the proposition that IP 
protection was indeed an issue intricately related to trade.564 Unilateral action meant that 
the US government, backed by the knowledge and information supplied by its industries 
had the green light to take effective measures against any country that did not abide by the 
new American rules. The US government quickly demonstrated their readiness to use the 
mechanisms provided by Section 301 and the first countries that fell victim were South 
Korea565 and Brazil566 in 1985. 
                                                 
560 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992) – pp. 2262 citing GATT, 
GATT Activities in 1985 (1986) 
561 Ibid. – pp. 2262 
562 Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act is a national trade enforcement tool that allows the US to withdraw the 
benefits of trade agreements or impose duties on goods from foreign countries – See P. Drahos, Developing 
Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting – pp. 13 
563 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992) – pp. 2256 citing Trade 
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 304 (f) (2). 
564 S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law, – pp. 85-6; M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy, – pp. 72-9; P. Drahos 
and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 93-9 
565 South Korea was selected for action under Section 301 following continuous complaints from American 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies, as well as from the IIPA. This was also a smart US government 
strategy to begin isolating developing countries  and targeting them with stringent bilateral action, which 
affected local developing economies – M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy,  – pp. 73-9; S. Sell, Private Power, 
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In 1986 events were starting to move very quickly towards a new round of trade 
negotiations. The Preparatory Committee appointed by the GATT had a broad mandate to 
determine the issues that were going to be discussed in the Uruguay Round.567 The US 
delegation submitted a proposal to include all intellectual property issues, which largely 
reflected the US attitude to this matter. Japan backed the US proposal, while Brazil, India 
and Argentina expressed open opposition once again on the grounds that IP issues were 
outside of GATT’s competence.568 Since negotiations even on the agenda of future talks 
looked like they were going to end up in deadlock, the Swiss and Colombian delegates who 
were chairing the meeting of the Preparatory Committee put together a compromise 
proposal including the issue of intellectual property in the agenda for the future trade talks, 
as agreed by the US, the EC, Japan, and some developing countries, which was later 
supported by more than 40 delegations. The Brazilian delegation submitted another 
proposal to exclude both services and intellectual property from the future negotiations, 
while an Argentinean proposal approved of IP issues but not of services being included in 
the GATT agenda. The Brazilian proposal was supported by about 10 delegations569 but 
was outweighed by the Swiss-Colombian one, which became the basis of the Punta del Este 
                                                                                                                                                    
Public Law – pp. 90; T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992) – pp. 
2256; P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 102-4 
566 Procedures against Brazil were initiated primarily on the grounds of complaints by the US pharmaceutical 
industry and computer software companies – M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy,  – pp. 79; S. Sell, Private 
Power, Public Law,  – pp. 90; T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992) 
– pp. 2256;  P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 104-5  
567 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992), – pp. 2262 citing GATT 
Doc No. L/5925 Decision of 28 November 1985 on Establishment of the Preparatory Committee.  
568 Ibid.  – pp. 2262-3. 
569 This became known as the Group of Ten, including Brazil, India, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia – See M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy, –pp. 108; S. Sell, Private 
Power, Public Law,  – pp. 108; P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 133; J. Watal, 
(ed.) Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, – pp. 19, according to the author, the 
group of hard-line opposition had shrunk from 25 countries – named as Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
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“A Social Theory of Trade Regime Change: GATT to WTO”, International Studies Review, Vol. 4, no. 3, 
2001 – pp. 125, citing GATT, BISD, 28S.  
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Ministerial Declaration.570 The historical account of events so far begins to outline the 
group of the conservative actors whose opposition was partially successful in its attempts to 
bring to a halt the development of the new IP protection norm and which had to be 
overcome if the norm was to become a practical reality. The Group of Ten was the core 
active opposition, which had the support of many other developing countries. 
The Punta del Este ministerial declaration seemed relatively harmless in itself, 
aiming “to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and 
disciplines”.571 However, in the context of the increased determination of US industries to 
get results, these words should have rung ‘danger’, because of the broad spectrum of 
meanings that the term ‘appropriate’ can have. Developing countries failed to detect the 
actual scope of the mandate granted by the 1986 Ministerial declaration. Their opposition to 
the creation of international norms for IP protection was undermined by the lack of unity 
among them. Some developing countries saw negotiating opportunities in areas where they 
needed to improve the existing terms of trade with their economically advanced 
counterparts, namely, textiles and clothing, agriculture, tropical products.572 In 1987 the 
start of the Uruguay Round negotiations saw the developing countries still hanging on to 
the hope that they could limit the discussions of IP protection to trade in counterfeit 
goods.573 At the same time, the US, backed up by Japan and Switzerland, made it clear 
from the start that they were willing “to discuss substantive standards of IPRs such as 
copyright, patents, trademarks, designs, geographical indications, lay-out designs of 
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semiconductor chips and trade secrets, by making detailed submissions on these issues”.574 
In 1988 the negotiating group on TRIPs began to address specific proposals by 
various nation-states – the Nordic countries, Switzerland, the European communities, 
Thailand, Mexico, Brazil, etc.575 The developing countries expressed concerns that 
intellectual property could be overprotected, which would slow down the transfer of 
technologies and increase the cost of agricultural and pharmaceutical products.576 In the 
meantime, communications and trade-offs between the US, Japan and the EC continued. 
Corporations from these countries were also liaising closely across borders, which 
culminated in the industry position paper on IPRs, entitled “Basic Framework of GATT 
Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and 
United States Business Communities”.577  
This basic framework was most notably opposed by India and Brazil on the grounds 
that developing countries should be allowed to exclude pharmaceuticals, food and 
chemicals from patent protection.578 In the mean time, the United States government was 
working on its domestic IPR protection agenda by enacting the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, which included the Special 301 obliging the USTR “to provide an 
annual report on unfair trade practices in foreign countries… where investigations with 
regard to IPR infringements were to be launched and action completed within statutory 
time limits… [t]his annual listing by the USTR follows detailed submissions by interested 
                                                 
574 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries – pp. 23 
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US industry associations”.579 The strengthening of bilateral actions under Special 301 
began to break down the foundation of the consensus between the G-10 because more and 
more countries could not meet US national IP protection rules and as a result faced the 
threat or the actual use of retaliatory trade measures.580  
The mid-term review of the progress in the TRIPs negotiating group of the Uruguay 
Round took place in April 1989 and the only agreement that was achieved was on a 
“general framework for future negotiations to cover standards concerning the scope and use 
of intellectual property rights and the means of enforcing them”.581 The meetings of the 
Negotiating Group that followed in 1989 consisted of proposals and counter-proposals by 
the delegations who were actively participating in the negotiations.582 These, however, 
produced limited substantive agreements, namely, that additional time should be provided 
for less developed countries to comply fully with the regulations of the new agreement.583 It 
was becoming obvious that developing countries envisaged TRIPs negotiations as a threat 
and unless this perception changed, agreement was going to be very hard to achieve.584 At 
this point, however, pressure exercised outside of the negotiating group and primarily by 
the bilateral trade actions of the US government proved very effective in bringing the 
negotiations closer to an end.  
Developing countries began to signal their acceptance of the jurisdiction of GATT 
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over the protection of intellectual property.585 The most important breakthrough in the 
months to come was the announcement made by India in September 1989 that they 
accepted “in principle the international enforcement of the trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights within the framework of the Uruguay Round negotiations”.586 
This, in turn, led to more developing countries adopting more flexible positions on the 
future of this agreement.587 The dialogue between the governments in favour and against 
the new norm turned into a discussion of the parameters of this new norm where division 
lines multiplied. The persuasion campaign on the need for such norm, however, was 
complete. The coalition of developing countries had lost its major leaders – India had 
backed down, while Brazil was heavily pressured into compromise by the sanctions used by 
the US government under Special 301. According to one author, “developing countries 
came to realise that in reality [their] choice was between GATT and USTR”.588 Left with 
this option and in view of possible gains from preferential regional agreements, many 
developing countries chose to support an IP protection norm in favour of broadened market 
access.589 The dialogue with the conservative actors gradually evolved into the bargaining 
over the content of the legal agreement. Although the pressure between developed and 
developing countries remained, new chasms were beginning to open among the 
industrialised countries – the US, Japan, the EC, Canada.  
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Political Closure 
When the states leading the opposition campaign against the creation of a particular 
norm signal their willingness to cooperate and negotiate the provisions of this new norm, 
one can conclude that political closure has been reached. Discussions at international 
political forums are quite revealing about the stage of development of new norms. Debates 
on the normative and technical need to create a regulative instrument is typical for the stage 
of norm development discussed above – the dialogue with conservative actors. When 
political negotiations turn to the scope and wording of a new norm, then political closure 
has been reached and a broad consensus exists on the need to create an international norm 
to regulate behaviour. Closure on the debate regarding the creation of a new and effective 
international norm protecting intellectual property rights did not mean an end to the 
disagreements among the negotiating parties, however. Rather, it signalled a new phase in 
the development of the norm. An agreement on the need for an international IPR norm was 
reached as a result of the interplay between economic logic, technical knowledge, 
persuasion, coercion and argumentation. All these elements played a part in a process of 
constructing the need for the protection of all products of the mind and in turning this need 
into an obvious problem that required a swift and adequate response.  
The economic logic and technical knowledge needed to justify the new norm were 
generated mainly by US corporations and their European and Japanese counterparts.590 The 
unilateral policies and actions undertaken by the US government increased the strain on 
                                                 
590 See The Intellectual Property Committee, Keidanren, UNICE, Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on 
Intellectual Property: Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and United States Business 
Communities, June, 1998 
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already volatile developing economies.591 Many developing states that had experienced the 
determination of the US government to uphold its position on IPR protection by means of 
unilateral retaliatory trade measures were of the opinion that a multilateral solution could 
be less harmful and more flexible than bilateral talks with the US government.592  
Some authors have argued, however, that coercion alone could not explain the 
whole process of creating this norm.593 Coercion played a large role, but other issues made 
closure possible. Many developing country governments lacked a clear understanding of 
this highly technical and complicated subject matter, which led them to make commitments 
the scale of which they did not fully comprehend.594 The opposition to TRIPs – coming 
from public health agencies, consumer groups and NGOs - was not nearly as well organised 
as the proponents of the new norm.595 As discussed earlier, linkage bargaining meant that 
states, especially the members of the Cairns Group, were more interested in the immediate 
gains to be achieved in the sphere of agriculture and the textile industries than the long-
term commitments that they were making.596 In other words, the closure reached at the 
TRIPs negotiating committee was neither a result of genuine consensus on a plan of action 
regarding IPRs, nor of fair persuasion in which the best solution prevailed. 
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Although a consensus was reached on the need to create an international norm 
protecting IPRs, many fundamental disagreements remained among the negotiating parties, 
concerning the scope, nature, and enforcement of the new rights. These disagreements were 
not removed by the negotiations over the treaty language and thus the final agreement, as 
we will see, better reflected the interests of private companies within the developed 
countries than of anyone else. This in turn meant that the foundations on which the IP 
protection norm was build were not solid enough to endure the test of time and public 
pressure. Closure, at least with regard to the intellectual property provisions protecting the 
developments in the pharmaceutical industry, was later challenged and reformulated to 
incorporate concerns about public health.  
 
Legalisation 
The discussions with the conservative actors over the need for a new norm 
gradually turned into a debate over the form of the agreement and the institutional 
arrangements. This was not going to be an easy discussion as there were major differences 
still to be resolved between developed and developing countries as well as among 
developed countries, as discussed earlier.  
Dramatic progress in the TRIPs negotiations was made in March 1990 when the EC 
tabled a draft agreement597 in treaty language that covered standards, principles and 
enforcement issues and marked the beginning of the process of legalisation.598 By May, 
four more proposals were on the table authored, respectively, by the United States, Japan, 
                                                 
597 GATT (1990) MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 – cited in T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A 
Negotiating History (1986-1992) – pp. 2273; G. Evans, “Intellectual property rights as a trade issue – the 
making of the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights”, World Competition: Law 
and Economics Review, vol. 18, no. 2, 1994 – pp. 171 
598 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries – pp. 29; D. Gervais, The 
TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, – pp. 16 
 193
Switzerland and India (the latter was backed up Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Cuba, Egypt, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Uruguay).599 The proposal submitted by the 
developing countries still demanded that the issues of trade in counterfeit goods should be 
separate from other intellectual property protection issues.600  As it became obvious that 
compromise was going to be difficult to achieve, the Chairman of the TRIPS negotiating 
group, Ambassador Lars Anell of Sweden, presented the Chairman’s draft.601 The draft was 
basically a report summarising the positions of the negotiating parties and comprised of two 
parts, reflecting, respectively, the proposals of the developed and the developing 
countries.602 Ambassador Anell’s draft signalled that some agreement was in sight. 
According to Jayashree Watal,603 the most important and effective negotiations took place 
in the second half of 1990 in informal meetings.604 Drahos and Braithwaite point out that 
membership in the informal groups was chosen on the basis of the expertise of the 
delegates and most important decisions were often taken in the smallest groups.605 Since 
these meetings were informal, they left no record and this hinders further studies of the 
changing positions of different governments. The proposals that were put forward have no 
                                                 
599 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992) – pp. 2273; G. Evans, 
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Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries – pp. 30; Gervais (2003) – pp. 16 
601 Stewart (1993) – pp. 2274 citing Meeting of Negotiating Group of 20th July 1990, Note by the Secretariat, 
GATT Doc No MTN.GNG/NG11/24; Evans (1994) – pp. 171; D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting 
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WTO and Developing Countries – 31-2; M. Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – 
pp. 6;  
603 Jayashree Watal was a trade negotiator for India in the TRIPs negotiating group and is currently an 
intellectual property expert at the WTO – “The Right to Good Ideas” (2001) The Economist, June 21, 2001. 
604 J. Watal,  Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries – pp. 32 
605 P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 142 – the authors conducted a series of 
interviews at the GATT Secretariat in 1993, which revealed the careful selection of the states that were 
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recognised source and this impedes a better understanding of the dynamics of the 
negotiations – of how and why certain provisions were adopted or, indeed, discarded.606  
Although hopes were high that the Uruguay Round could come to a close at the 
Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in December 1990, they quickly disintegrated as 
negotiations broke down due to deadlock over agricultural subsidies between the European 
Community, the Cairns Group607 and the United States.608 Disagreements existed among all 
actors – between North and South, among the industrialised North, among the developing 
South. Economic might, although not irrelevant, became insufficient to resolve differences; 
the way forward for the negotiations’ progress was the weight of numbers.609 As Jane Ford 
discusses, the role of developing countries was changing - they became negotiators rather 
than just passive receivers of policies.610 Once the Ministerial meeting in Brussels failed to 
reach its objective of concluding the Uruguay Round, it became clear that even states with 
relatively little economic power were in a position to derail the negotiations by adopting an 
uncompromising attitude on key issues. This development dispels the conventional 
understanding that economic might and political pressures alone can push a large number 
of unwilling members of the international community into signing agreements that run 
counter to their interests. The reasons why many developing countries agreed to sign TRIPs 
will be discussed in more detail later in this section. 
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was restarted in February 1991 and the 
                                                 
606 South Centre, The TRIPs Agreement – A Guide for the South. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights, (South Centre, Geneva: 1997) – pp. 9 
607 The Cairns Group represented agricultural exporters from developed and developing countries alike and 
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GATT to WTO”,  – pp. 127 
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aspects of intellectual property rights”,  – pp. 173 citing 4 WIPR, 1990; J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights 
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609 J. Ford, “A Social Theory of Trade Regime Change: GATT to WTO”,– pp. 126 
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GATT was looking for more flexible approaches as it became clear that that was to be the 
only way towards closing the negotiations. The initial fifteen negotiating groups were 
restructured into seven groups.611 The negotiating committees sought effectiveness by 
“keeping the negotiating process constantly under review and supervision”612 and by 
introducing informal meetings to foster consensus. The Director General Arthur Dunkel 
recognised that states were not finalising their positions and were not pushing on with the 
negotiations on TRIPs because they were waiting for the outcomes in two other spheres of 
trade negotiations – agriculture and textiles.613 Director General Dunkel, in his final attempt 
to salvage the Uruguay Round, put together the Dunkel Draft, which compiled the results of 
negotiations and “provided an arbitrated resolution to issues undecided by the 
negotiators”.614 Negotiations continued throughout 1992 and 1993 with the US and India 
tabling proposals for changes to the Dunkel Draft.615 Once the conflict over agriculture was 
settled, however, the member states agreed to the whole package of the newly created 
World Trade Organisation, one part of which was the Agreement on TRIPs.616 The 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was concluded on 15th December 1993, the final act 
was signed in Marrakech on 15th April 1994 and the WTO Agreement was scheduled to 
                                                 
611 T. P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986-1992)– pp. 2276 
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come into force on 1st January 1995.617 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round is not entirely logical if we examine only 
what was happening in the negotiating groups; neither was the agreement on TRIPs. 
External factors and the state of the international economy contributed to the conclusion of 
this round of trade negotiations, while the completion of the TRIPs agreement was almost 
entirely circumstantial. According to Gail Evans, the Round of trade negotiations had 
become too costly to let agreements slip away; furthermore, the slowing down of the world 
economy increased fears of protectionism and raising levels of national debt,618 which 
pushed nation states into signing the final WTO agreement. Jayashree Watal argues instead 
that it was political events – the collapse of the Berlin wall, the crumbling of the Soviet 
Union, and the success achieved in the first Gulf War – which influenced the closing of the 
Uruguay Round. According to Watal, the US emerged as the undisputed hegemon in the 
world, and that made developing and developed states alike unwilling to oppose the global 
superpower when so near to reaching an agreement at the end of the negotiating round.619 
In other words, Watal proposes that political factors were the catalyst for the completion of 
the Uruguay Round, and not the consensus reached in the other sphere of trade, discussed at 
the trade round.  
The completion of the TRIPs agreement is a conundrum, the explanation of which is 
not readily apparent. The US, EC, Canada and Japan needed the support of the developing 
states to create this agreement and simple economic logic shows that it was not in the 
interest of developing states to create international norms of intellectual property 
                                                 
617 P. Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting – pp. 16; P. 
Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, – pp. 149; Watal (2001) – pp. 41 
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aspects of intellectual property rights”,  – pp. 174-5 
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protection. The success of the TRIPs agreement is partly based on the disproportionate 
power of US government, which was further supported by the lack of a strong unified 
position on the part of the developing countries. The US industries successfully employed 
rhetorical action, which persuaded the US government to protect their interests worldwide. 
The US government made good use of Section 301 of its trade act, thus breaking up a 
relatively strong group of developing countries who dared to stand for their interests.620 The 
developing countries’ actions were further limited by the lack of expertise and a clear 
understanding of the full scale of consequences stemming from this new international 
norm. Furthermore, the package offered at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations – 
including concessions on trade in agricultural and textiles products, was too good to miss. 
The possibility of future gains in areas that deeply concerned the developing countries, 
coupled with the prospects of having to deal with the unilateral pressure exercised by the 
USTR,621 were incentives to vote in favour of international minimum rules for the 
protection of intellectual property rights.622 Citing a US trade negotiator in his study of the 
developing countries and their position in the international IP standard-setting process, 
Drahos observes that TRIPs was less of a negotiation and more of a “convergence of 
processes”, as the opposition of the developing countries was not met by argumentation and 
reasoning, but was instead diluted through bilateral negotiations and unilateral trade 
sanctions.623 The position of the developing countries was further undermined by the fact 
that African states were not significant players in these trade negotiations even though their 
development prospects and the welfare of their citizens was going to be inevitably affected 
                                                 
620 P. Drahos, Developing Countries and Intellectual Property Standard-setting – pp. 13-4 
621 Ryan cites a GATT Secretariat official, who pointed out to developing states that they were acting as if 
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by the decisions of other states.624 NGOs were also marginalised, as the position of the 
GATT was that if any actors other than nation-states wanted to put their agenda forward, 
they should do so through their respective governments,625 many of whom were disinclined 
to pay heed to civil society activists.  
The above overview of events shows that the closure and agreement reached at the 
end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations were not the result of genuine consensus 
and persuasion. There was no agreement on the way in which TRIPs will be implemented 
and many developing states lacked the expertise and resources to make IP provisions a part 
of their domestic legal context. The TRIPs agreement was a rather shaky foundation for the 
creation of a functional international intellectual property regime and that showed in the 
years to follow. 
 
Operationalisation 
Operationalisation of a norm refers to the stage at which the actions of states 
become norm-compliant and any behaviour that is not consistent with the norm is 
condemned or punished by administrative measures. The TRIPs agreement came into force 
on 1st Jan 1995, giving developing countries until the end of the year 2000 to comply, while 
the least developed countries (LDCs) received an initial extension until the end of the year 
2005, which was further postponed until 2016 by the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and 
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Public Health (2001).626 This analysis will continue with a focus on the developments to the 
IPR regime in the pharmaceutical industry, as this industrial sector was affected in a very 
specific way. The political closure on TRIPs in the pharmaceutical sector became undone, 
due to normative issues raised by the developing countries and global civil society.  
The actors who were most eager to operationalise the norm protecting intellectual 
property rights in the pharmaceutical industry were the large corporations like Pfizer, 
Brystol-Myers, Glaxo Smith Klein, along with the other members of PhRMA, who initiated 
the campaign to create internationally enforceable intellectual property rules. The US 
government had vested interests in enforcing IPRs, which was perceived as one way of 
decreasing the trade deficit. Both industry and the government were in favour of much 
stricter minimum rules of IP protection at the Uruguay Round, and while developing 
countries believed that the TRIPs agreement was the lesser evil compared to unilateral trade 
sanctions by the US, their hopes that the USTR would lessen the pressure on their fragile 
economies were in vain. The US government continued to pursue higher standards of 
intellectual property protection with the same vigour627 and by using the same methods. 
Since the late 1980s, the United States had included requirements for the provision of 
adequate IP protection as a pre-requisite to the conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) and by 1987 BITs were signed with eleven developing countries.628 Peter Drahos 
discusses in some detail the complementary use of BITs and Section 301 in the case of 
Nicaragua (1995), which resulted in Nicaragua implementing IP protection policies in 1998 
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prior to its TRIPs deadline in the year 2000.629 The US continued to use extensively the 
provisions of its domestic legal principles, while taking full advantage of the WTO dispute-
settlement mechanisms. The US filed the first six complaints for TRIPs violations in 1996 
against Japan, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Turkey and Indonesia, followed in 1997 by dispute 
settlement procedures against Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Ecuador.630  
 Discontent with the increasing demands of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
actions of the US government was brewing in the late 1990s. There were several 
overlapping concerns, which formed the foundation of a relatively powerful opposition to 
IPRs for pharmaceutical products. Firstly, many developing countries felt they did not get a 
fair deal out of the TRIPs negotiation process to start with (due to its lack of transparency, 
asymmetries of power and the isolation of African countries, as discussed earlier). 
Secondly, developing countries were not fully availing themselves of the transitional 
provisions, compulsory licensing provisions and parallel imports provisions granted by the 
TRIPs agreement. Moreover developing countries were often sanctioned by the US 
government, which sought the speedy implementation of the new agreement. Thirdly, 
NGOs were beginning to actively pursue the issue of access to essential medicines (the case 
of HIV/AIDS is a particularly strong example) and the problem of the creation of drugs for 
neglected diseases (tuberculosis, malaria, etc.). All three of these campaigns benefited from 
the attention that each of them attracted, and that helped in gaining critical mass and wider 
public support. Although a norm had already been created, there was growing pressure for 
the revision of this norm in a way that would allow it to cover issues of social justice, the 
right to health, sustainable economic development and so on. A coalition was growing 
among various partners, including developing country governments, NGOs, civil society 
                                                 
629 Ibid. – pp. 794-6 
630 S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law, – pp. 129-132 
 201
activists, medical professionals, lawyers and economists. The political closure regarding the 
need for and effectiveness of an IP norm protecting pharmaceutical products came undone 
and the issue was re-opened for discussion because normative concerns had been 
completely disregarded in the process of previous negotiations. It should be kept in mind 
that the process of renegotiating the parameters of this norm began only as a result of 
sustained pressure and well-calculated political action by the partners of the coalition 
against this norm. 
Since resistance towards the implementation of IPRs in the pharmaceutical industry 
grew, not without the help of the public in the industrialised world, policy-makers were 
forced to reconsider and renegotiate the TRIPs provisions in relation to public health. A 
norm-revision process was set in motion when non-governmental organisations revealed 
the negative consequences of TRIPs on the already poor state of health care in developing 
countries and in the context of worsening HIV/AIDS pandemic.631 
 
Configuration of the Network of Normative Opposition 
There is a history of domestic campaigning within the United States for affordable 
treatment for HIV/AIDS. The ACT UP campaign, which officially began in 1987 with the 
creation of the First Working Document setting out its objectives and structure, was 
continuously drawing attention to the “drug development bottleneck” and the greed of 
pharmaceutical companies when creating treatments for AIDS.632 In 1993 Ralph Nader and 
James Love (who started the Consumer Project on Technology in 1995)633 in testimony 
                                                 
631 Susan Sell argues that the HIV/AIDS pandemic was “a contingency that sped up the revelation of the 
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before the Special Committee on Aging of the US Senate,634 drew attention to the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies in general and Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) in particular were 
benefiting from government-sponsored R&D. These two activists opened the debate on fair 
pricing of and access to medicines, which have been discovered with tax-payers money.635 
US NGOs were further concerned with the availability of medicines to the marginalised 
groups in society.636 The traditions in campaigning on these issues were useful when 
similar concerns were raised at the international level.  
New and existing international organisations were getting involved with normative 
issues stemming from IPRs in the pharmaceutical industry, the availability and affordability 
of drugs not only for HIV/AIDS, but also for a list of the ‘neglected diseases’637 that are 
affecting primarily developing countries. The Consumer Project on Technology was 
created in 1995 to address the issue of the high cost of pharmaceuticals.638 In 1996 the 
Amsterdam group Health Action International639 organised the first major conference for 
NGOs regarding issues of health care and TRIPs.640 In 1998 the highly-influential 
Medecines Sans Frontiers sought the acquiescence of CPT and HAI to join their campaign 
for access to medicines.641 The support of MSF was even more important in 1999 when the 
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organisation was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the money from which MSF donated to 
the Neglected Disease Fund, which was set up to fund projects related to neglected diseases 
and access to medicines.642 Another very active coalition of NGOs was consolidated in 
March 1999 – the Health GAP (Global Access Project) Coalition. Health GAP was started 
by a New York physician who treated low-income and formerly homeless persons with 
AIDS.643 The organisation is a meeting point of human rights activists, people living with 
HIV/AIDS, public health experts, fair trade advocates, and so on and their activities are 
centred on campaigning for access to affordable, life-saving medicines as a way to control 
the AIDS pandemic.644 
NGO activities were bolstered by political events and social research, which made 
the claims of the advocates of civil society all the more persuasive. Ever since the coming 
into force of the TRIPs agreement in 1995, the developing countries have been under 
pressure to stop importing generic drugs that can combat widespread and growing 
epidemics of curable diseases.645 In late 1998, a high profile lawsuit was filed by 39 of the 
biggest pharmaceutical companies against the government of South Africa. The South 
African government had passed the African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory 
Authority Act, which allowed it to revoke patents and to use compulsory licensing for 
purposes of averting a health crisis due to the high number of HIV/AIDS patients in the 
country.646 This case, which was dropped by the pharmaceutical giants in 2001,647 
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generated negative publicity for the pharmaceutical industry, turning into a terrible PR 
disaster; but it also helped NGOs and developing countries mobilise public opinion in 
favour of their cause.  
The network of opposition was most clearly delineated at the Geneva Meeting in 
March 1999, which was organised by MSF, HAI and CPT and comprised more than 120 
delegations from 30 countries.648 The meeting brought together representatives of national 
governments, NGOs, international organisations and industry delegates. Attention was 
focused on the issue of compulsory licensing as a means of making drugs more affordable 
in poor countries.649 The Access to Essential Medicines Campaign continued to grow, with 
Oxfam UK joining it in 1999650, thus contributing to increased civic activism. The interests 
of otherwise separate campaigns overlapped in their constructive opposition to the TRIPs 
agreement. Less powerful actors found strength in numbers and were able to make their 
concerns heard by the governments and the industries of the developed countries alike.  
 
Formulation of the issues raised by the Opposition 
The need to revise the TRIPs agreement in such a way as to address public health 
concerns was formulated by NGOs and developing countries, against the backdrop of 
claims by pharmaceutical companies that without full compliance with TRIPs they would 
go out of business.651 NGOs and developing countries organised a number of conferences 
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to discuss issues of access to and availability of essential medicines and medicines for the 
neglected diseases. They used a number of tactics to negotiate a modification to the TRIPs 
agreement, as discussed below.  
Concerns of a medical character along with ethical questions were juxtaposed to 
economic interests, within a political and judicial context, which was not sympathetic to the 
needs of the poor. Science was accused of following markets and money in setting research 
agendas and not catering for the greater good of the greater number of people.  
How we phrase the problem defines the solutions we seek… AIDS, the TB, the malaria, the sleeping 
sickness epidemics are not simply global public health crises – they are obscene acts of political 
negligence that cannot go on… Trade law around intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals, the 
political process around their application, the deification of profit over people, and the fact that trade 
has become a barrier to health of literally billions of people is nothing short of the most profound 
obscenity.652  
These succinct but powerful words of Dr James Orbinski – the functioning president of 
MSF International in 1999 - summarised the way in which the opposition to full-scale 
TRIPs rules for pharmaceutical products defined the issues that they were trying to resolve.  
The scale of the problem, as highlighted by the opponents to TRIPs, was indeed 
daunting. According to UN estimates from 1998, twenty six of the estimated 33 million 
people infected with AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa and approximately 95% of the 
worldwide cases of HIV are in the developing world.653 According to MSF, most of the 
patients with HIV in Africa have no access to antiretrovirals at all, while only about 1 in 
100 patients in South East Asia can afford the drug cocktails.654 Communicable diseases 
killed 14 million people around the world in 1999 and most deaths were in developing 
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countries.655 More than 90% of all death and suffering from infectious diseases occurs in 
the developing world, while around 0.2% of pharmaceutical research is devoted to 
infectious diseases like acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis (TB) and diarrhoea.656 
Malaria exists in 91 countries, which puts around 40% of the world’s population at risk – 
from the 500 million cases that are recorded, around 90% are in Africa where up to 2.7 
million die from the disease.657 And while one third of the world’s population has no access 
to pharmaceutical drugs, the industrialised countries hold 97% of all pharmaceutical patents 
worldwide.658 These medical statistics compiled by various IGO agencies and NGOs paint 
a completely different picture to the one presented by the pharmaceutical giants, which had 
simply chosen to ignore the state of the health of individuals in developing and least 
developed countries (LDCs).  
Serious ethical issues relating to access to essential medicines, neglected diseases, 
and social justice were raised by the civil society campaigns. In 1996 the World Health 
Assembly Report pointed out that “poverty exposes hundreds of millions of people to the 
hazard of infectious diseases in their everyday lives… half the world’s population lacks 
regular access to the most needed essential drugs”.659 In developing countries, according to 
Oxfam, more than 60% of the cost of medicines is covered by the patients, compared to the 
industrialised world where more than 50% of drug costs are not paid directly by the 
                                                 
655 Fatal Imbalance – The Crisis in Research and Development for Neglected Diseases (2001), DND Working 
Group, Medicines Sans Frontiers – “Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines”, Sept 2001. – pp. 10 citing 
World Health Organisation The World Health Report 2000 (Geneva, World Health Organisation, 2000). 
656 Amsterdam Statement to WTO Member States on Access to Medicines, 25-26 Nov 1999. 
http://www.haiweb.org/campaign/novseminar/amsterdam_statement.html 
657 World Health Organisation, World Health Report 1996 – Fighting Disease, Fostering Development, 49th 
World Health Assembly, Provisional Agenda Item 10, Doc No A49/3, 1996, available from 
http://policy.who.int  
658 Oxfam, World Trade Rules and Poor People’s Access to Essential Drugs, available from 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/worldtrade_drugs.htm. Last accessed on 01-Nov-04 
659 World Health Organisation, World Health Report 1996 – Fighting Disease, Fostering Development, 49th 
World Health Assembly, Provisional Agenda Item 10, Doc No A49/3, 1996, available from 
http://policy.who.int 
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consumers.660 Once the TRIPs agreement is fully operational generic drug producers, which 
have been supplying affordable drugs to their own and other developing countries’ 
governments, will not be allowed to export their products to countries which do not have 
the capabilities to produce their own pharmaceutical products.  
This ethical concern of people in developing countries dying from curable diseases 
because medicines are priced out of their reach is deepened by the foreign trade policies of 
the US government. Its bilateral agreements in the form of BITs and Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs)661 are eroding the ability of developing countries’ governments to set 
standards that meet the needs of their citizens.662 The campaigners for revising the TRIPs 
agreement have, by means of publicising the decisions and policies of the US government, 
constructed an ethical problem. They question the morality of policy-makers and businesses 
alike and seek to “reveal injustice, to provoke change, and to locate and insist on political 
responsibility”, in the words of James Orbinski.663 To tackle the problem with access to 
medicines, Oxfam initiated the Cut The Cost Campaign in February 2001. While making 
the case for affordable drugs, Oxfam together with other NGOs such as MSF, HAI, CPT, 
ACT UP began to deconstruct the argument made by the pharmaceutical companies that 
“without patents, [some drugs] would not even exist”.664 
Pharmaceutical companies initially constructed their concern with IPRs as an 
economic issue of life or death for the industry: “innovative pharmaceutical companies are 
                                                 
660 Oxfam, World Trade Rules and Poor People’s Access to Essential Drugs, available from 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/worldtrade_drugs.htm. Last accessed on 01-Nov-04 
661 A Free Trade Agreements was signed with Jordan in the year 2000 and according to Peter Drahos contains 
TRIPs-Plus feature, narrowing grounds for exclusion from patentability, introducing conditions on 
compulsory licensing and requiring Jordan to implement the TRIPs agreement before it is required to do so by 
the WTO. Similar agreements are said to be negotiated with Chile and Singapore – P. Drahos, “BITs and BIPs 
– Bilateralism in Intellectual Property”, Journal of World Intellectual Property – Law, Economics, Politics, 
Vol. 4, no.6, 2001 – pp. 797-8. 
662 Ibid. – pp. 803 
663 James Orbinski, MSF Speech to Health Forum, Jun 14 2000, available from http://www.msf.org 
664 “A War over Drugs and Patents - Johannesburg”, The Economist, Mar 8th 2001. 
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in business to make money, as well as to market new medicines, and, unless they do both, 
they would be out of business, and the flow of new medicines would be reduced”, said the 
CEO of Merck &Co Inc.665 Lee Gillespie-White from the International Intellectual Property 
Institute stated along this line of argument that “[i]t is only from the protection of the 
intellectual property invested in new drug development that the incentive to innovate arises. 
And without this incentive, new drugs will not be produced and the right to health care will 
be increasingly insecure”666 and further “IP is being asked to shoulder too much of the 
burden of the right to health care. [And since the system is unable to do this] new drugs will 
not be produced and future advances in health care will be jeopardised”.667 The estimated 
cost of discovering a new medicine and bringing it to the market, according to studies 
within the pharmaceutical industry, has been estimated to rise from around $54 million in 
1979, to $231 million in 1987 US dollars, and to as much as $802 million in 2001, which, 
after being supplemented by the cost of failed projects ($114 million) and the inflation 
figures, has been put up even higher.668 Furthermore, the pharmaceutical industry argues 
that there is no causal link between relaxed intellectual property rules and improved access 
to medicines.669 Patents are not considered to be the principle impediments to supplying 
patients with medicines because the impediments are more practical, such as lack of 
                                                 
665 P. R. Vagelos, “Are Prescription Drug Prices High?” Science, vol. 252, no. 5009, 1991 - pp. 1083 
666 L. Gillespie-White, Health and Patents: The Rights Issue – A Presentation to an Audience Convened by 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation, (International Intellectual Property Institute: 2002). This view 
is further supported by PhRMA – its opinion is quoted in Stanya Kahn, “The whole world is watching – US 
AIDS Activists Go Global”, HIV Plus, no.5, Sept 1999 
667 Ibid. – pp. 5;  
668 P. R. Vagelos, “Are Prescription Drug Prices High?” – pp.1080; G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Life Science Industries, – pp. 106 citing a study conducted by the Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug 
Development (2001). 
669 L. Gillespie-White, Patent Protection and Patients’ Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
(International Intellectual Property Institute: 2001) – pp.7 
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“refrigerators and clean water, needed for administering complicated anti-HIV regimes”.670  
NGOs and developing agencies have been working hard to produce evidence that 
countered the reports of industries, aiming to show that these are manipulative and one-
sided, and disregard the needs of the poor in search for higher profit margins. According to 
Oxfam, the pharmaceutical industry has some of the highest operating profits already, 
standing at around 20-23% on investment;671 moreover, the whole of sub-Saharan Africa 
accounts for only a minute fraction of the global market for medicines - $1 billion of a $343 
billion US industry.672 If the markets of the developing countries are so small, then even 
more lax IPR rules in these parts of the world would not profoundly affect the R&D 
capacity of the pharmaceutical industry. On the question of the causal link between IPRs 
and innovation, various authors have argued that it does not exist. According to the UNDP 
Human Development Report, “studies have found that the competitive markets are the 
biggest influence on research and development, not patents”.673 Research and development 
seemed to be influenced by the prospect for profits and the size of the market for new 
products and not by the availability of patent rights.674 According to the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights (set by the Department for International Development in the 
                                                 
670 Stanya Kahn, “The whole world is watching – US AIDS Activists Go Global”; similar point was made by 
B. Lehman, Patents and Health – A Presentation to the Policy Advisory Commission of the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation, (International Intellectual Property Institute: 2002). – pp. 12-3.  
671 Oxfam, Cutting the Cost of Global Health, Oxfam Parliamentary Briefing 16, Oxfam GB: 2001 – pp.3; 
Oxfam, Implausible Denial: Why the Drug Giants’ Arguments on Patents do not Stack Up, 2001 available 
from http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/implausible_denial.htm - the article quotes profit 
margins for Pfizer in the year 2000 at 30%, Glaxo-Smith Kline – 28%, where R&D costs amount to around 
15% of the production costs. 
672 Oxfam, Implausible Denial: Why the Drug Giants’ Arguments on Patents do not Stack Up, 2001, available 
from http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/implausible_denial.htm  
673 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1999, available from 
http://www.un.org – pp. 73 
674 S. Mathur, “Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Copyright Provisions – Some Issues 
with Special Reference to Developing Countries”, Journal of World Intellectual Property – Law, Economics, 
Politics, Vol. 6, no. 1, 2003 – the author quotes econometric analysis of US and Japanese firms, conducted in 
2000, which concluded that there was no evidence of an increase in R&D spending or innovative output that 
could plausibly be attributed to patent reform” – pp. 93 
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UK), “stronger patent protection in poor countries is unlikely to lead to significant increases 
in global innovation for neglected diseases. This is because the key disincentive for 
international companies to develop intellectual property of use to developing countries is 
not the lack of patent protection in those countries but the lack of market demand and 
profitability”.675 This argument is at the centre of the campaign to modify the trade rules of 
TRIPs in such a way as to make them more responsive to the needs of the poor.  
The NGO campaign brought attention to another ethical concern in relation to the 
modification of the TRIPs agreement, namely, the treatment of neglected diseases and the 
direction of scientific research. “Science follows the market”, claims Jeffrey Sachs in his 
article about the state of world’s poorest populations.676 There is nothing wrong with a 
mutually beneficial relationship between science and the market, as long as it does not 
compromise the life and wellbeing of the populations of entire continents. The latter, 
however, is just what is happening in the research departments of large pharmaceutical 
companies – “money talks louder than need”.677 According to the UNDP report of 1999, 
“tighter control of innovation in the hands of multinational corporations ignores the needs 
of millions”.678 Medecines Sans Frontiers conducted a survey in 2001 that included the 20 
largest pharmaceutical companies in the world and some of these findings have helped to 
further outline the ethical problem of neglected diseases. None of the companies that 
responded to the survey had for the past 5 years brought to the market a drug for the most 
                                                 
675 Ruth Mayne, “The TRIPs Agreement and Access to Medicines: an NGO Perspective” in Homi Katrak and 
Roger Strange (eds.) The WTO and Developing Countries, (Pagrave Macmillan, New York: 2004) – pp. 155 
citing Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy (Commission on Intellectual Property, London: 2002) 
676 Jeffrey Sachs, “Helping the World’s Poorest”, The Economist, Aug 12 1999 
677 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1999 available from 
http://www.un.org – pp. 68 
678 Ibid. 
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neglected diseases.679 Furthermore, for 25 years only 15 new drugs for tropical diseases and 
tuberculosis were brought to the market, compared to 179 new drugs for cardiovascular 
diseases, where tropical diseases and TB make up 12% of the global disease burden and 
cardiovascular conditions make up 11%.680 These figures help raise awareness about the 
disproportionate burden of disease in many developing countries, which is worsened by the 
fact that pharmaceutical companies are not interested in consumers who cannot afford to 
pay. Non-governmental organisations worked to mobilise governments to take action and 
resolve the conflicting rights to private property and to live and health.681  
Oxfam constructed the problem of access to medicines as an issue influencing 
economic development as well. The organisation drew attention to the global health divide, 
where “widespread sickness acts as a brake on economic growth”.682 The HIV/AIDS 
epidemic combined with the Asian Economic crisis in the late 1990s is said to have had a 
detrimental impact on development in the region since it hit the most productive members 
of society and began to reverse the development gains.683 The problem of HIV/AIDS and 
access to medicines for neglected diseases is even worse in Africa, where, according to the 
World Bank, “AIDS has already reversed 30 years of hard-won social progress in some 
countries”.684 Jeffrey Sachs also warned that disease and short life expectancy in the 
developing countries are not “just a result of poverty, but also a powerful cause of 
                                                 
679 Fatal Imbalance – The Crisis in Research and Development for Neglected Diseases, DND Working 
Group, Medicines Sans Frontiers – “Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines”, Sept 2001 – pp. 9 
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impoverishment”.685 In other words, non-state actors have attached the issues of access to 
and availability of medicines to economic development, which has been on government and 
international institutional agendas since the call for a New International Economic Order of 
1974.  
The network of normative opposition to the newly legalised norm of IPR protection 
has managed to reveal a multilayered normative problem in its vast complexity by 
publicising and problematising various aspects of this new norm – such as human health, 
access to medicines, affordability of medicines, economics development, and weighing 
individual rights to health and life against the rights of companies to exclude individuals 
and governments from the advances of pharmacology in the name of higher profits. The 
underlying normative theme, however, has been centred on the issue of social justice. 
Initially, TRIPs was created under the influence and with the assistance of experts from 
various industries and this is reflected in the inflexible character of the agreement, which 
aims at ensuring that royalties flow to the patent-holders and free-riding on registered 
patents is kept to a minimum. The powerful normative message constructed by the 
opposition campaign and developing countries, however, managed to effectively mobilise 
public opinion worldwide.  
Re-opening of the debate between the proponents and opponents of full-scale 
implementation of the TRIPS Treaty with regards to the sphere of pharmaceutical research 
 
NGOs and developing countries formed the network of normative opposition, 
formulated their issue of concern and led a dialogue with those actors who supported the 
full scale implementation of the TRIPs Treaty in the years between 1999 and the present (as 
the efforts to achieve the best deal for those suffering in the developing world are ongoing). 
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In this section, I analyse the key events that brought about a change in the provisions of the 
TRIPs Agreement relating to the products of the pharmaceutical industry.  
As discussed earlier, campaigns for access to HIV/AIDS medicines were well-under 
way in the US in 1996 with CPT and ACT UP leading the way. In March 1996, the World 
Health Organisation published a report of the World Health Assembly, entitled “The State 
of World Health – A fatal complacency”.686 The report drew attention to problems related 
to the struggle for control over infectious diseases such as malaria, respiratory diseases, 
AIDS, hepatitis, some cancers caused by viruses.687 In January 1996, UNAIDS was created 
to manage and coordinate the work of six other UN agencies – UNESCO, UNDP, UNFPA, 
UNICEF, WHO and WB688. Also in 1996, HAI International, organised the first conference 
on public health and TRIPs, held in Germany.689  
The actual dialogue between non-state activists, developing countries, the 
pharmaceutical industries and the governments of the Quad countries (US, EU, Japan and 
Canada)690 did not become visible to the public until 1997. In 1997, the South African case 
discussed previously outraged many and drew attention to the issue of IP protection. In 
1999 NGOs began to mobilise for the upcoming 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle, as this was a chance to get the issue of access to medicines on the governmental 
agenda. A number of NGO conferences were held, including AIDS and Essential Medicines 
and Compulsory Licensing – held in Geneva, 25-27 March, and sponsored by Medecins 
                                                 
686 Available from http://policy.who.int 
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easily turn into international epidemics, moreover, the improper use of medicines to cure these diseases often 
leads to the development of drug-resistant strands, which poses serious problems. See footnote 253. 
688 Peter Piot, “Human Rights and HIV/AIDS”, Statement by the Executive Director of the Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), April, 1996. Available from 
http://www.unaids.og/EN/other/functionalities/search.asp  
689 S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law,  – pp. 147-8 
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Sans Frontiers (MSF), Health Action International (HAI) and Consumer Project on 
Technology (CPT),691 and Increasing Access to Essential Drugs in a Globalised Economy 
Working Towards Solutions (conference organised by HAI, MSF, and CPT, in Amsterdam, 
25-26 Nov).692 These brought together not only NGOs but health professionals and 
governmental officials from developing countries.  
In 2000, UNAIDS reached an agreement with five of the biggest pharmaceutical 
companies to supply cheaper AIDS drugs to some African countries.693 The 53rd meeting of 
the World Health Assembly attracted trade and IP experts representing states and 
international organisations.694 The meeting was focused on confronting the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and on taking swift actions to match the political commitments that many 
developed countries had made.695 President Clinton issued an executive order to make 
AIDS drugs available far more cheaply throughout sub-Saharan Africa.696 In other words, 
although NGOs and developing countries were not negotiating directly with pharmaceutical 
giants and developed-country governments, the dialogue between them was taking place on 
the pages of academic journals, in the discussion forums of various UN agencies, at 
international conferences, and in the eyes of the larger public. The debate was made very 
public and pharmaceutical companies were trying to keep the image of “caring and 
sharing” members of society, while holding on to their demands for the strict application of 
the TRIPs agreement, but that was impossible. Companies began to make concessions by 
means of donating drugs to developing countries and by selling medicines at discounted 
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693 S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law,  – pp. 154 
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prices.697 NGOs pointed out that such ad hoc measures were not a solution to the problem 
of access to medicines, nor to the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, which is rather 
rigid in its provisions and disregards the needs of many in the developing world.698  
The next year, 2001, was one of fast developments and changes in the dialogue 
between the actors on issues of public health and access to medicines. Oxfam, UK launched 
its campaign “Cut The Cost”, joining MSF, CPT, HAI, VSO in their efforts to generate 
enough public attention to influence policy-makers into taking practical actions and 
commitments on these issues.699 Public pressure was mounting and the continued court case 
between the South African government and the pharmaceutical companies was in the public 
eye. MSF launched an internet petition to collect signatures asking drug companies to drop 
the case.700 Under increasingly negative public exposure and in view of the commitments 
made by President Clinton in 2000, the companies dropped the lawsuit. This was an 
important moment for the campaigners because it confirmed that their tactics were useful in 
this dialogue. Campaigners realised, however, that in order for their arguments to be taken 
seriously and have some persuasive power they needed to be supported by expert 
knowledge.  
The group of NGOs and developing countries began attracting its own pool of 
experts – legal scholars, economists, medical personnel. They provided technical analysis, 
which showed that in many situations the arguments provided by the experts of the 
pharmaceutical industry were only aimed at protecting the economic interests of the 
industry. Legal scholars such as Frederick Abbott and Peter Drahos, medical experts like 
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Nathan Ford (MSF), and economists like Carlos Correa solidified the arguments put 
forward by the activists of civil society.701 The dialogue among experts revealed the 
complexity of the problems posed by the current intellectual property legislation - including 
ethical issues of access to medicines and profit levels of pharmaceutical companies, legal 
issues of whose rights should take precedence – individual rights or rights to intellectual 
property, political issues between developing states and most often the US with its practice 
of bilateral trade agreements. The actors in this case study were of different economic 
calibre – volunteer NGOs vs. the top pharmaceutical companies,702 but they were equally 
unified around their arguments, which makes the success of the civil society campaign all 
the more interesting. 
The dialogue between the supporters of full-scale enforcement of the TRIPs 
agreement and the supporters of changes to the agreement met at the 4th WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, Qatar (Nov 2001). The conference was preceded by intense political 
and social activities. The World Health Organisation together with the WTO, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the Global Health Council organised a workshop on 
differential pricing and financing essential drugs.703 The African countries, which were 
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virtually left out of the TRIPs negotiations, became united in their demands for the revision 
of the agreement and submitted a proposal to the TRIPS Council requesting that the issue 
of IPR protection be examined in conjunction with the problem of access to medicines.704 
The Council accepted this proposal, which was later examined in the meetings of the TRIPs 
negotiating group. The dialogue between North and South at the Doha Ministerial 
Conference was influenced by a number of external factors. The unsuccessful lawsuit of the 
39 pharmaceutical companies against the government of South Africa gave more power to 
Western NGOs and caught the attention of Western media and public opinion. The 
increasing amount of scientific research on the influence of patents over the availability and 
affordability of various drugs,705 which was conducted independent of industrial groups like 
PhRMA, took the sting out of an otherwise highly influential study by Amir Attaran and 
Lee Gillespie-White,706 undermining its “aura of scientific objectivity”.707 The anthrax 
attack in the US immediately following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York had made the US government consider compulsory licensing in case of a public 
emergency, which was the same move that the US was trying to deny to the developing 
world.708 Moreover, the NGO campaign had influenced public opinion so much that the 
OECD governments could not afford to disregard public demands for concerted actions to 
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improve the availability of medicines in developing countries and afford their governments 
the right to look after the health of their citizens in situations of public health crisis.709  
Discussions at the Doha Ministerial Conference were by no means easy, but 
governments had agreed that “TRIPs should not be part of the problem but part of the 
solution… and that countries should not be put under pressure bilaterally or in the WTO to 
limit their use of the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement”.710 After prolonged 
discussions in Doha, the TRIPS Council produced the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health711 (hereafter referred to as the Doha Declaration).  
The Doha Declaration represents a limited political closure in a debate, which 
continues even today. The declaration signals closure on the issue of the need for action on 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, on government responsibility to address this problem together 
with the issue of neglected diseases. Attention was also drawn to the disproportionate 
public health burden on developing countries’ governments and agreement was reached 
that concerted government action should be taken.712 Developed countries recognised the 
problems of developing countries without production capabilities for generic medicines, 
which will be unable to import cheap generic drugs after the agreement is fully in force and 
requested the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution.713 The declaration 
postponed the entry into force of the agreement for the least-developed countries until 1 
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January 2016.714  
The Doha Declaration did not completely close the debate over TRIPs between 
industry and civil society. It may have partially moderated the TRIPs-related foreign 
policies of the US towards the rest of the world, but it neither resolved problems of public 
health, nor established any long-term mechanisms that would ensure that TRIPS would not 
get in the way of any possible solutions to problems of access to medicines, availability of 
R&D for neglected diseases and the treatment of HIV/AIDS. The debates over the best 
possible policies continue on the pages of academic journals,715 in various conferences and 
workshops,716 and by different civil society actors.717 One last development that took place 
in August 2003 seem to have concluded, at least for the moment, the legal and political 
battle over the permissibility and the extent of IPR protection of pharmaceutical products. 
A decision was taken by the Council on TRIPs to make it easier for developing countries to 
import cheap generics made under compulsory licensing if they were unable to manufacture 
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the medicines themselves.718 The member states of the WTO had planned to reach an 
agreement on permanently incorporating the Doha Declaration on Public Health-waiver 
into the TRIPs Agreement by the end of June 2004; however, this has not yet been 
achieved, as negotiations have been stuck in details.719 This issue is likely to remain 
unresolved until the next WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005. 
Conclusions 
This chapter applied the model of norm development and knowledge creation to the 
norm protecting intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical industry. The empirical 
evidence that was obtained shows that the process of norm creation is not necessarily a 
linear one. When consensus among key actors becomes unattainable, the processes of 
normative network configuration and issue formulation may take place anew to frame the 
normative issue in a way consistent with state interests and public normative demands. It 
has further become apparent that reaching political closure does not always signify the end 
of normative, scientific, and political negotiations. The process of creating a norm is a 
dynamic one, and it continually interacts with the normative, scientific, and political 
context of the time. It is this interaction that can lead to unpredictable results – such as the 
opening and closing of controversies, reaching swift agreements, or prolonging 
negotiations.  
The case study of IPRs in the pharmaceutical industry is particularly interesting 
because of the interplay among political, normative, and economic power. The outcome of 
these negotiations defies the conventional wisdom that ‘might makes right’. Economic 
interests although prevailing at first have had to give way to more important normative 
                                                 
718 Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (2003) WTO News Press Release Doc. 
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719 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/health_background_e.htm - “TRIPs and Public Health: the 
situation in late 2005” 
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concerns and developed countries have had to give in to the demands of the developing 
ones, for more lax principles of intellectual property protection of pharmaceuticals. 
Economic power and political power are very important determinants of the 
direction in which international norms evolve; however, these alone may not always 
determine the direction of normative change, because moral campaigns have the potential 
and ability to overshadow economic and political power. Scientific knowledge is another 
influential resource in the creation of norms and is useful in backing up practical and 
ethical arguments alike. Public opinion is an understudied force in international norm 
creation because when mobilised, it may speak louder than economic power, especially in 
cases when the price of economic progress in one part of the world costs human lives in 
another. This is certainly not the case in every situation and there are still numerous 
examples of economic actors abusing their power, but this case study shows the potential of 
public opinion even against some of the largest corporations in the world. The number of 
actors and the strength of their union are also crucial in the negotiations of the parameters 
of a norm. Although developing countries, for example, do not have influential economic 
leverage they can sometimes accumulate political leverage in international negotiations 
when they stand together in difficult negotiations.  
An important conclusion stemming from this historical reconstruction of the events 
leading up to the current norm of IPR protection of pharmaceutical products is related to 
the nature of closure in international politics. Initially, political closure leading to the TRIPs 
agreement was reached via coercion and was based on partial scientific closure, which was 
based on the reports of Northern industries. The normative closure was also one-sided in 
that it only took account of the normative concerns of fairness that industries put forward. 
Political closure was based on rhetorical action and coercion, and proved to be unstable as a 
result. Since the industrialised states were faced with difficulties and strong normative 
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uproar from civil society networks and developing states, political closure was reversed and 
the debate over the scope and character of the new norm re-opened. This empirical study, 
thus shows that coercion is not always effective and that when political closure is based on 
one-sided technical knowledge and normative concerns, it may become unstable and open 
to breaking up.  
The developments leading up to the creation of the TRIPs Agreement and the 
negotiations that followed it fit well into the negotiating stages proposed in the theoretical 
model of norm creation. Although the normative process was specific to this norm (with the 
reopening of political debates), the negotiations’ dynamics were characteristic of the same 
theoretical stages. Studying the negotiating processes in more detail clearly reveals the 
different types of power at play in the international system and shows that more traditional 
theoretical approaches, which limit their understanding of power to that of state power are 
missing out on vital developments in the international system. The negotiating networks 
develop their own methods of cooperation and lines of agreement, which become the 
foundation of more peaceful coexistence and regional collaboration. The interaction 
between governments and scientific communities, lobby groups, civil society organisations, 
advocacy networks paves the way to more transparent and democratic international 
governance. This case study shows that normative concerns play a large part in 
international policy-making and that the general public is capable of applying political 
pressure on moral grounds it when properly mobilised. The developments post-Doha also 
raise hopes that the international community can address issues in a way that is sensitive to 
the needs of individuals in the developing world. They also raise the question whether 
individual human rights are taking centre stage in the politics of the global village, or if 
they still come second to what is perceived as the ‘strategic interests’ of states. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROTECTING THE ATMOSPHERE TO AVOID CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
“Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”.720 The norm of sustainable development in harmony with our natural 
environment was first spelt out in the Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development in 1987 and became the normative foundation for continuous legislation 
in the realm of international environmental politics. The Chairman of the Commission, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, emphasised that while until the 1980s humanity has been concerned 
with the effects of economic growth on the environment, “we are now forced to concern 
ourselves with the impacts of ecological stress – degradation of soils, water regimes, 
atmosphere and forests upon our economic prospects… Ecology and economy are 
becoming ever more interwoven… into a seamless net of causes and effects”.721 This 
report, submitted to the UN General Assembly, marked the entry of environmental issues 
on to the international political agenda, which was an important first step towards 
generating international environmental norms in the future. 
 The sphere of international environmental politics is very broad, comprising every 
aspect of our natural environment – the atmosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, etc. - and very 
complex – due to the high degree of interconnectedness between all natural elements and 
our insufficient understanding of these links. Legalising environmental politics is a difficult 
task as it involves numerous actors whose interests often collide irreconcilably or pull in 
                                                 
720 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Forty-Second 
Session of the UN General Assembly, 4 August 1987, Doc. No. A/42/427 – pp. 24 
721 Ibid. – pp. 21 
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different directions. Among the multitude of issues that one could choose to study in 
relation to environmental norm creation, I have focused my attention on the emerging norm 
for the protection of the atmosphere in light of the increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations, which have been perceived to lead to the warming of the global climate. 
The process of constructing the problem of global warming is interesting because it 
involves continuous scientific debate, strong normative beliefs that society has a 
responsibility towards future generations as well as to those less fortunate in the 
underdeveloped world, and the powerful economic interests of the energy producing 
industry. This case-study provides abundant material for the study of the interplay between 
technical knowledge, normative ideas, economic and political power; as well as for our 
understanding of the actors who partake in international decision-making and the powers 
that they exercise. The problem of global warming is of great magnitude and importance 
because of the scale of the possible consequences that it might have on all activities of 
humanity and its natural habitat.  
There has been a continual debate regarding the core causal relationships in the 
global warming issue, which has been characterised by scientific uncertainty and high 
political and economic stakes. Scientific opinion has varied widely and some authors have 
attributed this variation to the interests of the sources of research funding. The politicisation 
of science has had a negative impact on the confidence of the users of scientific knowledge 
in its neutrality and objectivity. The issue of scientific uncertainty is another impediment in 
the process of norm development, which results from the complexity and 
interconnectedness of our natural environment. The elements of our environment are 
interdependent and influence each other in ways not yet completely clear to scientists. 
There are many causal relationships between these elements that are still to be uncovered, 
while some argue that more science may not necessarily lead us to the right answers if such 
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exist at all, or even if it does, that it might not necessarily result in better policy.722 The 
complexity of nature and the interplay between its parts stands in the way of understanding 
whether there is a problem of global warming at all, what the direction of climate 
fluctuation is,723 what consequences we can expect, and if there is anything that can be 
done to modify these consequences. The scientific community seems unable to reach an 
unequivocal agreement on any of these issues. The lack of scientific closure has affected 
political negotiations and thus political closure as it allowed actors to make sustained 
arguments against political action on the basis of scientific uncertainty. 
The economic sector has been divided on the issue of climate change and on the 
need for immediate action to avert possible environmental crisis. The industries that are 
directly implicated in fostering climate change – the fossil fuel industries, as well as those 
who use their products - are in direct opposition to any meaningful action being taken at 
present, as any action is likely to come at a great cost. At the same time, the insurance 
sector and the green technologies sector have seen a window of opportunity to unite their 
efforts and counter the actions of energy producers in order to improve their market 
positions. Insurers are increasingly worried about the rising costs of the aftermath of natural 
disasters, which are predicted to increase in both frequency and intensity,724 while the green 
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energy lobby has an opportunity to offer an alternative to the energy producing practices of 
the oil-economy and attract finance and interest to its products.725 
Among states, the North- South debate has been magnified by the climate change 
negotiations because of debates about allocation of costs and responsibilities. The G-77 
countries, although very different in many aspects, managed to stand firmly on the position 
that the developed world should take the lead in lowering emissions and should furthermore 
pledge resources and technologies to assist the developing world in fulfilling its obligations 
towards future generations, because the consumption and life-style patterns in developed 
countries are perceived as the main cause of current environmental problems.726 There is 
also the principled issue of responsibility. While OECD countries predict that China, India, 
and the rest of the developing world will comprise 60% of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
emissions by the year 2050,727 the developing countries insist that they should be given an 
equal opportunity to develop economically and should not be held responsible for the 
pollution that developed countries have inflicted on the environment so far.728 
Environmental degradation in general and climate change in particular are predicted to have 
a most notable impact on developing countries, affecting patterns of agriculture, and food 
production, sources of fresh water etc. and thus would influence the prospects of future 
economic development of these parts of the world.729  
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Climate change is an issue of global magnitude, which has the potential to affect 
humans across the world. Since the earth’s atmosphere is one whole, the consequences of 
the enhanced greenhouse effect will not be confined to those states that produce higher 
emissions. An international response, however, is not easy to achieve in a political world of 
sovereign nation-states that still justify their actions with national interests in the context of 
an anarchical international system,730 are worried about free-riders and are striving to 
minimise their costs of compliance.731 Between scientific uncertainty and national interests 
is also the problem of the lack of urgency. When unusual climate conditions were affecting 
the US and other parts of the world in the late 1980s, environmental issues were swiftly 
brought onto the international agenda, but since climate has generally returned to a more 
stable, familiar state, meaningful action and decision-making have been delayed and even 
postponed. Examples of effective environmental agreements do exist, but one of the 
underlying features of those was the immediacy of international action required – in the 
case of acid rain, the ozone layer, biodiversity, and so on. The effects of the build-up of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere “may take decades to manifest themselves”,732 while 
action to combat increasing levels of greenhouse gases is likely to be costly and with 
unpredictable effects. Some scientists have emphasised the need to take decisive action on 
climate change before it is too late, because according to some predictions the effects of 
climate change may develop and strike the most vulnerable nations with unforeseen 
speed.733 The evidence provided has so far been insufficient to induce resolute international 
political action.  
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The study of environmental politics is probably the one area where the need to 
bridge the social constructivisms of IR and SSK is becoming fairly obvious. Analysis of the 
practice of knowledge creation with regards to the norm for the protection of the 
atmosphere has been much more extensive than in other fields of international politics. The 
natural sciences, in this case, have been heavily criticised for their subjectivity and accused 
of constructing knowledge in search of continued attention and funding.734 Politicians have 
been seen as adopting short-term positions to ensure their re-election, while missing out on 
the big picture of the detrimental effects that result from the lack of action to prevent 
intense global warming. The aim of this chapter is to begin untangling the complex web of 
processes leading to the construction of a norm to control climate change. To do this, it is 
important to examine the identity of the actors involved in the creation of this norm, their 
normative positions, and the tactics that they use to achieve their goals. Close attention will 
be paid to the methods of argument and persuasion that actors have used to get this issue on 
the international agenda, to sustain the interest in it and to persuade states to produce 
binding legal principles that will change the parameters of appropriate behaviour. One must 
not assume that this process of norm creation is a natural progression of human ethics, 
because as we will later see, the parties in this issue have taken and defended positions 
based on self-interest and so the resulting norms are not always benign and there to secure 
the well-being of the greatest number of people.   
The issue of global warming is related to the growing concentration of so-called 
greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere. Relative scientific consensus has been reached 
that industrialisation, deforestation, and the increased use of agricultural fertilisers raise the 
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amount of certain chemical compounds in the atmosphere.735 These compounds trap the 
heat reflected from the earth’s surface and thus produce an effect similar to a greenhouse. 
The greenhouse gases, however, are essential in keeping the earth inhabitable, as it has 
been estimated that if those were not in the atmosphere, the earth’s surface would be 
approximately 33°C colder.736 Sceptical scientists believe that there isn’t enough evidence 
to prove that human activity is capable of upsetting the natural balance of the greenhouse 
gases because there are natural mechanisms in place to regulate the greenhouse effect – 
some of these mechanisms are natural, the so called CO2 ‘sinks’,737 and some are man-
made, such as sulphur, soot, ash, dust, which reflect heat back into space and thus create a 
cooling effect.738  
The problem of global warming is of great magnitude because it is likely to affect 
not only our natural environment, but also almost all activities of humanity, as well as the 
availability of food and some natural resources. Although it is difficult to predict the exact 
scale of the problem and thus its exact consequences, some scientists have argued that 
increasing the temperature of the Earth’s surface will change the plant life, agricultural 
activity and food production, precipitation patterns and climatic zones, thus uprooting 
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established patterns of human existence.739 Scientists have further suggested that climate 
changes will affect developing countries worst because of the high financial and 
technological costs of adapting to the new conditions.740 Ecological imbalance and stress 
can swiftly become the leading cause of violent conflict in politically volatile areas, which 
has further engaged the interest of policy-makers at the international level.741 
 
A Brief History of Climate Change Research 
One can be justified in saying that the inception of climate change research was 
almost entirely accidental – global warming was discovered in the process of searching for 
the causes of the Ice Age.742 Although theories about the warming of the temperature at the 
earth’s surface were available as early as the 19th century, the issue was not problematised 
until much later. Global warming was discovered by scientists and it was scientists who 
constructed it as a problem, and this has inevitably affected the way in which the politics of 
this problem progressed.  
It was not until the 18th century that some European scientific societies began 
keeping a more structured and standardised record of weather and weather fluctuations.743 
A series of international conferences and publications of climatologists and meteorologists 
established the need for standardised record of temperatures, precipitations and general 
weather conditions, which later became one of the requirements of the scientific approach 
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to climate issues, to ensure consistency across the world.744 Consistent climate monitoring 
records have only been compiled over the last two centuries, which leaves contemporary 
scientists without direct historical data and this impinges their chances of recreating a 
reliable picture of the climate changes that the earth has experienced.745 Although two 
hundred years may seem like a long period, some climate change occurs in long cycles and 
the lack of older records leaves scientific hypothesis without solid evidence to prove either 
the lack or the imminence of global warming. 
In the 19th century, scientists and people with general interest in the natural world 
were researching the causes of the Ice Age when experiments and calculations pointed to 
the fact that not only is the Earth atmosphere retaining heat from the sun, but that the 
atmosphere is warming up. Jean Baptist Joseph Fourier is considered the first author to 
compare the function of the Earth’s atmosphere to that of “glass in a greenhouse” as early 
as 1824.746 Later, John Tyndall studied the transparency of the gases of the atmosphere and 
discovered that while oxygen and nitrogen were transparent, the gases produced by the 
burning of coal, like CO2 and methane were, opaque and able to absorb heat.747 Tyndall 
was concerned with the scenario where the concentration of the opaque gases drops and the 
surface of the Earth cools down, leading to another Ice Age.748 So, although he is 
considered to have coined the term “greenhouse effect” in his 1859 publication, his work 
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was not concerned with global warming.749 Further research on the greenhouse effect and 
the possibility of a new Ice Age was conducted by Svante August Arrhenius. He produced a 
mathematical model to reflect and predict the amount of temperature change related to the 
change of the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and conducted extensive calculations. 
Aarheius’ calculations were partly prompted by a natural phenomenon - the eruption of the 
Krakatau volcano on the island of Palau in Indonesia.750 The volcanic dust was spread 
around the world by winds, prompting scientists to predict the possibility of dropping 
temperatures and a new Ice Age.751 One of Arrhenius’ most popular publications is entitled 
“On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground”,752 and 
is often cited as the inception of the climate change discussion. 
Unlike scientists today, the early scholars of climate change believed global 
warming to be beneficial, because they perceived improved plant growth and warmer 
weather as positive and much needed effects in a world of growing population.753 The 
debate on the causes of the Ice Age, as well as the question whether the earth was warming 
up or cooling down, continued in the first half of the 20th century. The variability of climate 
being attributed to spots on the sun,754 to changes in geography, i.e., the movement of 
continents,755 to human activities, to the complexity of the interaction between the various 
parts of the natural environment,756 and so on. Some of the works were based on scientific 
evidence while others were purely speculative, but the debates were nowhere near to 
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reaching one conclusion or another. The first publication arguing that fossil fuel burning 
has caused an increase in the temperature of the Earth’s atmosphere was George 
Callendar’s article “The Artificial Production of Carbon Dioxide and Its Influence on 
Temperature”, published in 1938.757 The author had examined the data from 200 weather 
stations around the world between 1880 and 1934 and argued that temperatures were on the 
rise already.758 
Although many scientists from different scientific fields were producing reports, 
articles, hypotheses, and the debate on climate change was kept going, there was no 
political response to these scientific developments, nor were these issues made part of the 
social movements’ agenda. There are a number of reasons for this. Science was not taken 
too seriously by politicians in the early years of the 20th century because it was not 
perceived as systematic and objective. Science and politics were detached social spheres in 
the sense that science was not perceived as part of politics and the issue of climate change 
was only beginning to be constructed as problematic by the scientists who studied it. 
Moreover, even within scientific circles the issue of climate change took time to evolve - 
climatologists and meteorologists were slow to change their concept of climate: up until the 
early 20th century the predominant perception was that climate was stable and, although it 
might be susceptible to the influence of human activity, climate was influenced mostly by 
other components of the natural environment.759  
The growing understanding of climate as a fragile system that can easily be 
influenced by industrial development came along not only due to the evolution of science 
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but with changing political perspectives and after a series of natural disasters. The political 
events that unfolded during WWII and after it – the use of the atomic bomb, the unfolding 
Cold War and the politics of the arms race that followed - made politicians realise the 
potential benefits of scientific research, which were then directly related to issues of 
national security.760 After the end of the conflict, science became part of the new industrial 
complex, which resulted in an increase of both public and private funding and that in turn 
attracted even more scientists.761 In the politically-charged atmosphere of the Cold War, 
science was constructed as objective, neutral and practical, based on hard facts and precise 
calculations. 
The climate change issue was raised to the attention of politicians partly by 
scientists and partly by public concerns. The use of nuclear weapons at the end of WWII 
demonstrated the effectiveness of this new weapon, but also its potential to cause harm. 
Nuclear testing and proliferation was raising public concerns regarding human health, 
damage to the atmosphere and long-term effects.762 Atmospheric pollution was also 
considered in the context of the blooming industrial development during the 1950s when 
London became known for its ‘killer smog’.763 The press reflected public concerns in 
articles discussing apocalyptic scenarios of rising sea levels, loss of habitat, and changing 
agriculture zones that hindered economic development.764 These events, together with 
temperatures peaking (for the century so far) in the 1950s, changed an important part of the 
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public perception about the natural environment – namely, that human activity could have a 
substantial impact on the environment in general and on climate in particular.765   
In 1957 Roger Revelle and Hans Suess stirred the scientific circles by showing that 
the widespread belief that oceans will absorb the excess CO2 from the atmosphere is 
incorrect, or at least not to the degree proposed by previous studies.766 In 1957-8, during the 
International Geophysical Year, under the initiative of the World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO), systemic measurements of the carbon dioxide concentrations 
began.767 Public curiosity was raised, which sparked the need for further research and 
explanations. Scientists and international organisations were prepared to engage. What was 
missing was the attention of policy-makers to the problem of atmospheric pollution and its 
ensuing consequences to turn this into a vibrant political discussion.  
Social movements became more active in the 1960s when ecological groups 
overlapped with groups protesting nuclear proliferation and the arms race of the Cold 
War.768 The public concern with air pollution was further strengthened by the often cited 
book Silent Spring, by Rachel Carson (1962), which discussed the effects that agricultural 
pesticides (DDT) had on wildlife and particularly on birds. Separate developments were 
taking place in the scientific realm. The Conservation Foundation produced a report in 1963 
                                                 
765 In 1956, Gilbert Plass, an infrared physicist, proposed that “if at the end of this century, measurements 
show that carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere has risen appreciably, and at the same time temperature 
has continued to rise throughout the world, it will be firmly established that carbon dioxide is an important 
factor in causing climate change” – M. Nye, D. Lindberg, R. Numbers,  The Cambridge History of Science – 
the Modern Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Vol. 5, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2003) – 
pp. 647-8 
766 R. Revelle, and H. Suess “Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of 
an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 during the Past Decades”, Tellus, Vol. 9, No. 18, 1957. 
767 Georg Borsting and Gunnar Fermann, “Climate Change Turning Political: Conference Diplomacy and 
Institution-Building to Rio and Beyond” in Fermann, G. (ed.) International Politics of Climate Change – Key 
Issues and Critical Actors, (Scandinavian University Press: Oslo: 1997) – pp. 54 
768 C. Thomas, The Environment in International Relations, (Royal Institute of International Affairs: London: 
1992) – pp. 23; A. Jamison,  The Making of Green Knowledge – Environmental Politics and Cultural 
Transformation, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2001) – pp. 71-2 
 236
indicating in figures the relationship between CO2 emissions and climate change.769 In a 
1965 report of the US President’s Science Advisory Committee, respected scientists put the 
greenhouse-induced warming on the domestic US policy agenda, opening an opportunity 
for the issue to be brought to the attention of policy-makers.770 In the same year, a scientific 
conference in Boulder, Colorado, became a forum for scientists of different fields to discuss 
the problem of global warming.771 The conference was initially convened to discuss the 
causes of the Ice Age. An important scientific construction that evolved in the 1960s 
concerning the complexity and interconnectedness between the various elements of the 
natural environment became the foundation of growing scientific uncertainties. An 
accidental discovery of wide variation in results after introducing small changes in the 
numerical model of simulating weather patterns had a huge impact in changing the 
perceptions of scientists. Edward Lorenz of the MIT concluded that “orbital patterns, wind 
patterns, melting ice sheets, ocean circulation – everything seemed to be interacting with 
everything else… [and that] the planet’s environment was a hugely complicated 
structure”.772  
The 1970s were a tumultuous time in the development of environmental concerns. 
In the context of the Cold War, issues not directly linked to national security rarely reached 
the international agenda. The United Nations Conference on Human Environment 
(UNCHE), which took place in Stockholm 1972, however, managed to elevate 
environmental concerns to the level of global politics. Environmental issues thus became 
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imbedded in international politics because the UNCHE conference drew attention to and 
problematised various aspects of the human environment.773 Another development in world 
politics, which cemented environmental issues on the global agenda, was the oil crisis of 
1973. The abrupt rise in oil prices opened the political space to the proponents and 
producers of renewable energy,774 while also raising energy issues to the top of national 
political agendas.775 Even though energy issues came into the political spotlight, scientists 
continued to struggle to convey their findings to policy-makers successfully.776 This 
problem was partly due to the lack of consensus in scientific circles over whether global 
warming or global cooling was in store for our planet.777  
The climate change science was rapidly improving, with the increasing capacity of 
technology. One of the main methods to calculate the extent of climate change was through 
General Circulation Models (GCMs), which were based on extensive calculations of the 
interaction between various elements of the natural environment. The improving computing 
power and sophistication of these models led scientists to conclude that “there is no reason 
to doubt that climate changes will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be 
negligible”.778 Although the voice of science was becoming more determined, the inherent 
complexity of the natural environment made it very difficult to reach scientific consensus, 
because the global temperatures were indicating a consistent decline between 1945 and the 
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1970s.779 Scientists were not discouraged by the conflicting data that they were getting 
from studying the natural environment; their reports concluded that more scientific research 
was needed to resolve controversies surrounding climate change. Science, according to 
Andrew Jamison, was becoming more professionalized and there was a process of 
institutionalisation of knowledge production that took place during the 1970s, thus 
excluding those who could not afford to participate or were not educated to the required 
level.780  
Science alone was not sufficient to raise the issue of climate change to the 
international level. There was growing social pressure on politicians to find solutions to 
both pending and future problems related to the Earth’s climate. Droughts that affected 
India, Russia, and the American Mid West and the famine that hit Africa during the 1970s 
assisted in drawing the attention of the general public to environmental issues.781 
Environmentalist social movements were beginning to pop up in different parts of the 
world – most notably, 1969 saw the inception of Friends of the Earth782 and Greenpeace 
was founded two years later in 1971.783 The activists of these organisations were taking 
direct action in protest both against government activities and against the ignorance of the 
wider public on issues such as biodiversity, deforestation, nuclear energy, protection of the 
oceans.784 These campaigns, along with the coverage of the droughts, attracted much 
needed media attention,785 which in turn assisted in mobilising the wider public in support 
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of environmental policies.  
Public, political and scientific attention to the issue of global warming grew 
exponentially in the late 1970s and the 1980s. An increasing number of international 
scientific conferences took place to reflect the changing research agenda.786 Politicisation, 
professionalisation and specialisation characterised the field of environmental studies of the 
1980s.787 Non-governmental organisations and environmental social movements became 
more active. Environmental departments were created within larger companies to defend 
their interests,788 while policy-makers were asking for more conclusive scientific 
knowledge. The 1980s were a decade of ever growing environmentalism, which paved the 
way for the political achievements of the 1990s.  
Green parties entered the politics of the UK, Germany, and New Zealand,789 
juxtaposing themselves to the main stream ‘grey’ parties, which were considered to be part 
of the problem of environmental degradation as opposed to part of the solution. Throughout 
the 1980s and the 1990s, these political movements became stronger and more noticeable, 
especially in the countries of the European Union.790 A new type of actor entered the sphere 
of domestic politics - the not-for-profit think tanks, which were prepared to provide less 
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biased advice to policy-makers compared to mainstream scientific communities.791 During 
the Reagan Administration, scientific communities compromised their objectivity by 
providing tentative conclusions to their research on climate change, which unsurprisingly 
coincided with the opinion of the President’s administration. They indicated that warming 
would probably not be severe and that humankind can get through temperature changes like 
it has done in previous generations. As a result, President Reagan laid plans to cut back on 
research funding for these issues.792 This political context and the way in which scientific 
reports reflected on it, indicated diminishing neutrality and objectivity within scientific 
circles.  
National scientific unions were not the only ones blamed for acting on political 
biases. Environmentalists from various social movements were clashing with the in-house 
scientists of the fossil fuel industries as well, undermining the concept of scientific 
objectivity even further.793 Domestic think-tanks were useful, but insufficient to clear the 
name of science. Concerted international effort was needed not only to instigate 
international political action, but also to construct the science that could be the foundation 
of this political action, one that did not favour the interests of some actors at the expense of 
others. The World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1979, which drew together both 
government officials and scientists, called for an international structure to be set up to 
conduct scientific research for the first time.794 The scientific conference in Villach, Austria 
that was organised by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the International Council of Scientific Unions 
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(ICSU) in 1985 became a milestone in building international scientific consensus because it 
‘shifted emphasis away from solely the need for more research, towards including 
assertions of the need for political action’.795 The Toronto Conference of 1988 was the first 
one to establish a specific target for the cutting of carbon dioxide emissions, which was 
agreed upon by the numerous scientists and policy-makers who took part in it.796 The 
United Nations established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 
to foster scientific consensus.797  
All these developments hinted at some of the problems that climate negotiations 
would come across and would have to resolve in the future, as the negotiations were not 
only political, but also scientific, economic and social. Political consensus appeared 
difficult from the start. For a start, the scientific community had not reached closure on the 
debate of global warming, prompting continual arguments among scientists from different 
backgrounds and political inaction based on these disagreements. Although the IPCC was 
established to foster consensus, the scientists outside of it questioned the scientific value of 
the conclusions reached by this organisation. North-South disputes over economic 
development, responsibility, humanitarian ethics and resources began to appear on the 
international agenda in the 1970s and became one of the major dividing lines in world 
politics after the end of the Cold War. The size of the fossil fuel industry alone and the 
alliances and resources of the oil-producing countries enabled both the industry and states 
to stand in the way of political agreements. All of this meant that the future of the climate 
change negotiations was not one of easily negotiated treaties and general consensus.  
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To begin untangling the negotiating processes and examining the actors involved 
and the sources of their influence, I will apply the model of norm creation proposed in 
chapter one to the historical developments of the international norm for the protection of 
the atmosphere from increasing GHG concentrations. Figure 4.1 below reflects the 
chronological sequence of the unfolding political events.  
 
Figure 4.1 
TIMELINE OF THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO 
CONTROL CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
1827 Baron Jean Baptiste Fourier showed that the earth’s atmosphere traps heat in a similar 
fashion to a greenhouse. 
1859 John Tyndall discovered that some of the gases in the atmosphere are transparent and let 
heat escape in space, while others are opaque, trapping heat and keeping the Earth warm. 
1896 Svante Arrhenius proposed a link between human activity such as fossil fuel burning and 
the increase in earth’s surface temperature. 
1938 British scientist G.S.Callendar suggests that human emissions are sufficient to alter climate 
significantly 
1957 Study of Man’s Impact on Climate, International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) 
concluding that the build-up of carbon dioxide is potentially a major threat 
1957-8 International Geographical Year – the first major international plan to develop a better 
understanding of the atmosphere, co-organised by the WMO and the International Council 
of Scientific Unions (ICSU) 
1965 “Causes of Climate Change” Scientific Conference in Boulder, Colorado, USA 
Jul 1971 First major international meeting of scientists “Study of Man’s Impact on Climate” – Wijk, 
Sweden – begin to establish the state of scientific understanding regarding the impact of 
human activity on regional and global climate 
1971  First International Conference on Environmental Futures, Finland  
1972  UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 
Dec 1972 UNEP was established by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2997 of 15 Dec 
1977 The Beijer International Institute, Stockholm, was established under the auspices of the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences to foster interdisciplinary work on environment, 
economics and development 
Feb 1979 First World Climate Conference, Geneva 
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1979 World Climate Program (WCP) was launched by the WMO, UNEP, UNESCO, and ICSU 
1980 First WMO/UNEP/ICSU Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of the Role of CO2 on 
Climate Variations and their impact, Villach, Austria. WMO and ICSU Agreement on the 
World Climate Research Programme. 
1985 Scientific Report UNEP, WMO, International Council of Scientific Union (ICSU) 
Oct 1985 Second International Conference - Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and Other 
Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts – held in Villach, Austria. 
Organised at the initiative of UNEP, WMO and ICSU 
May 1987 Brundtland Report 
1987 Developing Policies for Responding to Climate Change – workshops held in Villach 
(Austria - Oct) and Bellagio (Italy- Nov)  
June 1988 The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, Toronto, Canada 
Nov 1988 World Congress on Climate and Development, Hamburg, Germany 
Nov 1988 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is established by UNEP, WMO, 
and ICSU 
Dec 1988 UNGA Resolution 43/53 Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations 
of Mankind 
Feb 1989 Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change: Perspectives from Developing 
Countries, New Delhi, India 
Feb 1989 International Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts on the Protection of the Atmosphere, 
Ottawa, Canada 
May 1989 UNEP Governmental Council Decision 15/36 to prepare for negotiations of a Framework 
Convention on Climate 
Jul 1989 G-7 meeting was held in Paris and was dubbed the ‘green summit’ 
Sep 1989 Tokyo Conference on Global Environment and Human Response Towards Sustainable 
Development, Tokyo 
Nov 1989 Small States Conference on Sea-Level Rise, Maldives 
Nov 1989 Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change, Noordwijk, the 
Netherlands (representatives from 72 countries) – producing the Noordwijk Declaration on 
Climate Change. 
May 1990 Bergen Conference – preparatory meeting for the UN Conference on Economic 
Development 
Jan 1990 Global Forum on Environment and Development, Moscow 
Nov 1990 Second World Climate Conference, Geneva 
Feb 1991 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (ING) holds the first session towards the 
creation of a framework convention on climate change 
Jun 1991 Beijing Declaration on Renewable Energy for Sustainable Development– resulting from the 
meeting of 40 developing countries 
Jul 1991 International Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts on climate change and oceans, 
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Malta 
Oct 1991 World Bank, UNDP and UNEP jointly establish the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
to provide funding for research into the protection of the environment in developing 
countries. 
Jun 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) signed at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development – Rio de Janeiro  
Apr 1995 Conference of the Parties (CoP-1), Berlin – Berlin Mandate 
Jul 1996 Conference of the Parties (CoP-2), Geneva – Geneva Ministerial Declaration 
Dec 1997 Conference of the Parties (CoP-3), Kyoto – Kyoto Protocol 
Nov 1998 CoP-4, Buenos Aires 
Nov 1999 CoP-5, Bonn 
Nov 2000 CoP-6, The Hague 
Nov 2001 CoP-7, Marrakech 
Nov 2002 CoP-8, New Delhi 
Dec 2003 CoP-9, Milan 
Nov 2004 Russia ratifies the Kyoto Protocol 
Dec 2004 CoP-10, Buenos Aires 
Feb 2005  Kyoto Protocol enters into force 
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Theoretical Model and Empirical Findings 
Formulating the idea 
Although 19th century scientists began examining issues relating to the earth’s 
atmosphere and the way in which it functions, the problem of climate change was not 
formulated until the middle of the 20th century. The early researchers believed that rising 
temperatures were a good thing, as the latter would improve food production and would 
open more areas for agriculture. It was not until the mid-1950s that scientists started 
working on the hypothesis that the increase of CO2, which resulted from industrialisation, 
could have extreme consequences for our environment, threatening the livelihood and 
habitat of many.798 These theories evolved slowly and were a product not only of growing 
scientific knowledge but of the combined effects of changing weather conditions, 
increasing social awareness, and even changing military doctrines. 
Scientists dedicated their efforts to working out the causal relationships of the 
climate change issue in view of the new hypothesis that climate change may have negative 
effects. They began by examining the causal relationships between human activity and the 
increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The term greenhouse 
effect is often misused as a substitute for global warming. However, there is nothing 
problematic about the greenhouse effect as it keeps the surface of the Earth warm and 
inhabitable. It is the enhanced greenhouse effect that has drawn the attention of scientists. It 
has almost been accepted as conventional wisdom that burning fossil fuels along with 
certain agricultural activities (including clearing land) are the causes of increased 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.799 Consensus within 
scientific circles on the sources and sinks of GHGs, as well as on the effects of increasing 
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GHG concentrations has still not been achieved.  
The issue of global warming came on to the public agenda in the 1950s. The 
Northern Hemisphere was experiencing unusually high temperatures800 and popular press 
was asking whether the world was getting warmer.801 The International Geophysical Year 
was under way in 1957 and it marked the beginning of consistent studies of the carbon 
cycle.802 The first laboratory for the study of changing CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere was established by the US government in an extinct volcano in Hawaii.803 
Mauna Loa was chosen because of its distance from cities and industrial facilities, which 
could otherwise distort the measurements made there. The advancement of science in the 
sphere of climatology and meteorology reflected the growing confidence of policy-makers 
in the ability of scientists to tackle complex issues. Governments in Western societies 
actively sought and encouraged the construction of new knowledge, which assigned natural 
sciences a new social position.804 Governing elites began to realise the potential of 
scientific knowledge for improving policy-choices - predictions, calculations and increased 
clarity were at the heart of any scientific enquiry, while causality and predictions can help 
make better policies. 
A landmark study was produced in 1957 and later presented by the International 
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Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to the Stockholm Conference in 1972. The Study of 
Man’s Impact on Climate, authored by Roger Revelle and Hans Suess of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), suggested a causal link between growing concentrations of 
CO2 in the atmosphere and extreme weather conditions.805 Although this study proposed 
and defended important causal relationships that outline potential harm to our natural 
habitat, scientists concluded that further research was needed to clarify the causal links 
between atmospheric changes and unusual weather patterns. The underlying assumptions 
that climate was largely stable (or at least that any changes were gradual and took place 
over centuries) and that humans could not have a sizeable impact on a planetary scale, 
however, remained prevalent,806 which slowed the process of constructing climate change 
as a serious problem. 
The ideas about the possible effects of the enhanced greenhouse effect began to 
consolidate in the 1960s, not least because some observation data on CO2 concentrations 
was already available from the laboratories. Scientific models were constructed to calculate 
the change of GHG concentrations and any possible effects on world’s climate. Issues such 
as nuclear pollution, acid rain, industrial smog, loss of biodiversity807 found a niche in the 
public agenda and prompted the rise of public environmentalism808 at a time when social 
movements and NGOs were gaining increasing influence on domestic politics, especially in 
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the US. In 1964 Roger Revelle authored a White House study of the relationship between 
climate change and the use of fossil fuels,809 which signalled that concerns about and 
doomsday predictions of the effects of climate change entered US politics on the back of 
newly created scientific knowledge. Another scientific novelty was the growing consensus 
that “everything was interacting with everything else… [and that] the planet’s environment 
was a hugely complicated structure”.810 This paradigm resulted from improved General 
Circulation Models (GCM). These models are computer simulations of the changes that 
take place in the atmosphere of the Earth. They require extensive calculating capabilities, 
which explains why their development was boosted in the 1970s (due to improving 
computing capabilities). The studies of climatology could begin concerning themselves 
with more global issues. These models allowed scientists to begin working on their 
hypothesis for the effect of human activities on the environment and the possible effects of 
global climate change.811 By displaying errors and mismatches in predictions in GCMs 
which used different components of the natural environment, these models indicated that 
there were many more elements that needed to be incorporated in the calculations in order 
to improve the understanding of the way in which the natural environment functions.812 
These developments called for more complex studies and observations, because scientists 
had to begin to understand how the different parts of the earth’s natural environment – air, 
water, ice, winds, etc. – interacted.  
The understanding of the changing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere was improving in the 1970s, but this decade was also marked by a slight loss of 
public interest in the issue of global warming. Reports were produced showing that average 
                                                 
809 Ian Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change – pp. 67 
810 S. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming – pp. 64. 
811 “Historical overview of AGCMs”, available from http://www.aip.org/history/sloan/gcm/histoverview.html 
812 See supra note 48 
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global temperatures have actually dropped in the period 1945-1970,813 which in turn 
increased fears that a new Ice Age might be about to set in.814 Scientific interest in the 
issues of global warming or indeed global cooling did not slow down, although the same 
cannot be said about the public and political interest in the issue. 
In 1971 the first international scientific conference on the long-term effects of 
climate change took place in Wijk, Sweden, with the aim of assessing the state of scientific 
understanding of the human impact on global climate.815 It is important to outline at this 
point that scientific interest was being driven primarily by the logic of truth-seeking at that 
point, as there didn’t seem to be enough political interest or economic interest, based on 
material gains that could have driven scientific research instead. This could not be said with 
the same degree of confidence for the years following the oil crisis (1973), which were 
marked by the increased attention of oil producers and their counterparts - the producers of 
‘green energy’ - for the issue of climate change. Global warming became part of the agenda 
of economic actors as well. 
The 1970s were also a decade of stark climate anomalies, which attracted scientific 
interest.816 There were droughts in India, the USSR, the American Mid-West and Canada, 
droughts in Africa resulted in widespread famine, floods hit Romania, Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Iceland, the US, and so on.817 These focused the attention of the media back on 
                                                 
813 Ian Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change – pp. 68 
814 D. Demeritt, “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science”, Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, Vol. 91, no. 2 – pp. 315; J. Morris, (ed.) Climate Change – Challenging 
Conventional Wisdom, IEA Studies of the Environment No. 10, (Harlington Fine Arts Ltd, London: 1997) – 
pp. 18 
815 Ian Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change - pp. 70 
816 Ibid. - pp.89 
817 S. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming – pp. 91; M. Holdgate, M. Kassas, G. White, (eds.) The 
World Environment 1972-1982 – A Report by the United Nations Environment Programme, (Tycooly 
International Publishing Limited: Dublin: 1982) – See Table 2.8, pp. 55 
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the issue and resulted in the publication of apocalyptic scenarios of the future.818 A report 
by the United Nations Environmental Programme claims that the rise in articles in the 
public media was supplemented by “an information explosion among scientific journals”, 
which reflected both the increased calculating capacity of GCMs and the deepening 
understanding of the workings of the environmental system.819  
Scientific opinion was tentatively consolidating around an agreement on the 
existence of a causal relationship between human industrial activities and growing 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere, and, further, that the 
growing amounts of GHGs may lead to global warming, which in turn might have 
undesirable consequences on human habitats and world’s climate. The 1970s was the 
decade in which consensus was reached to problematise the enhanced greenhouse effect 
and to conduct further studies into the components of the proposed causal links – i.e. to 
research the relationship between human economic activity and increased GHGs in the 
atmosphere, as well as the probable effects of this increase on the overall climate of our 
planet, and the future consequences of this climate change. Scientific uncertainties 
remained high, but the issue was officially on research agendas across the world, as became 
apparent at the first World Climate Conference in 1979. The Conference was organised by 
the World Meteorological Organisation and held in Geneva, where it concluded that:  
it could be said with some confidence that the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and 
changes of land use have increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere… it 
appears that an increased amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can contribute to a 
                                                 
818 Opinions in the media were conflicting from articles such as the one published in the The Times – 26 Aug 
1970 “Pollution ‘catastrophe’ denied” or the publication of “World’s temperature likely to rise” on 22 Jun 
1976 and “Ominous Changes in World’s Weather”, Fortune  Feb 1974, “Another Ice Age?” Time, 26 Jun 
1974; to more moderate assessments and scientific reports – The Times, 7 Feb 1974, “Pollution: Assessing 
CO2 Levels”; The Times, 13 May 1976, “Meteorology: Effect of Pollution”, “The World Climate is Getting 
Worse”, Business Week, 2 Aug 1976, “The Carbon Dioxide Question”, Scientific American, Jan 1978.  
819 M. Holdgate, M. Kassas, G. White, (eds.) The World Environment 1972-1982 – A Report by the United 
Nations Environment Programme – pp. 14 
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gradual warming of the lower atmosphere, especially at high latitudes.820 
 
The initial idea regarding global climate change was formulated almost exclusively 
by communities of scientists, whose work was brought to the fore by the media and active 
social movements at the time. Politically, the need to construct an international norm 
regarding environmental sustainability, responsibility and equity was formulated much 
later. However, the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm 
(which will be discussed in more detail in the following stages) marked an important 
political cornerstone. It outlined the causal link between human activities and the state of 
our environment, and clearly stated the principle of states’ responsibility for environmental 
damage even when the latter is beyond state borders.821   
 
Network Configuration 
The network of support for the reversal of climate change is loosely knit. This 
network encompasses an incredibly large number of actors822 with a broad spectrum of 
vested interests – political, normative, economic or scientific. An interesting characteristic 
for the normative network of support to reverse climate change has been the 
disconnectedness between its normative and scientific partnerships. Unlike the networks in 
the case of outlawing torture or those in the intellectual property debate discussed in 
previous chapters, the actors in this case-study seemed to have been working on more than 
one aspect of the new norm. Technical knowledge was constructed not only by scientific 
                                                 
820 C. Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds.) Negotiating Climate 
Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, -  pp. 129-130 citing WMO, World Climate Conference 
Declaration and Supporting Documents, (WMO: Geneva: 1979). 
821 L. Elliot, The Global Politics of the Environment – pp. 11 
822 Although the exact number of environmental NGOs around the world is unknown, at least 4,000 NGOs are 
included in the database of one environmental organisation – G. Porter and J. Brown, Global Environmental 
Politics, (Westview Press: Oxford: 1996) – pp. 50. 
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communities, but by businesses, NGOs and IOs, which made it extremely difficult to rely 
on scientific objectivity and/or neutrality. And although science is inherently political, in 
this particular case, scientific knowledge became so politicised that it began reflecting the 
interests of its creators, which in turn undermined its credibility to a degree. 
Studies of the evolution of the climate change issue have tended to classify the 
actors participating in the norm entrepreneur networks into international organisations, 
NGOs, epistemic communities and corporations.823 This classification is likely to become 
repetitive, as the activities and tactics of these otherwise different types of actors overlap. 
The issue of climate change is politically and economically charged; it is contentious and 
has the potential to have far-reaching consequences whether or not political action is 
taken.824 NGOs, scientists, IOs, and business communities were equally concerned about 
the outcomes of international political negotiations. Since the problem at the heart of this 
normative campaign was primarily scientific, most actors chose a knowledge-creating 
strategy to persuade policy-makers of the merits of their cause. Some of these actors – such 
as the representatives of the fossil fuel industry - sought to destabilize scientific consensus 
and thus contribute to scientific uncertainties, while others – like green NGOs and scientific 
think-tanks – were focusing on decreasing uncertainties and gaining useful knowledge to 
back up policies that can reverse the enhanced greenhouse effect.  
This case study differs from the previous two in two major respects. Firstly, there 
                                                 
823 G. Porter and J. Brown, Global Environmental Politics, (Westview Press: Oxford: 1996) – pp. 41-65; S. 
Oberthuer and H. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol – International Climate Policy for the 21st Century, (Springer: 
Berlin: 1999) – pp. 29-32; C. Gough and S. Shackley,  “The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The 
Epistemic communities and NGOs”, International Affairs, vol. 77, no. 2, 2001 – pp. 331-6; L. Elliott, The 
Global Politics of the Environment – pp. 113-125; J. E. Smith, “The Role of Special Purpose and Non-
Governmental Organisations in the Environmental Crisis”, International Organisation, vol. 26, no.2, 1972, 
Special Issue – International Institutions and the Environmental Crisis, 302-326; D. A. Davies, “The Role of 
the WMO in Environmental Issues”, International Organisation, vol. 26, no.2, 1972, 327-336; R. Gardner, 
“The Role of the UN in Environmental Problems”, International Organisation, Vol. 26, no.2, 1972, 237-254 
824 If no action is taken to curtail GHG emissions, the consequences are likely to come in the form of natural 
disasters or other physical changes to the natural environment; if immediate action to the above effect is 
taken, the consequences that will ensue are likely to be economic, political, and social. 
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were two distinct networks in the process of the development of the norm for controlling 
climate change. One of the networks was made up of actors who believed that climate 
change is a problem that needed to be tackled and the second one propagated against this 
notion. It is necessary to emphasise once again that none of these networks is as closely 
linked as their counterparts in the two previous studies. Secondly, the process of network 
configuration continued even during the stage of dialogue with the conservative actors, i.e., 
the state-level negotiations. The membership of the networks of support evolved 
continuously, making this case-study particularly complex and dynamic.   
The network in favour of the need for political action to control climate change was 
configured during a number of conferences and scientific meetings. Some of these 
conferences were organised under the auspices of the UN – like the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment and the First Meeting of Experts in Villach (Austria) - while others 
were convened by communities of scientists – such as the First International Meeting of 
Scientists in Wijk, Sweden and the First International Conference on Environmental 
Futures in Finland. The initial stages of the configuration of this network took place during 
the 1970s and were confined mainly to scientific circles in the US and Western Europe. 
Scientists were working on GCMs, which were improving over time with the evolution of 
information technology. These scientific communities were functioning within 
meteorological organisations and prestigious universities – the Weather Bureau of the US, 
Princeton University, UCLA, and the UK Meteorological Office.825 Other scientific 
communities were working on assessing the human influence on the environment. The 
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment was established in 1969 to provide 
expertise and scientific advice to nation-states, other scientific communities, and the UN 
                                                 
825 http://www.aip.org/history/sloan/gcm/1955_65.html  
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General Assembly.826 This network of scientists worked closely with other 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations. The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) also conducted influential studies and they became fundamental to the 
UN Conference on Human Environment in 1972 – namely, the Study of Critical 
Environmental Problems (SCEP) and the Study of Man’s Impact on Climate (SMIC).827 
Furthermore, these studies provided the basis for the establishment of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency.828 The agency was to lead the nation’s environmental 
science, research, education and assessment efforts.829 Another national scientific 
community, which later became a prominent international actor, is the Beijer Institute of 
Ecological Economics, established in 1977 under the auspices of the Royal Swedish 
Academy of Sciences to study issues of energy and development.830 These scientific 
communities were initially doing work at the national level, addressing domestic issues and 
influencing national governments. It took time for them to develop international 
connections and to aim to influence policies at the international level.  
A number of environmental NGOs were created in the late 1960s and early 1970s – 
Friends of the Earth was established in 1969,831 Greenpeace was launched in 1971,832 Earth 
First! was created in 1979.833 These NGOs used direct action and spectacular campaigns to 
get their ideas through to policy-makers and engage public opinion. However, their efforts 
were dispersed on different environmental issues, and since these were not coordinated, the 
                                                 
826 http://www.icsu-scope.org/  
827 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Man’s Impact of the Global Environment – Report of the Study of 
Critical Environmental Problems, (MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1970); Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Inadvertent Climate Modification – Report of the Study of Man’s Impact on Climate, (MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1971) 
828 M. Gemmell and J. Lehr, “Ecology’s Ancestry” in J. Lehr (ed.) Rational Readings on Environmental 
Concerns, (John Wiley and Sons: 1992) – pp. 14 
829 http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm  
830 http://www.beijer.kva.se  
831 http://www.foe.org – Friends of the Earth 
832 http://www.greenpeace.org – Greenpeace 
833 http://www.earthfirst.org – Earth First! 
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NGOs were lacking the critical voice and mass that was needed to be persuasive and 
effective in influencing politics. 
During the 1980s there was a significant growth in the number of activists and 
scientific communities campaigning in favour of the curbing of greenhouse emissions. The 
network of activists, although loosely knit, was dynamic and managed to push the climate 
change issue higher on the international agenda. Some green NGOs, especially in the 
developing countries, were consolidating at the regional level – the African NGO Coalition 
was created in Nairobi, 1982;834 the Asia-Pacific Peoples’ Environment Network was 
founded in Malaysia, 1983;835 the Asian Society for Environmental Protection (ASEP) was 
founded in Germany in 1984 to provide a training and resource point for professionals and 
organisations in the region.836 The Climate Action Network was established in 1989 to 
provide a forum, at which NGOs could discuss strategies for action, exchange information 
on climate change and construct policies to be offered to nation-states.837 The organisation 
provided a much-needed forum for the consolidation of critical mass and voice for NGOs, 
because otherwise the actors’ differing objectives and priorities were sending them off in 
different directions, thus dispersing their ability to influence policy-makers. In 1989 a 
number of international lawyers who were concerned with the issue of climate change 
created the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) in 
London, which is a not-for-profit organisation providing advice to governments, inter-
governmental organisations and NGOs.838 The Stockholm Environmental Institute was 
                                                 
834 L. Elliott, The Global Politics of the Environment – pp. 121; 
http://www.interenvironment.org/wd3intl/ingo-a-b.htm - World Directory of Environmental Organisations: 
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established in the same year at the initiative of the Swedish government with the aim of 
developing an international environmental research organisation.839 Although these groups 
communicated, they were not actively involved with each other. Their work was mainly 
concentrated on influencing governments, or on assisting them with expertise and scientific 
knowledge during international negotiations. The actors in this coalition were acting out a 
logic of truth-seeking in a context of appropriateness. They were seeking answers to 
complicated questions, without having an agenda of economic or political interests to 
follow. In other words, the science created by this network is more likely to be objective 
than the science constructed by the second normative network, which is discussed below. 
The second major normative network argued that global warming was not a 
problem. Instead, they claimed, these were only natural fluctuations of climate. It was made 
up primarily of the industries (and later nation-states) that produced or relied heavily on 
fossil fuels. The non-governmental organisations associated with the above actors are often 
called ‘grey NGOs’ and were coordinated by the International Chamber of Commerce.840 
These organisations – both companies and NGOs – outlined the impact that any change of 
policy with respect to global warming will have on the international economy, which is still 
largely dependent on the burning of fossil fuels for energy. They based their arguments on 
the lack of scientific certainty about the causality between human activity and increased 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, about the effects of global warming on the 
environment and finally about what action would be appropriate to avoid catastrophic 
consequences. According to economists, the price of these uncertainties is too high, 
because, while little is known about the way in which nature will react, quite a lot is known 
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about the price of adjustment and/or abatement costs and their effect on the economy.841 
Companies were using their financial might and political clout to influence domestic 
politics by creating the Global Climate Coalition (GCC).842 The GCC hired professionals to 
lobby the governments of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
the United States.843 This network used the usual tactics of persuasion – lobbying, 
knowledge construction, data and research collection. The coalition was made up of 
different actors that were led in their actions by a logic of consequences and used the logic 
of rhetorical action to direct where possible policies in a way that they considered 
beneficial to their own interests. The scientists employed by the GCC, united by their 
relations to the fossil fuel industry produced sceptical reports about the findings of main-
stream scientists. For purposes of clarity, I will designate these ‘politicised’ scientists to 
differentiate them from the scientists who were engaged with research without an economic 
agenda. 
The interests of the two normative coalitions collided irreconcilably and the 
agencies of the United Nations provided a forum for debates, while keeping its work 
focused on the most practical solution to the problem of climate change. The agencies of 
the United Nations became heavily involved with the issue of climate change and 
greenhouse emissions. The World Meteorological Organisation was one of the most active 
participants in the formulation of the norm to protect the atmosphere. WMO undertook, 
coordinated and summarised research into climate change,844 and helped to create 
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international standards for measuring and recording various aspects of the world’s 
climate.845 The First World Climate Conference was held under the auspices of the WMO 
in February 1979. The organisation became a focal point for early climatic research and 
was particularly useful in indicating the interconnectedness of our natural environment, due 
to its involvement in projects related to the atmosphere, the oceans, and other water 
resources.846 The WMO has been very active in giving policy advice to fellow UN 
agencies, as well as to nation-states. It provided an international framework for cooperation 
on the complex issues of climate change. The WMO was rather useful in the international 
negotiations because it combined expertise with its status of an IGO agency, thus increasing 
its political clout and trustworthiness. Moreover, the organisation per se has no vested 
interests in the issue apart from the furthering of knowledge about the atmosphere and 
climate, and the protection of people from extreme weather conditions.   
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was created as a result of 
the recommendations of the UNCHE Conference in 1972. The United Nations General 
Assembly “convinced of the need for prompt and effective implementation by 
Governments and the international community of measures designed to safeguard and 
enhance the environment for the benefit of present and future generations” established the 
United Nations Environmental Programme.847 UNEP became an important hub for 
scientific communities and expert organisations, as it dealt with a large array of 
environmental issues. Together with the World Climate Organisation, the UNEP helped set 
up the International Panel on Climate Change in 1988.848 The IPCC was established to 
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assist the achievement of scientific consensus on the climate change issue by combining 
various aspects of existing knowledge – economic, political, environmental, and social.849  
Although many actors became involved in the climate change campaign and the 
actors already involved were interested in projecting their influence to the realm of 
international politics, this network of normative support remained highly decentralised. 
Moreover, this large, diverse and relatively disconnected group of social movements was 
often torn by conflicts and disagreements between Northern and Southern NGOs, between 
mainstream and politicised scientists, over different priorities, conflicting objectives and 
strategies, resulting in its powerlessness. According to Mark Valentine from the US 
Citizen’s Network, NGOs “barely scratched the surface of official documents [at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992]”, while Larry Williams of the 
Sierra Club admitted that “[NGOs] had almost no impact” at these negotiations.850 
Scientific communities were more successful in influencing the agenda and the direction of 
the negotiations, but analysts have concluded that the heart of the problem of climate 
change is deeply political in nature and so would be the solutions to it.851 
 
Issue Formation 
The issue of climate change was not problematised until the middle of the 20th 
century. Although scientific hypotheses about an enhanced greenhouse effect existed, 
scientists believed that global warming was a positive and welcome change, which would 
improve the ability of humanity to produce food and would increase the chances for 
development of those in more deprived regions of the world. As apocalyptic scenarios 
                                                 
849 Ibid. 
850 L. Elliott, The Global Politics of the Environment – pp. 123 
851 S. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming – pp. 174; L. Susskind,  Environmental Diplomacy – 
Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, (Oxford University Press: New York: 1994) – 63-66. 
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began filtering through the public media in the 1960s and the 1970s, scientific research had 
already been undertaken to try to establish whether the nature of the changes in our 
environment is positive or not, what the causes of these changes are and what effects can be 
foreseen. The results of these studies were inconclusive every time. Scientists were 
tentative in their hypotheses and emphasised the need for further research into the causal 
links of the global warming problem. The campaign for the creation of a norm to control 
climate change was different from the two cases considered in the previous chapters, in that 
it was not a focused committed campaign to achieve a particular goal, but rather a 
collection of normative campaigns related by the common theme of the effects of climate 
change. This characteristic is reflected in the issue formulation process, which is 
decentralised and where the separate campaigning normative networks construct different 
parts of the future norm.  
Constructing an issue to be put forward to policy-makers who, in turn, are expected 
to create an international norm to govern it is, ultimately a political process. The 
problematic issue needs to be constructed in a way that will attract and sustain the interest 
of policy-makers and that justifies political attention, and this can be very difficult at times. 
The process of issue formation requires information and data gathering, research and 
analysis, sensitivity to the overall normative context of the times and the sympathy of 
public opinion. The final decision on whether a norm will be created or not lies ultimately 
with policy-makers, which means that national interests and national priorities will play a 
role. 
The issue of climate change is highly complex, affecting many aspects of human 
activity, development and international justice. Different aspects of climate change were 
formulated by different actors who took interest at different moments in time. The problem 
was not really compounded into one single issue until the 1990s. The Toronto Conference 
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of 1988 brought the issue of global warming onto the international agenda, the 1989 G-7 
meeting in Paris also addressed environmental issues, and the UN set up the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to negotiate the framework convention on 
climate change in 1990, thus embedding the issue in the international political agenda.852 At 
the first meeting of the INC held in December 1990, the Executive Director of UNEP said 
that “the mounting evidence of global warming and climate change gave urgency to the 
present negotiations”.853 The first report of the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), published in 1990, emphasised the existence of broad scientific consensus that the 
“possibility of global warming had to be taken seriously”.854 Moreover, the overall political 
climate following the end of the Cold War was favourable for international cooperation, 
economic integration and multilateral institutionalisation of world politics.855 The UN 
Conference on Environment and Development scheduled for 1992 attracted the attention of 
the activists of civil society as a forum where they could present their issues to policy-
makers, which further assisted in consolidating the problem of climate change in its entire 
complexity. 
 There are a number of different aspects to climate change. One relates to the natural 
environment and biodiversity. A second aspect concerns issues of human wellbeing, equity, 
justice, development and sustainability (these two aspects are largely normative and dealt 
with by social movements, NGOs, advocacy groups, and some scientific communities). A 
third aspect is economic and deals with the impact of climate change on the economy and 
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different industries. The fourth aspect is the scientific, relating to the causes and effects of 
climate change (the latter two aspects are primarily technical and have been studied by 
epistemic communities and economists). This is a simplified picture of the scope of the 
climate change issue, but it is comprehensive enough to provide a good understanding of 
the dynamics and relationships of the various aspects and social groups that took part in the 
formulation of this problem.  
The problem of climate change was formulated from the vantage point of the four 
thematic layers discussed above. Climate change emerged as a technical issue during the 
International Geophysical Year (1957-58),856 when laboratories were established to begin 
measuring CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Studies of the human impact on the 
environment were commissioned and scientific activity was underway to develop 
knowledge that would improve the understanding of the complex issue of climate change. 
The 1960s were the decade when the underlying construction that climate is inherently 
stable and that any fluctuations are natural and short-lived was altered.857 Changes in the 
basic understanding about the nature of climate continued to take place during the 1970s as 
well. Following a series of natural disasters and unusual weather conditions, scientists 
concluded that the climate system is based on a fragile equilibrium that can easily be upset, 
with catastrophic consequences.858 Moreover, a report published in the United States, 
entitled Limits to Growth, suggested that continued economic growth would have 
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devastating environmental consequences.859 This perception of a zero-sum game between 
economic growth and stable environment was prevalent for a decade and a half and has left 
a serious mark on the social perceptions and expectations about the link between human 
economic activity and global warming. 
The research in the 1960s and 1970s was primarily conducted at the domestic level 
with the greatest role being played by US scientific communities.860 Developments that 
were brought about by these domestic communities were slow and had trouble reaching 
policy-makers. Although the oil crisis from 1973-4 empowered to some degree the 
advocates of green energy, the fossil fuel industrial lobby was much more powerful within 
the United States, which hindered the ability of the mainstream scientific communities to 
influence the US government.861 National scientific communities were unable to formulate 
the problem of the enhanced greenhouse effect on their own and had to seek critical mass 
and voice in uniting with other such communities across national borders. 
The United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE), held in Sweden 
in 1972 was an important landmark for the construction of the problem of global warming. 
This conference, although poorly attended by government representatives,862 was a crucial 
focal point for the normative concerns relating to the impact of human activity on the 
environment and for NGO participation in UN conferences.863 As discussed previously, a 
number of local and regional NGOs were already engaged with issues of biodiversity and 
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the impact of human activity on the natural environment. The UNCHE is famous for 
principle 21, according to which  
States have…the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.864  
 
The creation of a number of international NGOs dealing with environmental issues, such as 
WWF and Greenpeace, in the early 1970s further assisted in establishing environmental 
issues as international problems that go beyond state borders and require concerted 
international effort to alleviate any undesirable consequences.  
The normative concern relating to climate change was not confined to the problems 
of the biosphere and wildlife. Following the end of the era of decolonisation and the 
economic shocks of the Oil Crisis, in 1974 newly-independent countries brought the issue 
of economic development to the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly by calling 
for the creation of a New International Economic Order.865 Economic development and 
international distributive justice became dominant issues on the normative international 
agenda. Within this politico-normative context, research showing that the worst impact of 
possible global warming will be experienced by the poorest regions of the world866 brought 
about demands for unconditional international cooperation, equitable distribution of 
responsibility and improved principles of international justice. These demands were voiced 
by a number of NGOs and environmental institutes, such as the International Institute for 
Environment and Development in London and Buenos Aires; the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development of Canada; the Stockholm Environment Institute of Sweden, 
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etc.867 The predominant number of NGOs are based in industrialised countries and this has 
given rise to controversies between Northern and Southern NGOs, and to criticism that 
Northern NGOs lack sensitivity to the real needs of the developing South.  
The culmination in the formulation of this aspect of the future norm for controlling 
climate change came with the report of the independent World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED), chaired by the Prime Minister of Norway Gro 
Harlem Brundtland Our Common Future, published in 1987.868 This report, also known as 
the Brundtland report, spelled out the norm of sustainable development – our duty to use 
resources in such a way as to not compromise the needs of future generations for 
development.869 The report also called for those more affluent to make sensible use of 
natural resources870 and this hinted at the principle of equitable distribution of 
responsibility. At the state level, the contentious issue of distribution of responsibility later 
turned into a negotiation impasse between North and South.  
Another change of perceptions that was brought about by the Brundtland report 
relates to the conventional wisdom constructed by economists of the 1970s. As previously 
mentioned, there was a wide-spread belief that environmental protection and human 
economic development is a zero sum game. The Brundtland report overturned this belief by 
claiming that protecting the environment does not have to compromise economic 
development and would not necessarily result in economic stagnation.871 The old view, 
however, was so deeply rooted in social constructions that these two opposing beliefs gave 
rise to competing policy recommendations on climate policy, which I will discuss at a later 
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point. 
The most important debate, leading to the formulation of the problem of climate 
change and global warming, was scientific. One aspect of the science of climate change is 
its fundamental uncertainty, which continues to play a role in policy-making and 
institution-building even today. Arrhenius proposed a causal link between human activity 
and increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in 1896. It was not until the 1960s that 
scientists problematised this causal relationship. Scientists joined efforts across national 
borders at a number of international scientific conferences in the early 1970s held in 
Sweden and Finland (Figure 3.1) and, although some scientific publications proposed 
apocalyptic scenarios,872 the overall agreement among scientists was that more research 
was needed. There was no certainty on the question of how the increased GHG 
concentrations would change the Earth’s climate, when, with what intensity and what 
would be the impact of that change in different regions of the world.  
In 1980 one of a series of workshops of climate experts took place in Villach, 
Austria, under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organisation, the United Nations 
Environment Programme and the International Council of Scientific Unions.873 This 
conference of experts reached consensus on some basic scientific understandings and put 
together a list of recommended actions that were passed on to governments.874 The 
conclusions of this workshop warned that “the accumulation of greenhouse gases posed a 
great risk to the earth’s natural equilibrium”.875 The second workshop of this series took 
place in Villach in 1985 and this time scientists began formulating demands for 
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international political action.876 This conference was authoritative in its conclusions, 
because it gathered top scientists from 29 industrialised and developing countries who 
reached some level of consensus on the scientific findings and put together an action plan 
that policy-makers could take into account.877 Discussions among scientists and policy-
makers continued in the same format with further workshops being organised in Villach 
(Oct 1987) and Bellagio (Nov 1987). Scientists examined various possible scenarios of 
climate change and the responses of the natural system to those.878 They also discussed 
possible strategies to deal with the changes, which were divided in two groups – adaptation 
strategies and limitation strategies.879 The former included the calculation of anticipated 
large expenditures that would need to be dedicated to adapting to the effects of climate 
change – adapting infrastructure, coastal defences, fresh water supplies, irrigation systems, 
etc. - while limitation strategies would incur the limiting of GHG emissions, which would 
also involve high costs.880  
Inspired by the work of the scientific conferences of the 1980s, policy-makers and 
mainstream scientists took part in the Toronto Conference of 1988, entitled “The Changing 
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security”. However, this consensus seemed 
premature, policy prescriptions were issued881 but no mechanisms were created to ensure 
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that the ambitious targets would be met, nor were institutions created to monitor 
compliance and provide policy advice and ultimately. None of the recommendations was 
applied. The Toronto Target was based on much enthusiasm and little in-depth 
understanding of the complexity of the issue. The consensus was unstable and unproductive 
because it was not founded upon a solid closure to the scientific debates that made up this 
issue. Many unresolved controversies remained among the actors involved.  
The unusually hot summer that hit the United States in 1988 helped the climate 
change issue climb further up on the international agenda among speculations that scientists 
were wrong in predicting when climate change would take place and that the latter is upon 
humankind already. In June, James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies 
declared before the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee that he was 99% 
certain that the current temperatures experienced that summer were evidence of global 
warming.882 This statement raised public attention in America,883 but for all the wrong 
reasons, because public pressure for the expansion of knowledge was bringing in 
expectations about the underlying causal links between various elements of the natural 
climatic system. These expectations were becoming the foundations of scientific research 
and might have pushed natural sciences in the wrong direction altogether.884  
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The issue of scientific uncertainty penetrates all scientific reports and books on the 
subject and is the basis, some argue, for political inaction. Scientific uncertainty, which was 
further fuelled by ‘politicised’ scientists, was also the underlying principle on which much 
of the arguments of ‘grey’ NGOs and the fossil fuel industry were built. Apart from human-
produced emissions of carbon dioxide, nature has its own sources of CO2 as well as natural 
mechanisms that absorb these gases (CO2 sinks), which balance off the sources. Since 
modern science does not have a clear idea about all sinks and sources, about their capacity 
to emit or reduce CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, it is difficult to predict the level of 
future GHG concentrations.885 Moreover, there are natural negative feedback mechanisms, 
which influence the magnitude, timing and patterns of climate change. Sulphur particles, 
clouds, volcanic dust and water vapour can offset the effects of global warming;886 changes 
in the temperatures of the oceans and the thickness of the polar ice sheets will have an 
impact on the scale and regional distribution of the effects of climate change, including sea-
level rise.887 Another major difficulty in scientific analysis, giving rise to scientific 
uncertainty, is the global nature of this problem, as the natural environment is a very large 
system, which is slow to display both positive and negative changes in its equilibrium.888 
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Scientists still debate the degree to which increasing GHG concentrations are necessarily 
coupled to rising temperatures.889 
These uncertainties influenced the desire of industries to participate in the process 
of alleviating climate change by opposing any meaningful actions that could cut into their 
profits. Corporate actors recruited their own teams of economists and natural scientists to 
construct knowledge that would reflect the downsides of environmental policies based on 
uncertainties. Another approach used by the ‘grey’ NGOs was to couple the issue of 
climate change with that of energy policy. This move was quite effective and slowed down 
the process of policy-making because energy policy is tightly related to issues of national 
security: when it comes to compromising national security, international consensus tends to 
break down.890 Economic analysis of adaptation costs, the cost of the research into new and 
cleaner but unreliable energy sources, the cost of slowed down economic development not 
only in industrialised countries, but in poorer countries too, all managed to sway the 
opinion of policy-makers in their consideration of the possible options.891 Corporate actors 
like the Global Climate Coalition were better equipped to lobby governments at the 
national level because of their experience and connections with government agencies, and 
were thus more effective in getting their message through.  
In 1988, following the Toronto Conference, which marked the beginning of high-
level political debate on climate change, UNEP, WMO and the ICSU created the 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “to assess scientific, technical and 
socio- economic information relevant for the understanding of climate change, its potential 
impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation”.892 The IPCC produced its first scientific 
report in 1990, in time for the United Nations Conference on Economic Development (Rio 
Summit, 1992). The conclusions that were reached in this report represented scientific 
consensus that “the increase in global-mean temperature over the coming century was 
likely to be of the order of 2˚C but might be as much as 4.5˚C… noting that such warming 
was likely to have severe adverse consequences for mankind and recommending that GHG 
emissions should be cut by at least 50%”.893 Global warming as a threat to humankind and 
as a result of human activity was officially confirmed in the Second Assessment Report by 
the IPCC, published in 1995, which stated that “the balance of evidence suggests there is a 
discernable human influence on global climate”.894 In other words, the IPCC downplayed 
the scientific uncertainties that were discussed earlier to create scientific closure on the 
basis of which solid political action could be taken. Thus, the scientific closure reached was 
institutional rather than based on true scientific consensus and the nature of this closure 
would haunt the political negotiations that followed.  
The politicisation of science for the purposes of climate change negotiations tainted 
the perceived objectivity of scientists and made science much more open to criticism for 
siding with some political actors and not with others. The problem of institutional scientific 
closure undermined scientific efforts to gain a better understanding of the nature of the 
problem and the appropriate remedies. In the process of formulating the norm for the 
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prevention of climate change, science lost some of its aura of neutrality and the perception 
that scientists would work for the greater good. This has added confusion and intensity to 
scientific debates and has undermined the foundation of any future political agreement 
related to the norms and instruments of improving our natural environment.  
 
Dialogue with the Conservative Actors 
The problem of climate change cannot be resolved by research alone, because the 
decisions that need to be made with regards to climate change policy are value-laden policy 
decisions.895 Some interests will have to be sacrificed for the greater good; costs will have 
to be borne by businesses or societies, or both; economic development might have to 
change pace and direction. These are issues of distribution and justice and they need to be 
addressed by policy-makers. The global character of the problem of increasing the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere means that the action of one, 
or a number of states, or indeed for that matter, any combination of states short of the 
whole international community promises to be short of effective as “the actions of one 
[state] can be negated if others fail to act”.896 If climate change is even to be slowed down, 
that will only be achieved by concerted action by the majority of states. Although this 
principle has been made very clear by mainstream scientists, it has had very little effect on 
reaching consensus about the mechanism through which this problem needs to be 
addressed.  
Although the positions on the climate change issue are two – in favour and against 
the creation of an effective norm that will curb the increasing amount of GHG emissions – 
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there are a number of groups of states with different priorities and competing demands for 
the provisions of the upcoming agreement. Following the UNEP Governmental Council 
Decision 15/36 of May 1989, preparation began for negotiations of a framework on climate 
change. In February 1991 the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) held its first 
session, establishing two working groups – Working Group I to deal with ‘Commitments’ 
and Working Group II to work on ‘Mechanisms’ for implementing these commitments.897 
The negotiating positions of the participants became clear from the first few sessions of the 
INC. The main division line ran between North and South. Industrialised and developing 
countries are locked into a relationship of economic interdependence, and unequal 
economic power and development prospects. The North has been “keen to emphasise that 
whilst it has contributed most of the problem historically, the future emissions of Southern 
countries will counter the global effectiveness of any action the North takes to offset 
climate change”.898 The problem of global warming is likely to put the South in an even 
more disadvantaged position whatever policy-course the industrialised countries choose to 
take. Adaptation policies would require large amounts of money to be put into defences 
against sea rises, into adapting agricultural technologies to new weather conditions, and 
dealing with an increased number of natural disasters. Limitation policies will require 
investments in new cleaner technologies, and in training specialists how to use them, which 
will make economic development even harder to achieve. A secondary dividing line among 
states involved in these negotiations was between the producers and consumers of fossil 
fuels, where the former were doing their best to slow negotiations down, while the latter 
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were keen to create effective principles to control climate change and were ready to explore 
the production of greener energy.  
Outlining the conservative actors in these negotiations is an awkward task because 
of the nuanced negotiations relating to such a complex and dynamic problem as climate 
change. States disagreed on different aspects of these negotiations, which produced unusual 
alliances. The OPEC group, for example, was opposed to the whole process of regulating 
GHG emissions and the very norm of controlling climate change. At the other spectrum of 
the negotiations was the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which was in favour of 
the new norm and on its timely operationalisation, as some of these islands are in danger of 
disappearing should sea levels rise. The US, Canada, Australia and Japan did not oppose 
the creation of a new norm, but were against extensive responsibilities to control GHGs, 
which could harm their industries, while the EU was in favour of the new norm and new 
responsibilities, as long as the provisions of the norm were effective. The developing 
countries – ranging from LDCs to the Newly Industrialised Countries - were in favour of a 
new norm, but against any binding obligations that might slow down their development. I 
will examine the positions of these coalitions in more detail, before moving on to discuss 
the dynamics of the negotiating process.  
The most active group of states in favour of concerted action to control climate 
change is the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) for which the issue of reversing 
and/or preventing global warming is an issue of life and death.899 Many of these states will 
be submerged under water if sea levels rise even a few meters. Their vulnerability has made 
them virulent supporters of concerted international political action and they have utilised 
the alliance of international NGOs and legal professionals (FIELD) who provided them 
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with useful scientific and professional advice and cooperated closely on negotiating 
positions and the drafting of resolutions.900 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) stands for the exact 
opposite principles to those advocated by AOSIS. Although the OPEC countries are 
members of the G-77, their position is determined by their heightened dependence on oil 
revenues: should the latter seize or be cut significantly, these countries’ economies will 
suffer very much. Their position in negotiations has been to question the need for strong 
action and to emphasise the economic cost of scientific uncertainties.901 This group of states 
has also made use of the scientific and policy-proposals from groups of scientists and other 
professional organisations, who have been looking to lobby sympathetic states.902  
Another Southern coalition is the one emerging among China, Brazil, India and 
other newly industrialising countries.903 These countries are united in their ambitions for 
improved economic growth. They have demanded that their responsibilities under climate 
change conventions be postponed in time, so that their opportunities to achieve higher 
levels of economic development are not sacrificed. This coalition has been defending such 
principles of international customary law as equitable distribution of responsibilities for 
                                                 
900 David Runnalls, “The International Politics of Climate Change” in J.Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, J. 
Painuly (eds.) Climate Change and North-South Cooperation – Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint 
Implementation – pp. 36; F. Yamin and J. Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime – A Guide to 
Rules, Institutions and Procedures, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2004) – pp. 37-9;  
http://www.field.org.uk/climate_1.php  
901 F. Yamin and J. Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime – pp. 40-1; David Runnalls, “The 
International Politics of Climate Change” in J.Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, J. Painuly (eds.) Climate 
Change and North-South Cooperation – Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint Implementation – pp. 37; P. 
Newell, Climate for Change – Non-state Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse, (Cambridge 
University Press; Cambridge: 2000) – pp. 13 
902 The OPEC countries were regularly briefed by business lobbyists from the Global Climate Coalition and 
the Climate Council – S. Oberthuer and H. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol – International Climate Policy for the 21st 
Century, (Springer: Berlin: 1999) – pp. 45; B. Arts and J. Cozijnsen, “Between ‘curbing the trends’ and 
‘business-as-usual’: NGOs in international climate change policies” in E. Ierland, J. Gupta, M. Kok (eds.) 
Issues in International Climate Policy, - pp. 248;G. Porter and J. Brown, Global Environmental Politics, - pp. 
62-4 
903 P. Newell, Climate for Change – Non-state Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse, – pp. 17 
 276
environmental degradation, the polluter should pay and the principle that states should 
ensure that they cause no harm to other states.904 Their focus has been not so much on the 
environment but more on issues of justice, development and pragmatic solutions that are 
suited to both their needs and economic capabilities.905 India, China and Brazil have been 
particularly vocal in these negotiations and have stood their ground against the pressure 
from OECD countries to commit to targets that even industrialised countries avoid.906 
The remaining G-77 countries are mainly LDCs and they have been primarily active 
at the national and regional level, partly due to limited resources and partly to the specific 
character of the problems that they were facing – drought, desertification and floods.907 
Their main contribution to the debate has been confined to developmental issues and 
searching for financial assistance for any commitments required under the new 
international environmental roles..908 
Consensus has been lacking among industrialised countries as well. The European 
Union took the role of a normative entrepreneur, but could not always find a single voice – 
with the Scandinavian countries being very enthusiastic and proactive, while Southern 
Europe tried to pull away from strict guidelines and specific policies.909 The United States 
also opposed concrete targets and timetables,910 basing its arguments mainly on the lack of 
solid scientific consensus on the issue. The US has been a rogue state in these negotiations 
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and continues to play this role today by not joining the responsibilities set by the Kyoto 
Protocol. The economic position of America, combined with its high dependence on 
burning fossil fuels,911 goes some way towards explaining the practical aspect of this 
opposition.  
The positions of these coalitions clashed at meetings of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC)912 in the lead up to the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, 1992. The INC was charged 
with the task of drawing up a convention on climate change that would be signed by 
political leaders at the Rio Summit.913 One might wonder why coalitions of nation-states 
whose interests clash and are in some cases completely irreconcilable demanded a climate 
change convention when consensus seemed completely out of sight. The reason for that 
was the realisation that if any political action is to have practical effects at slowing down or 
reversing climate change it would have to be based on broad international cooperation.914 
Negotiations on the climate change convention started in the first INC meeting in 
February 1991.915 The task of bridging the differences among the coalitions listed above 
and of finding a solution among the noise of scientific theories and expert opinions was 
daunting to say the least. The problems of climate change, GHG emissions, the causal 
relationships between the latter, are highly political and politicised, going far beyond 
science, objectivity and neutrality. The United States were the strongest dissenting voice in 
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Formulating a Convention, (The Royal Institute of International Affairs: London: 1990) – pp. 5 
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914 W. Nitze, The Greenhouse Effect: Formulating a Convention – pp. 9 
915 C. Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds.) Negotiating Climate 
Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention – pp.131 
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these negotiations and the hardest bargain maker. They entered the negotiations resolved to 
avoid being ‘trapped’ in any explicit commitments like deadlines and specific reduction 
targets,916 as well as to include developing countries in the international response to climate 
change, even if in a limited manner.917 The developing countries, on the other hand, were 
resolved to stick to their position that the developed countries were responsible for the CO2 
problems and refused to undertake specific commitments.918 The available records from the 
meetings of the INC, however, are not verbatim records of the discussions that took place 
and rarely mention the positions of particular states.919 Reliable information about state 
positions can be found in publications by individuals who have participated or observed 
these negotiations.  
During the INC meetings, consensus was slow to develop and the European Union 
was at the forefront of the effort to foster cooperation. The Union made the first move to 
bridge differences with Japan and later with Canada, Australia and other OECD 
countries.920 The G-77 members were also negotiating a unified position around issues of 
poverty, economic development, and countering the power of the OECD coalition.921 The 
US position was proving difficult to negotiate around and its interests were closest to those 
                                                 
916 The US delegation explained this position as a desire to afford “flexibility in nations’ choices of their own 
measures” - C. Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds.) Negotiating 
Climate Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention – pp.134-5 
917 D. Runnalls, “The International Politics of Climate Change” in J. Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, J. 
Painuly (eds.) Climate Change and North-South Cooperation – Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint 
Implementation – pp. 28-30 
918 Ibid. – pp. 27; C. Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds.) 
Negotiating Climate Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention – pp.135 
919 See Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate 
Change on the work of its first session, Washington D.C., 4-11Feb 1991, UNGA Doc No A/AC.237/6; Report 
of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the 
work of its second session, Geneva, 19-28 Jun 1991, UNGA Doc No A/AC.237/9; Report of the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of 
its third session, Nairobi, 9-20 Sept 1991, UNGA Doc No A/AC.237/12 
920 C. Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds.) Negotiating Climate 
Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention – pp.136-7 
921 Yamin, F. and J. Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime – A Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
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of the OPEC countries. Differences had to be narrowed within this triangle of world 
political power. The only possible way was to water down the provisions of the future 
climate convention. Some observers argue that there was pressure of expectations on the 
national delegations at the INC meetings to come up with an agreed text of a climate 
convention for the Rio Summit, because 105 Heads of State were going to attend and the 
meeting had to be a success.922  
 
Political Closure 
After long hours of negotiations and hard bargaining prior to the Rio Summit, the 
resulting proposal for a climate change convention was ambiguous, set no specific targets 
for emission cut-backs, avoided shifting the responsibility to developing states923 and 
established the Conference of Parties to negotiate, review and implement further particulars 
of what specific actions will be taken and when.924 The Framework Climate Change 
Convention (FCCC) was signed at the Rio Conference in 1992 and entered into force in 
1994. The signing of this convention constitutes political closure on the problem of climate 
change. It is unusual that states agreed in such a short period of time to create a framework 
convention with such far-reaching consequences,925 but it is not surprising why consensus 
was easily reached. The FCCC “established a non-binding goal and policy framework for 
the industrialised countries to pursue various voluntary measures to limit their emissions of 
                                                 
922 D. Runnalls (1997) “The International Politics of Climate Change” in J. Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, 
J. Painuly (eds.) Climate Change and North-South Cooperation – Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint 
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923 C. Dasgupta (1994) “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds.) Negotiating 
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924 L. Elliot (2004) The Global Politics of the Environment – pp. 85 
925 I. Mintzer and J. Leonard, (eds.) Negotiating Climate Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, - 
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greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000”.926 Even though the Convention was 
based on limited consensus among the negotiating partners, resulting in hardly any practical 
change, it still reflected an agreement that greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and 
global warming were interconnected, problematic issues that needed to be addressed at the 
international level. One clear sign that political closure has taken place is an observation 
made by Lanchberry and Victor. According to these authors, “science has not been very 
relevant in the post-Rio negotiations. Most of the issues facing negotiators are either not 
scientific or are only very narrowly so”,927 which signifies that the debate over whether 
climate change is a problem is closed. The UNFCCC also recognised that the framework 
convention reached some kind of political closure and classified this as “a major 
accomplishment”.928 The Secretariat of the UNFCCC argued that “recognising that there is 
a problem… was no small thing [in 1994]”, especially in view of the fact that it is very 
difficult to get states to agree on and adopt a common approach to anything in world 
politics, especially if it is a complicated issue with unforeseen consequences.929  
The political closure that was reached on climate change remains unstable due to 
the continuing scientific uncertainty over the causal relationships between human activity, 
GHG concentrations, and global warming. This is demonstrated by continuing negotiations 
and debates on these problems post-Rio, post-Kyoto and up to the present day. However, 
what this tentative political closure indicates is that the place of the issue of controlling 
climate change has been secured on the political agenda and its technical and normative 
                                                 
926 W. Morrisey, Global climate Change: A Survey of Scientific Research and Policy Reports, CRS Report for 
Congress: 2000. Available from: http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim-24.cfm - pp. 3 
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928 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat (2005) The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change – Essential Background, available from: 
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parameters agreed on a very basic level, which closed off the debate between the normative 
entrepreneurs and the conservative actors as to whether this issue is a problem at all. Even 
in the face of significant scientific uncertainty, the need for meaningful international action 
has been recognised and accepted. Political negotiations moved on to issues of institutional 
and procedural mechanisms related to climate change.  
 
Legalisation and Operationalisation 
The political closure on the problem of controlling climate change was very 
rudimentary and did not involve any substantial agreement on how to protect the 
atmosphere and reverse global warming. This was partly due to the continuing scientific 
debates on causality and partly to the difficulties that faced the negotiating parties in their 
attempts to find consensus. The dialogue among states continued with the same fervour as 
prior to the FCCC and the positions of these actors did not change much. A deeper level of 
agreement and commitment was needed to produce an effective legal instrument that would 
be accepted by the majority of states.  
The process of legalisation and operationalisation were taking place 
simultaneously. States attempted to reconcile their conflicting views as they were creating 
legal principles with specific enforceable guidelines. The Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which was signed at the Rio Summit (1992) and came into force in 1994, 
was the main legal document began the processes of legalisation and operationalisation. 
Following the FCCC, the climate change debate moved on to practical questions of how 
this norm for the prevention of global climate change would be implemented and 
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operationalised.930 The FCCC established five institutions the Conference of the Parties 
(COP), the Secretariat, two subsidiary bodies to deal with questions of implementation and 
advice on science and technology, and a financial mechanism.931 The Global 
Environmental Facility was established in 1991 to help developing countries fund 
environmental projects,932 its functions were later utilised on an interim basis under the 
FCCC as a financial mechanisms.933 COP became the supreme decision-making body of 
the Climate Change Convention, responsible for the review and implementation of the 
convention provisions.934 Negotiations among states on commitments and mechanisms 
under the FCCC continued in the INC. The developing countries tended to unite in their 
demands for “common but differentiated responsibilities”.935 The countries most concerned 
with the problem of global warming – the AOSIS coalition – submitted a proposal for a 
protocol on climate change in 1995, which was met well by most states, apart from Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait.936 At the end of the 11th meeting of INC and prior to the first 
conference of parties, some states and NGOs were not pleased with the progress made in 
these negotiations, but appreciated the successes in beginning the process of 
operationalising this thorny issue.937 The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties took 
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place in Berlin in 1995.938  
According to Yamin and Depledge, the mere establishment of international 
institutions by states “signals acceptance that the pursuit of a shared goal is better achieved 
through a permanent mechanism to facilitate cooperation”,939 further emphasising that 
some sort of a political closure has been reached. Each of the COP yearly meetings resulted 
in the preparation of a mandate. The Berlin Mandate was mainly organisational and 
administrative in character, emphasising the need for the creation of stronger legal 
documents that would outline adequate commitments to alleviate the human effects on the 
Earth’s atmosphere.940 The Berlin COP meeting established the Ad-Hoc Group on the 
Berlin Mandate (AGBM), which was given the task putting together an authoritative 
document, spelling out legal obligations to the parties of the convention.941  
COP-2 took place in 1996 in Geneva and brought together 1500 delegates and 
observers.942 Three important developments took place at this meeting, which further 
established the direction for the efforts to implement and operationalised this new norm. 
Firstly, the Geneva declaration endorsed the IPCC reports as an authoritative and 
exhaustive scientific appraisal on the issue of climate change and confirmed the 
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 284
conclusions of these reports that continued GHG emissions will “lead to dangerous 
interference with the climate system”.943 Secondly, the declaration encouraged the AGBM 
to intensify the negotiations to create a legally-binding instrument for the adoption of steps 
towards limiting GHG emissions in the atmosphere.944 The third important development 
was the change in the US position on climate change and the instruments that should be 
adopted: the US government agreed on the need for “realistic, verifiable and binding 
medium-term emission target”.945  
The third COP meeting held in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 produced the Kyoto Protocol, 
which was based on the work of the AGBM and was created after long and complex 
negotiations among actors with conflicting interests.946 The Protocol was negotiated in an 
overnight session on the last day of the COP conference in Kyoto947 and although most 
analysts perceived it as a major achievement signifying the creation of practical 
mechanisms for the protection of the Earth’s atmosphere, some declared it as insufficient in 
light of what was needed to avoid future climate change.948  
The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change remained 
unimplemented until 2004 when Russia agreed to sign it and thus achieve the number of 
signatures needed to make the protocol binding.949 The COP meetings after Kyoto 
continued with debates on the problems and solutions to climate change. Even though these 
meetings take place every year, they have not managed to change the attitudes of states, nor 
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have they produced any effective mechanisms to implement the norm to control climate 
change.   
After hurricane Katrina hit the United States in 2005, fresh fears of the impact of 
global warming rekindled the debate. With the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol, 
states in Europe are concerned whether they can meet their obligations under the watchful 
eye of NGOs and scientific communities, which continue to rely on bleak scenarios to 
sustain the public interest on the issue. The United States, however, continues to refuse to 
follow the guidelines set by Kyoto, which it rejected from the very beginning. The freshest 
example of this attitude of the United States was displayed as the US delegation walked out 
of the 11th meeting of the Conference of the Parties held in Montreal (28Nov-9 Dec 
2005).950 Some journalists have argued, however, that President Bush and his 
administration are isolated at home for their climate change policies and that local action is 
taken by more than 140 city mayors to curb GHG emissions.951 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
continue their sustained opposition to the Kyoto targets as well. However, the combined 
opposition of these states has proved insufficient to prevent the process of operationalising 
the Protocol. COP-11 produced one of the most important instruments in the history of 
controlling climate change and that is the ‘rule book’ to operationalise the Kyoto 
Protocol.952 
Conclusions 
This chapter has studied in some detail the development of a norm to control 
climate change by reducing the emission of GHGs in the atmosphere, since they are 
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believed to be capable of upsetting the heat balance of the Earth, leading to change of 
climatic conditions, some with disastrous consequences. The process of creation and 
negotiation of this norm has been unusual, prolonged and extremely complex, reflecting on 
the character of the issue of climate change.  
The information available on this issue is vast. Analysts have studied many aspects 
of the problem, the science, the social concerns, the economic issues, and the politics of 
climate change. The literature on climate change reflects on a complex, diverse and loosely 
knit social network of support for the new norm, which shares concerns about the impact of 
human activity on the atmosphere and the resulting impact on natural weather conditions. 
The issue of climate change as discussed throughout this chapter is ridden with 
uncertainties, continual negotiations of meaning, implications and political discussion of 
consequences. Even today scientists cannot explain with sufficient clarity the exact causal 
links between human activity and GHG concentrations, between the change in GHG 
concentrations and natural climate, and cannot predict how exactly climate will change and 
with what effect. There is a further uncertainty over whether more research will resolve the 
above questions and whether humans are at all in a position to understand the intricate 
balancing mechanisms of nature, which make the physical environment relatively stable 
over time, let alone to try and influence these complex mechanisms.  
There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this detailed historical 
reconstruction of the events leading up to the creation of a norm to control climate change. 
Firstly, the complexity of the issue of atmospheric pollution and climate change, of its 
causes and effects, has resulted in very difficult political negotiations at the international 
level. Nation-states have had different degrees of involvement with this issue and varying 
degrees of responsibility for this problem. These complexities, combined with often 
irreconcilable national interests, have led to states being unable to agree on a meaningful 
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and effective solution to the problem. Since controversies over whether climate is indeed 
changing have not been settled with overwhelming scientific evidence, and because 
national interests make states carefully choose their policy, it has been difficult to identify 
who the conservative states are. Some states are conservative on some issues and 
cooperative on others and vice versa. The climate change negotiations are very densely 
layered and affect different spheres of economic, political and social life, which makes 
them complex for the analysis of the social sciences. Some of the agreements that have 
been reached are not based on genuine consensus, but on bargaining and trade-offs, which 
will ultimately affect the implementation of these agreements.   
Scientific uncertainties have provided further basis for difficulties in reaching 
political closure. Scientific consensus has been undermined by ‘politicised’ scientists who 
have been looking after the interests of the fossil fuel industries. The findings of these 
scientists, however, cannot be dismissed, because of the lack of overwhelming proof that 
one or the other network of scientists is right. Tentative and partial scientific closure has 
provided poor foundations for political closure and causal relationships are continually re-
examined, questioning the basis of closure.  
The former US President Bill Clinton, however, made a powerful assertion at the 
COP meeting in Montreal in December 2005, stating that “there is no longer any serious 
doubt that climate change is real, accelerating and caused by human activity” and that is 
sufficient evidence to demand state action on this problem, even in view of the continued 
scientific uncertainties, regarding some aspects of this issue.953 Scientific uncertainties have 
been the reason for hesitant policy-making, which is not sufficient to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions and is in no position to reverse global warming if such a process is indeed under 
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way. Clashing interests among states and other non-state actors have managed to limit 
agreements to a minimal common denominator, which has been celebrated by some but 
declared thoroughly inefficient by others. It is unclear whether policy-makers will be able 
to reach more meaningful agreements and implement effective mechanisms to tackle the 
issue of climate change. It is also unclear when climate change is likely to manifest itself 
and whether humanity can handle the consequences of it or not. The international resolve 
has not been strong enough to foster meaningful political action and the lack of a feeling of 
impending urgency has been fostering a more lax attitude of states towards this truly global 
problem. The latest COP meeting in Montreal reached what has been celebrated as an 
outstanding political achievement, to extend Kyoto Protocol beyond its initial deadline of 
2012. The United States agreed to hold informal talks, which was a further breakthrough 
after consistent opposition on their side to participate in any such negotiations.954 However, 
even these steps may prove insufficient in the global and far-reaching context of this 
problem. Many NGOs continue to call for a more determined approach to the issue of 
climate change, claiming that the current political agreements reflect too little action, which 
is coming too late and is insufficient in terms of the resources committed to it.  
                                                 
954 “Last minute Climate Deals Reached”, BBC News, 10 December 2005 
 
 289
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
International behavioural norms are created through complex social processes and 
are a product of the interplay between scientific knowledge, political and social power, and 
normative beliefs. Norms are not exogenously given, they are constructed as a result of a 
multitude of negotiations, taking place at different levels of analysis, in which actors with 
conflicting interests and/or demands battle out their differences. Behavioural norms are not 
always ‘good’, i.e., catering for the greater good or the greater number of people; neither 
are they always a product of genuine consensus based on unbiased scientific knowledge. 
International behavioural norms are constructed to respond to specific problems, which are 
either contemporary or are perceived to have far-reaching consequences in the foreseeable 
future. The attention of governments is usually drawn to the need of creating behavioural 
norms by a wide variety of non-state actors, or by pressing national interests.  
Norms emerge out of different circumstances, which inevitably affect the newly 
developing norm and in turn account for the variance in norm strength, norm compliance, 
and other aspects of the norm’s character. What this research has sought to demonstrate is 
that norms have similar patterns of development. A very important part of this pattern of 
norm construction is the moment of political closure that each normative idea has to go 
through before nation-states agree on the need for a new prescription for appropriate 
behaviour. The character of the political closure, which establishes the need for the creation 
of a new norm together with the basic parameters of this norm, is likely to influence the 
level of implementation and norm-compliance by states and non-state actors. The concept 
of closure, borrowed from the sociologists of scientific knowledge, is particularly useful in 
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understanding the dynamics of norm development and is an interesting social moment, 
which demands further research. 
If norms are socially constructed and emerge in a relatively defined logical 
sequence, then a number of questions arise. What is the right mix of scientific knowledge, 
political power and normative beliefs that leads to successful norm creation? What 
circumstances favour the development of new norms? What factors induce change in social 
perceptions? How is consensus built among actors of different calibre, different social roles 
and diverse aims and not necessarily harmonious interests? Who are the actors best 
positioned to attract the attention and support of policy-makers for the creation of new 
norms? The goal of this research has been to seek answers to these questions, as these 
would shed further light on our understanding of global governance and the everyday 
conduct of international politics, as well as the role and the type of power that various 
actors wield in the international system.  
These conclusions are organised around two questions central to this research. The 
first one being - how we theorise normative change; and the second one – how norm 
development and normative change actually take place in the context of world politics. This 
research has taken an innovative approach to theorising norm development by bridging two 
literatures that have not been communicating meaningfully so far – the sociology of 
scientific knowledge and the social constructivists in international relations. These two 
theoretical approaches have much in common, as both examine social processes in which 
perceptions, shared knowledge and ideas play important roles. Building on both the 
theoretical and empirical findings of these approaches, I propose a synthetic model of norm 
development, which is built on previous models that have not been as exhaustive and as 
comprehensive in their attempt to understand the causal relationships between the separate 
stages in the process of norm creation. I have further sought to reconstruct the events 
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leading up to the creation of three contemporary international norms in three separate fields 
of world policy-making. The historical reconstruction in this research has relied on primary 
documents, first-hand accounts of participants and negotiators, analysts both of state and 
non-state behaviour, media reporters, and conference documents, producing a 
comprehensive historical account of events that combines the viewpoints of state and non-
state actors alike. By reconstructing the sequence of events, I continuously analysed how 
these compare to the proposed model, which produced interesting empirical and theoretical 
conclusions.  
Theorising Normative Change 
Combining the findings of conventional constructivists of international relations and 
the sociologists of scientific knowledge has proven rather useful, as both have produced 
detailed studies of how changes in social constructions take place and of what processes 
lead up to these changes. Both approaches have drawn attention to power relationships that 
influence the process of creating social norms and scientific facts and to the tools that 
actors use - persuasion, argumentation, coercion, knowledge creation – in their work 
towards shaping social perceptions.   
Constructivists have studied the influence that norms have on state behaviour; they 
have also asked why states comply with international norms, how international norms 
affect state behaviour, and have tried to explain how specific norms have evolved and have 
been internalised. Another aspect of state behaviour that constructivists have analysed has 
to do with the way in which norms shape state action and influence state decision-making. 
A further constructivist contribution to IR theorising is the study of how various actors 
bring about change in the social environment and what processes of advocacy, persuasion 
or coercion take place before a norm is created.  
The sociologists of scientific knowledge, on the other hand, have argued that 
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science and scientific knowledge are both socially constructed, in a way that reflects 
hierarchical power networks and vested interests. SSK theorists have studied in great detail 
the social processes leading up to the closure of scientific debates and have drawn attention 
to this complex social phenomenon.  
I have sought to analyse both the theoretical proposals and the various case-studies 
presented by constructivists and synthesise a more comprehensive and flexible theoretical 
model of norm development, based on repetitive social processes apparent from already 
existing studies. The synthetic theoretical model proposed in Chapter 1 offers to create a 
bridge between studies of norm-compliance and studies of norm creation by showing in 
some detail how the process of norm development influences the future behavioural norm 
and possibly the levels of compliance with this norm in the future. The current research 
analyses repetitive practices, the influence of social, political, and economic context, the 
power and methods of argument and persuasion that influence norm construction and 
make-up this complex, multi-layered, social process.  
The theoretical model of norm development, proposed at the outset of this research, 
was based on the hypothesis that international norms are constituted by technical 
knowledge and normative beliefs. This hypothesis has held true across all case-studies and 
is an important contribution to the understanding of how norms evolve. When a campaign 
for the creation of a new norm is initiated, actors need to show that there is a good enough 
reason for the creation of a norm and that is usually done through demonstrating that there 
is a need to fix a problem or correct some form of an injustice. The campaign then proceeds 
to demonstrate in what is considered ‘clear and reliable terms’ (preferably by means of 
scientific knowledge) what the causes of the problem are and how the effects need to be 
remedied. Scientific knowledge is used to explain causal relationships, while normative 
beliefs justify the need for states to create a new behavioural norm. This view of norms as 
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constituted by technical knowledge and normative ideas is a departure from mainstream 
constructivist thought, which has tended to divide norms according to their character – as 
discussed in Chapter 2, where the work of Keck and Sikkink and Audie Klotz was 
examined.955  
This research is centred around the synthetic theoretical model of norm 
development, which is based on a combination of existing constructivist theoretical and 
empirical studies and the research of the sociologists of scientific knowledge. The model 
consists of seven main stages of evolution which have a causal character, meaning that the 
completion of one stage, leads to the next. After conducting the research on the three case-
studies presented above, it has become apparent that the evolution of some norms may go 
through some of the same stages more than once, until an agreement is reached between the 
pro-active and conservative actors.  
The first stage of norm development is the formulation of the initial idea to regulate 
behaviour in a particular sphere. Ideas for norms are usually formulated in the context of a 
crisis or an impending calamity. Norms emerge for reasons that are time- and context-
specific. One cannot understand entirely the growth of an initial idea if it is detached from 
the immediate political, economic, and cultural environment. As argued previously, norms 
are not created as part of an overarching process of ‘civilising’ world society; instead, they 
are constructed to respond to a particular concern or crisis.  
The formulation of the initial idea is closely followed by stages two and three of the 
synthetic model – network configuration and issue formulation. These two processes 
                                                 
955 See M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations. 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1998) – pp. 30; Sikkink briefly introduces this idea in an earlier article – K. 
Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America”, International 
Organisation. Vol. 47, no. 3, 1993 – pp. 412; and A. Klotz, “Transnational Activism and Global 
Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences” European Journal of International 
Relations. Vol. 8, no. 1, 2002 – pp. 52 
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usually take place simultaneously but have been artificially separated in the model to reflect 
in more detail the dynamics of interaction between the actors involved. Constructivists have 
studied some aspects of these two processes and have hinted on their importance for 
understanding norm construction.956 However, these studies have been largely incomplete, 
not very detailed and based on the differentiation of actors into states, epistemic 
communities, advocacy networks and NGOs. The current research has unpacked and 
studied these processes in more detail in order to understand the bargaining and 
argumentation that takes place. By closely examining the behaviour of various types of 
actors, one can also begins to understand how normative networks are being formed, the 
types of power that non-state actors use, and the ways in which these actors interact.  
A hypothesis stated in the opening chapter of this research that different actors – 
states, scientific communities, NGOs, etc. - come together to form normative networks and 
to take advantage of each other’s strengths and bargaining skills, has been confirmed by all 
three case-studies, which will be discussed in more detail below. Actors have grouped 
together according to their aims. The variance in membership to a norm-entrepreneurial 
network has been related to higher chances of an impact on state policy-making, since the 
differing backgrounds and capabilities of the actors involved allowed them to address both 
issues of normative beliefs and scientific knowledge. Normative entrepreneurs need 
technical and scientific expertise to substantiate their claims of injustices that need to be 
addressed by policy-makers. Scientific experts need normative entrepreneurs to help 
formulate a problem by covering it in a normative cloak. It is the combination of these two 
                                                 
956 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International 
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 295
sides to a proposed norm that has made for successful and productive normative campaigns, 
as will be discussed below. 
In the process of issue formulation actors participating in the normative network 
define the technical and normative scope of the proposed new norm. The scope of the norm 
is usually expressed in a working definition of the new norm. Actors need to define 
relationships of cause and effect that lead to problematic consequences or behaviour. 
Agreement may sometimes take a long time to achieve. Such agreement is signified by 
reaching normative and scientific closures. It is at various conferences and forums, in 
working groups, and at workshops that normative and scientific closures are reached. If 
closures are not reached the development of the norm is not necessarily discontinued, but 
the reaching of political closure is made all the more difficult, as opponents to the emerging 
norm will always try to exploit scientific or normative uncertainties to their advantage – as 
demonstrated in the case of the protection of the atmosphere. The concept of closure is 
borrowed from the sociologists of knowledge here and will be discussed in more detail 
below in relation to political closure. The empirical evidence in this research has shown 
that the process of creating norms is based on a continuum of closures through which the 
debates are moving forward, overcoming controversies that with time help norms evolve 
and reach the point where they are uncontested and their existence seems natural.  
Once the norm entrepreneurs formulate the problem that needs a policy solution, 
they begin seeking ways of putting this problem or normative proposal onto the political 
agenda. There usually are states that are supportive of the development of a new norm, and 
are even actively involved in normative campaigning, as well as states that are either not 
interested at all or actively oppose proposals for a new norm. The task that normative 
networks face is to persuade or coerce the actors who to a larger or lesser degree are in 
favour of keeping the status quo, which I have called ‘conservative actors’. Once again, this 
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stage of norm development has been acknowledged by some constructivists,957 but has not 
been studied in enough detail, and the politics of the dialogue with the conservative actors 
is just too dense to miss out in the overall analysis of the nature and effect of norms. How 
states and non-state actors reach an agreement to create a new norm has been demonstrated 
to affect the new norm – in terms of its strength, the level of compliance, and the way in 
which the norm influences state behaviour in the future.   
The dialogue with the conservative actors on the need to create a new norm 
concludes with reaching the moment of political closure. This moment marks the end of the 
controversy over whether a certain normative principle needs to be constructed and 
endowed with the power to regulate behaviour, i.e. the moment when a new norm becomes 
a part of the normative context within which actors interact. If closure is not reached, a loop 
may open in the model where actors go back to the preparation stages to amend either the 
norm proposed, or their normative campaign. The studies of the sociology of knowledge 
have contributed greatly to our understanding of the moment of closure, which is referred 
to as the ‘tipping point’ of norm development by constructivists in IR.958 However, the 
empirical case-studies in this research have revealed important shortcomings in our 
understanding of closure. One such deficiency is in the available tools of measuring closure 
and in the lack of a mechanism of establishing when closure has been reached. Pinpointing 
the moment of closure is a difficult task in the midst of multilateral political negotiations, 
which often include a number of equally thorny political issues. The causes of closure 
                                                 
957 In their article “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” Finnemore and Sikkink, hint to a 
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Program”. International Organisation. Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992 -pp.375-8 
958 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”. International 
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cannot be isolated with certainty, because in international negotiations it is often the case 
that some states are coerced into accepting a norm, or lured with trade offs in spheres they 
consider of higher importance to their national interests; closure sometimes happens 
unexpectedly under the pressure of deadlines to complete negotiations. Understanding the 
processes that lead up to closure more clearly will help us understand why some 
controversies are resolved, others reopened, and yet others ignored altogether. There is a 
need for further inquiry into the mechanisms of reaching political closure and into the ways 
in which closure can be measured and defined, as this is one of the crucial moments in the 
processes of both norm development and knowledge creation.  
The next two stages of the synthetic model – legalisation and operationalisation – 
do not necessarily take place in relation to every norm. The process of legalisation entails 
the creation of treaties, conventions, covenants, and other written rules of international law, 
referred to as ‘international conventions’ in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, which establishes the sources of international law.959 According to some 
legal scholars, treaties are increasingly beginning to replace customary international law, 
meaning that generally speaking more norms reach the legalisation stage.960 Constructing 
the legal language of the obligations that states agree to undertake is a process of difficult 
negotiations, which is increasingly involving not just states but non-state actors as well, 
both directly and indirectly. Consensus on the limits and legal language of the new norm 
may take a long time to achieve. Negotiations often reach deadlock, as none of the parties 
that present drafts of the new norm are willing to give way to other drafts. It has become 
apparent from the empirical studies in this research that negotiations are often concluded 
                                                 
959 P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised edn, (Routledge, London: 
1997) – pp. 36 
960 Ibid. – pp. 37 
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due to pressing negotiation deadlines, with states signing up to final drafts that come short 
of their initial demands and comprise elements from the various proposed drafts. This is an 
interesting finding that needs to be researched further, as it might have far reaching 
implications for our understanding of how international negotiations are concluded.  
Even though some norms evolve so far as to be legalised, states might need extra 
help to make the legalised norms functional, for example, by creating institutions that 
oversee norm-compliance, or by constructing optional protocols that offer mechanisms to 
verify norm-compliance, etc. The operationalisation of norms is another stage of norm 
development where the work of non-state actors is again focusing on attracting public 
attention and pressuring states into upholding their normative obligations. A specific 
feature of the public campaigns at this point is that they already have a legal basis and it is 
much more likely to shame states into norm compliance. The stage of operationalisation 
provides the link between norm development and norm internalisation. The issue of how 
states adopt norms and why they choose to follow them is closely related to the way in 
which norms have been negotiated and constructed. We cannot understand why states 
comply with norms until we understand why these norms have materialised in the first 
place.  
This synthetic theoretical model, based on the theoretical and empirical research of 
social constructivists in IR and the sociologists of scientific knowledge, was compared to 
three empirical studies. In this research I have historically reconstructed the events leading 
up to the creation of three separate behavioural norms, which have been constructed in the 
relatively recent past. This detailed historical reconstruction has been quite insightful with 
regards to the validity of the theoretical model. Alongside the theoretical findings, I have 
also tried to examine the process of norm development in its dynamic form by comparing 
records of the same process kept by the different actors part-taking in it. This research has 
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resulted in detailed empirical and theoretical examinations of the development of three 
norms from different spheres of the field of international relations- the norm outlawing the 
use of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the norm protecting 
intellectual property in the pharmaceutical industry and the norm for the protection of the 
atmosphere from increasing levels of greenhouse gases. All examples studied here have 
been marked by the strong influence of normative beliefs, which has not necessarily 
resulted in the creation of ‘good’ norms. Technical knowledge has been instrumental in 
pushing forward the normative campaigns, but it has also provided the main source of 
contention in the case of the protection of the earth’s atmosphere.  
 
Normative Change in World Politics 
Initial ideas in world politics, as argued by the theoretical model in this research, are 
constructed as a result either of a crisis or of a feeling of an impending disaster. The 
evidence from all three case-studies has confirmed this hypothesis. The development of 
international norms is neither predetermined, nor natural and often at the beginning of a 
normative campaign, nom entrepreneurs may not be able to predict the scale of the impact 
of their campaign. In the case of the creation of a norm to outlaw torture, the campaign that 
Amnesty International began was aiming at drawing the attention of policy-makers to an 
age-old practice, which as Amnesty demonstrated in a series of reports was taking 
enormous proportions and was in breach of basic human rights. The way, in which the 
campaign for the protection of intellectual property rights began, was also incidental in the 
sense that although the multilateral corporations involved wanted to have worldwide 
protection, they took a gamble by accusing developing state governments of allowing the 
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theft of intellectual property to take place.961 The reason why this campaign was a gamble 
was because developing states were important markets for the corporations and the whole 
matter could have turned against vital corporate interests leading to large scale losses of 
revenues. The campaign to control emissions of greenhouse gases experienced a prolonged 
period of consolidation, as the interest in the protection of the atmosphere fluctuated with 
the incidents of freak weather conditions. One of the catalysts keeping this idea going was 
the continual fear that humans might soon come to pass the point of no return upon which 
damage to the world climate might be permanent.  
All three empirical cases suggest that when the normative idea had gained enough 
momentum, the actors supporting it begin to configure networks of support. Contrary to 
more traditional constructivist beliefs, the process of network configuration draws actors 
from different spheres of social life – global civil society organisations, advocacy networks, 
communities of scientists, professional networks, industries, even some states that are 
sympathetic and supportive of the proposed norm. Evidence of this is available from 
conference records that documented the configuration of the normative network against 
torture,962 from reports and existing literature on the development of the norm protecting 
intellectual property rights,963 reports and conference papers delivered by scientists, green 
energy producers and some interested states in the case of the norm for the protection of the 
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atmosphere.964 It is important to note that actors group together according to their vested 
interests and in the search of not only critical mass, but also expertise and effective access 
to policy-makers. Actors who are interested in the technical language and scientific logic of 
a norm seek others who can add a normative spin to that knowledge, providing evidence in 
favour of another hypothesis of this research – namely, that all norms contain a technical 
and a normative component, prescribing what is appropriate in the normative context of 
society and what is effective, given the laws of science.965 The case of the norm outlawing 
the use of torture illustrates this point where a network of support for the new norm 
comprised the International Commission of Jurists alongside Amnesty International, the 
British Medical Association, the World Council of Churches, the Danish Medical Group, 
and so on. Two important empirical conclusions emerged from this case study – firstly, that 
networks of support can be in a perpetual state of flux as actors were coming to the 
forefront of the campaign when their expertise was needed and taking a back seat when 
questions outside their competence were discussed. Secondly, the different parts of this 
campaign were interlocked, in the sense that findings from the medical and legal field were 
logically connected and provided a solid ground for the technical argument related to the 
norm.  
Technical and normative campaigners are not always on the same side of the debate 
over the need for the creation of a new norm, as was the case with the development of a 
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one-size-fits-all type of norm for the protection of intellectual property. The industry 
network leading the process of norm development created close ties with the governments 
of economically developed states by setting up expert committees and industry-wide 
associations, which supplied expertise to governments on issues of concern. The network 
avoided the attention of the wider public and concentrated on lobbying governments. The 
normative entrepreneurs of the campaign against this norm had to deal with the well-
developed arguments of the economists supporting a blanket norm. Actors attempted to 
engage in debates to reconcile their differences and find plausible solutions, but no 
consensus was reached. If no consensus can be reached, then a norm would either not 
emerge at all, or it will emerge but only addressing the concerns of one side, which in turn 
might lead to that norm being continually challenged by the group whose concerns were not 
addressed. In this particular case, while attempting to operationalise the norm reflecting 
industry sentiments and actively hurting individuals in poorer countries, the continuum of 
norm creation opened a loop – there was a second instance of network configuration for the 
network opposing the blanket norm and demanding a norm more sensitive towards the 
needs of the underprivileged.  
The case study of the campaign for the protection of the atmosphere from 
greenhouse gases presents a different scenario of network configuration where two 
opposing normative networks developed simultaneously. Both of these were loosely 
connected and the normative and scientific partnerships did not work very productively 
together. The contributions of developing scientific knowledge were pulled together by the 
World Meteorological Organisation, which coordinated and summarised research to 
produce some common standards for measuring and recording various aspects of world 
climate fluctuations.  
The process of formulating the problematic issue has been taking place 
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simultaneously with the process of the configuration of the network of support in all three 
cases reconstructed in this research. The aim of this process is, by reaching scientific and 
normative closures, to come to a definition of the nature and scope of the problem and 
propose solutions. Part of the proposed solution is the creation of a new norm, which will 
ameliorate the problematic consequences of certain behaviour. The normative network 
needs to determine the substance and limits of a norm and position it within the appropriate 
context, so as to demonstrate to policy-makers the benefits that it can bring.  
The three case-studies of this research provided further insight into the dynamics of 
the stage of norm development. The campaigners against the use of torture were determined 
not to repeat the mistakes of previous campaigns and to formulate the norm against the use 
of torture in a way that would not provide any room for justification of the use of this 
practice. Normative closure and determination to create the norm was at the heart of the 
normative campaign, the stage of issue formulation was dedicated to the technical 
definition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The 
discoveries of the full extent of the consequences made by medical professionals working 
with torture survivors gave great impetus to the normative campaign, which ran parallel to 
campaigns for the creation of codes of ethics for medical personnel. In the legal field 
various national courts confirmed the existence of a customary principle of law against the 
use of torture. Legal professionals worked towards a tighter definition of torture with a 
more universal reach. The scientific closure was marked by the unified position of non-state 
actors rallying for a new norm on torture.  
The case study of the norm of intellectual property protection outlined the 
importance of an appropriate choice of institutional forum, which best to address the needs 
of the norm entrepreneurs. Formulating the issue of the protection of intellectual property 
rights as a problem of unfair trade practices secured the attention of the US government and 
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the governments of other industrialised countries. The proposed forum for intellectual 
property-related trade grievances was the GATT (and later WTO), an organisation with 
more enforcement mechanisms than the World Intellectual Property Organisation. The 
various industrial associations emphasised the normative character of their campaign – 
fairness and the protection of private property (including ideas and products of the mind) - 
and carefully formulated the technical parameters of their normative proposal in close 
cooperation with the US government.  
Formulating the issue at the heart of a norm for the protection of the atmosphere and 
for the prevention of climate change took place in a number of different forums and over a 
long period of time. The loose character of the normative networks proposing the creation 
of competing norms led to a decentralised process of issue formulation, resulting from the 
work of a number of different campaigns. The construction of new knowledge about the 
relationship between different aspects of climate and human activities was in high demand, 
meaning that scientists were not the only actors engaged in knowledge construction. This 
case-study illustrates most clearly the socially-constructed character of scientific 
knowledge. Some critics claimed that scientific knowledge was produced to respond to 
certain concerns, depriving this knowledge of objectivity and neutrality. The separate 
campaigns on the protection of the environment reached their own normative closures 
regarding biodiversity, the protection of the atmosphere, fairness, the right to development, 
etc. There was no overall scientific closure, however, meaning that scientific uncertainty 
remained a source of opposition throughout the process of norm development. The only 
reason why states came together to discuss climate change and try and work out a solution 
to the problem was the constant pressure from UN agencies – the World Meteorological 
Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme.  
The dialogue with conservative actors is one of the most important stages of norm 
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evolution. This is the stage at which enough political will needs to be generated to create a 
new behavioural norm. All three normative campaigns echoed a common concern – 
namely, that the problematic issues that they addressed ultimately boiled down to questions 
of political will. When normative campaigners reach the stage of dialogue with the 
conservative actors, they have to make their case stand out among all other issues on the 
world political agenda. This is a crucial social moment when policy-makers have to make a 
normative judgement as to whether the problem in front of them requires regulation and the 
creation of a new norm. The empirical findings of this research show that the dialogue with 
conservative actors takes different forms, from the near lack of normative opposition in the 
case of the norm against torture, to the abundance and varying success of opposing groups 
in the case of the norm protecting the earth’s atmosphere.  
The normative dialogue with states unwilling to change the human rights status quo 
began with Amnesty’s petition with more than one million signatures. The proactive states 
that played the role of norm entrepreneurs used persuasion and argumentation at the UN 
General Assembly and in the Third Committee to push forward with the creation of a new 
norm. The conservative states (many non-aligned states led by Chile and Yugoslavia) 
downplayed the seriousness and extent of torture and claimed that their sovereignty would 
suffer if such a norm is created. Normative opposition was difficult due to the nature of the 
problem and due to the fact that no state wanted to openly support the use of torture. The 
overall international normative climate was conducive to the creation of a more structured 
and extensive prohibition on the use of torture. Agreement developed in a functionalist 
manner – starting from agreements to create professional standards of ethics – for 
policemen, doctors, medical personnel, prison officers, etc., all of which incorporated the 
belief that torture is inexcusable, and finished with overall agreement to create a convention 
against torture, inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment or punishment.  
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When proposals for the creation of a one-size-fits-all norm protecting intellectual 
property rights were tabled at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, India and Brazil 
immediately formed a coalition of developing states to oppose the creation of such norm. 
The discussions to put together such a norm, however, were part and parcel of a larger 
framework of trade talks, where the coalition of transnational corporations had the right 
partners on its side – the industrialised states. The normative leader among the negotiating 
states was the US, later supported by the European Union countries, Japan, and Canada. 
The US government signalled how dedicated it is to create this norm by changing domestic 
legislation in such a way as to allow US companies to punish foreign governments for not 
upholding US domestic principles of IPR protection abroad. It was mainly due to coercion, 
linkage bargaining, and trade offs in other spheres of trade that the industrialised countries 
emerged victorious from these negotiations. The leaders of the opposition campaign – India 
and Brazil were both coerced and enticed by US trade policies into agreeing to negotiate 
the TRIPs agreement. 
The most complex case in terms of reconstructing the dialogue with the 
conservative actors was that on the prevention of climate change. There was not a single 
state that was totally dedicated to the creation of this norm. Some states played the role of 
normative leaders – such as the Nordic states of Europe – but they would only agree to the 
new norm if its provisions were constructed to be effective, which of course could not be 
guaranteed. The Southern Member States of the EU, however, were not as keen. US, 
Canada, Australia and Japan did not oppose a new norm, in principle, but were not eager to 
agree to a norm, which imposed extensive responsibilities to control greenhouse gas 
emissions. Some developing countries were concerned with issues of development, social 
justice and responsibility, while others were worried about the consequences that global 
warming might have on their natural environment; for some like the states from the 
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Association of Small Island States, this was a question of survival. The countries members 
of OPEC were understandably concerned for their future income from the production and 
use of oil and other fossil fuels. In other words, the dividing lines of opposition among 
states ran on so many levels, and states brought along so many of their personal demands 
that the resulting agreement for the protection of the environment emerged in a very weak, 
watered down form. The dialogue in this case was based on conflicting scientific reports 
and the agreement reached bore fairly little value. It was only with the help of the UN 
agencies that debates were sustained for long enough so states could agree to take 
legislative action.  
In the successful process of norm development the dialogue with the conservative 
actors completes with reaching political closure. Political closure is an understudied stage 
of normative development and it carries useful information about the strength and 
effectiveness of the emerging norm. The issue of closure was studied in greater detail by 
the sociologists of scientific knowledge, who have conducted extensive research and 
produced an in-depth analysis of different types of closure.966 These observations are 
particularly relevant to the study of the development of norms, as it seems that social norms 
emerge in a similar process to scientific knowledge, and under the influence of similar 
factors. This research applied the concept of closure to the development of behavioural 
norms and has suggested a link between political closure and the strength of the new norm. 
The empirical evidence gathered in relation to the three case-studies shows different 
political dynamics leading on to closures. In the case of the creation of a norm prohibiting 
the use of torture, inhuman, cruel, and degrading treatment or punishment, closure was 
reached fairly quickly at the UN General Assembly, where a UN Resolution was put 
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 308
together requesting the Third Committee, which deals with pressing concerns on human 
rights and social welfare to prepare a draft convention against torture. Things went fairly 
smoothly in the case of the creation of a norm on the protection of intellectual property 
rights too. Once the opposition of India and Brazil was thwarted by a series of coercive 
measures, economic sanctions, and trade-off bargains, the discussions at the Ministerial 
Meeting turned to the technical scope and the wording of a new norm. This is a sign that 
political closure was reached. The closure, however, was not a stable one, as it was neither 
a result of genuine consensus, nor of fair persuasion. Fundamental disagreements remained 
among the negotiating partners and that undermined the prospects of making the norm 
functional.  
Another reason to relate closure to the future stability and effectiveness of an 
emerging role is the empirical evidence from the third detailed case study on the norm for 
the protection of atmosphere. Closure here emerged as a product of circumstances and 
expectations rather than as a result of widespread agreement that action was needed. The 
pressure to come to an agreement among state leaders who had gathered at the INC meeting 
prior to the Rio Summit, some authors argued,967 led to a tentative closure under which 
political leaders undertook responsibility to commit to cutting back on GHG emissions in 
the future. The reason why the Framework Climate Change Convention signalled a political 
closure was because in the words of some commentators on the development of the 
debates, science was no longer relevant in the post-Rio negotiations,968 meaning that the 
process of persuasion and argumentation on the need for a new norm was complete.  
                                                 
967 D. Runnalls (1997) “The International Politics of Climate Change” in J. Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, 
J. Painuly (eds.) Climate Change and North-South Cooperation – Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint 
Implementation – pp.37; C. Dasgupta (1994) “The Climate Change Negotiations” in I. Mintzer and J. Leonard 
(eds.) Negotiating Climate Change – The Inside Story of the Rio Convention – pp. 144-5 
968 J. Lanchbery and D. Victor, “The Role of Science in the Global Climate Negotiations” in Helge Bergesen, 
G. Parmann, and O. Themmessen (eds.) Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on 
Environment and Development 1995 – pp. 37 
 309
These findings have broadly confirmed the hypothesis on the existence of a causal 
link between political closure and norm strength, but what they have also outlined is the 
need for further research in this field and the need to work out a more objective test to show 
when closure has been reached. The relationship between closure and the future of the 
emerging norm needs to be examined in further depth.  
The processes of legalisation and operationalisation have taken the form proposed 
in the theoretical model only in one of the three cases. The development of the norm 
prohibiting the use of torture is the only example of clear-cut legalisation followed by 
attempts at operationalisation. In this case-study non-governmental actors were particularly 
active and involved in close cooperation with national governments in working out the 
technical sides of the new norm. The norm prohibiting the use of torture materialised in the 
Convention Against Torture (1984). Non-state actors, however, did not feel that the 
convention had enough impetus to ensure compliance and the Swiss Committee against 
Torture called for the creation of an optional protocol, containing provisions for prison 
inspections and further instruments for the implementation of the new norm. The Optional 
Protocol was signed in 2002 and has taken further four years to be ratified and enter into 
force.  
Chapter 5 demonstrated that legalisation and operationalisation can take place 
simultaneously and yet manage to have limited success. The success and effectiveness of 
legalisation is partly dependant on the stability of political closure. In the case of the norm 
for the protection of the environment a limited political closure was based on contested 
scientific knowledge, which was supplemented by the lack of desire of states to take 
determined action to deal with this problem. States with conflicting interests continued to 
pull in different directions, resulting in the creation of an increasing number of institutions, 
which were supposed to foster consensus. Consensus, however, was evasive, as the issue of 
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atmosphere protection needed widespread political agreement. It was not until 1997 that 
such consensus emerged in a very watered down form – the Kyoto Protocol, which some 
argue was outdated even at the time of its completion. It took further seven years for the 
required number of states to ratify the protocol, which finally entered into force in 2004. 
This rather disappointing development has been weakened significantly by the sustained 
opposition of the United States, which is one of the main producers of Green House Gases. 
The analysis of the norm for the protection of the atmosphere presented an example of how 
a ‘good norm’ can be badly implemented and rendered almost powerless by political 
considerations.  
The study of the development of the norm for the protection of intellectual property 
seemed as if it provided a clear example of norm development and knowledge creation by 
the overpowering muscle of international corporations working closely with the 
industrialised North. Legalisation advanced in the context of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations under GATT, with the help of informal meetings among small working groups 
made up of experts from interested parties. Even though the power of the developed states 
was by far overwhelming, political and economic might alone proved insufficient to 
complete these negotiations. When negotiations reached impasse across the board at the 
Uruguay Round, the Director General of GATT – Arthur Dunkel – created a historic draft 
(the Dunkel Draft), which summarised the results of negotiations and provided an arbitrated 
resolution on issues undecided by the negotiators. Even though the United States and India 
wanted to revise the draft, only minor changes were adopted. The final agreement of the 
Uruguay Round was the almost unchanged Dunkel Draft, which included an agreement on 
TRIPs. The conclusion of the TRIPs agreement, in other words, was almost entirely 
circumstantial, fostered by the leadership role of the Director General. Political analysts 
have tried to make sense of this unexpected turn of the negotiations, arguing that it was 
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considerations such as the state of the world economy, the expensive nature of the 
negotiations, fears of protectionism, political events, and the emergence of the US as the 
undisputed hegemon of world politics, that influenced the hasty conclusion of the round of 
trade negotiations.  
Following the conclusion of the TRIPs agreement, the United States took 
operationalisation in its own hands by both applying domestic mechanisms to ensure 
compliance (Section 301), and concluding Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT), which 
allowed the US to request developing states’ compliance with principles for the protection 
of intellectual property much earlier than stipulated by the TRIPs agreement. The growing 
concern among welfare- and health-based NGOs, and developing states suffering the 
consequences of US trade sanctions, were at the heart of a normative campaign to oppose 
full implementation of the TRIPs agreement, earlier than planned, and at the cost of public 
health and human lives. This case study provides an example of the creation of a loop 
within the model of norm development. The political closure underlying TRIPs came 
undone when developing states and NGOs began to campaign together for a less rigid 
approach to the protection of intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector.  
The network of normative opposition centred attention around the fact that, for 
centuries, governments had exempted the pharmaceutical industry from the application of 
intellectual property rights regulations, due to concerns for public welfare. Normative 
issues stemming from the application of IPRs brought together a number of NGOs – the 
Consumer Project on Technology, Health Action International, Medicines Sans Frontiers, 
Health GAP Coalition, Oxfam UK, and so on – that campaigned for accessible drugs, for 
more research and development into neglected diseases, and for the establishment of 
practices that would allow the production and trade of generic drugs in the developing 
world. The campaign against the pharmacological giants was sustained and hard-hitting and 
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attracted many experts and academics, who exposed some shortcomings of the economic 
arguments of corporations and presented a strong normative case in favour of more lax 
legislation in the pharmaceutical sphere.  
This normative campaign proceeded in the same sequence as other normative 
campaigns in this research. The developing states had the support of a variety of NGOs and 
some UN agencies – the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Development 
Programme. An extensive number of conferences were held, which aimed at attracting the 
attention and support of the wider public for the revision of the initial norm to protect 
intellectual property rights. A high profile case by pharmaceutical corporations against the 
government of South Africa was dropped, as it was generating negative PR for the 
companies, which signalled that public opinion was successful in exercising pressure in the 
United States and Great Britain. African states were invited to participate in various 
workshops on differential pricing and financing essential drugs, which was another 
important move in this campaign, as African states were practically not included in the 
initial negotiations of the TRIPs.  
It was a chance happening, however, that allowed the above dynamics to produce 
the required change. The anthrax attacks that followed the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre in New York, acted as a catalyst to the changing position of the US government on 
issues of IPR protection in the pharmaceutical industry. The Doha Declaration on Public 
Health (2001) signalled political closure in the debate on the need for special treatment of 
the pharmaceutical industry. The Doha Declaration was aimed at ameliorating the effects of 
TRIPs and also at allowing at least partially the limited production of and trade in generic 
drugs among underdeveloped states. This was a major victory for the normative campaign 
that sought the revision of the TRIPs agreement, which reflected the power and influence 
that NGOs can exert together with developing states in the world system. This campaign is 
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not entirely over, as debates on the implementation of TRIPs are likely to continue in future 
ministerial meetings of the WTO. This case study has provided abundant material for 
research and analysis with regards to the normative issues that question international 
politics today.  
Conclusions 
The theoretical model presented in this research combines the findings of the social 
constructivists of international relations and the sociologists of scientific knowledge. The 
comparison between the hypothesis of the theoretical model and the detailed empirical 
case-studies presented here shows that the model is flexible enough to accommodate 
differences in the dynamics of the emerging norms, while still reflecting the logically 
connected stages of norm evolution. The stages of the theoretical model are broadly 
defined, allowing for much fluctuation and different developments. These stages largely 
manage to describe and to some degree explain how international norms develop. Findings 
from the empirical case-studies reflecting the role of contingencies, chance, the role played 
by individuals in leadership positions, call for a rethinking of the overall perception of 
policy-making, the roles that different actors play in social, political and economic 
interactions and the liaisons that they form in their search for political leverage. It has 
become apparent that political deadlock is often resolved unexpectedly - under the 
influence of external events, under political or public pressure, etc. – which is another issue 
that requires further research. It has also become clear that key individuals in leadership 
positions – Director Generals of Organisations, Chairmen of meetings, and so on - can yield 
much power to keep negotiations going and foster agreement and closure. The individual 
level of analysis, of course, is difficult to accommodate in an overall theory of norm 
evolution, but it is worth remembering the crucial role that individuals can play. As 
outlined on a number of occasions throughout this research, actors form networks of 
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support for various ideas, regardless of their nature. It is not unusual for states to be norm 
entrepreneurs. Since norms are composed of scientific and normative parts, NGOs end up 
working with scientists, various specialists, UN agencies, and sometimes states. In other 
words, normative labels regarding good and bad actors are not relevant and may even 
hinder political analysis. Further studies into political closure, as well as into the 
relationship between closure and norm compliance are essential, as these would bear useful 
answers to the question of why states follow norms and how norms affect state behaviour.    
International behavioural norms are a central element of the analysis of world 
politics today and understanding how they shape behaviour is rooted in understanding how 
they come into existence. States are the actors who validate behavioural norms, meaning 
that states are often part of the problem as well as part of the solution. Keeping this in mind, 
it has been useful to analyse the roles that other actors play in the process of norm 
development. The reconstruction of politics events has provided empirical evidence of 
processes that have often been discounted in the analysis of state behaviour in an 
increasingly legalised world. Understanding the nature of social processes leading to norm 
creation might help state and non-state actors alike to moderate or indeed foster the 
development of better norms, catering for the wellbeing of people around the world.  
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APPENDIX I 
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 
Resolution 2997 Resolution establishing the United Nations Environmental 
Programme, December 1972 
Resolution 3059 Question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, November 1973 
Resolution 3218 Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment adopted 
November 1974 
Resolution 3219 Protection and Human Rights in Chile, November 1974 
Resolution 3452 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, December 1975 
Resolution 3453 Resolution to consider issues of torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and 
imprisonment 
Resolution 34/169 Resolution, containing an Annex, which spelled out the Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
A/RES/32/62 Resolution requesting the Commission on Human Rights to prepare a 
draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, December 1977 
A/RES/39/46 Resolution adopting the Convention Against Torture, December 
1984 
A/RES/43/53 Resolution to further examine issues of the protection of global 
climate for present and future generations of mankind, adopted 
without vote, December 1988 
A/RES/45/212 Resolution establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee on climate change 
A/RES/57/199 Resolution adopting the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture, December 2002  
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